Reconfiguring and Transforming Christianity in a Post-postmodern Paradigm of Theology and the Social Sciences

Park, Jung Chul

Awarding institution:
King's College London

Reconfiguring and Transforming Christianity in a Post-postmodern Paradigm of Theology and the Social Sciences

by

Jung chul Park

A Thesis Submitted to

King's College London

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Theology and Religious Studies

School of Art and Humanities

King's College London

2016

Contents

Abstract

Contrary to the proposition of “secularization theory”, Christianity has neither disappeared, nor retreated into the private realm. Rather, it has transformed itself into new forms with new characteristics, and continues to play a significant role in the public sphere, by engaging in society through new ways, a development that unleashes its potential as a reflexive agent for individuals, society, and the global community.

The objective of this research is to revisit and re-articulate the sustainability and potential, the substantial value of Christianity, by examining the trajectories of a morphological transformation of Christianity in the latest modern world through a new post-secular approach beyond both the discourse of “secularization” and that of “religious resurgence”, and the public presence of Christianity based on the socio-political engagement of Christianity in the public sphere in both empirical and normative aspects; and to reconstruct the substantial meaning of Christianity as a reflexive agent by examining its potential through discussion of how the Christian faith can inspire and impact on the formation of human being in today’s global capitalist society on the one hand, and establishing a foothold to overcome its intrinsic defects as a religion through radical reflection in the post-postmodern paradigm by on the other.

The central argument of the thesis is that neither modern nor postmodern approaches and neither secular nor anti-secular positions are conceptually able to penetrate the ambiguities of the presence of religion in contemporary society. Going for a post-secular and post-postmodern approach does not mean to apply linear thinking. The suggestion is rather to think of a way that does not deny both but tries to think beyond them (“re-modern).

In doing so, this study delves deeper into a sociology of religious meaning in society rather than a sociology of religion, and socio-philosophical theology rather than philosophy of religion.

Acknowledgement

In the process of studying this dissertation, I have received the invaluable advice and constructive criticism of many people in a variety of ways. I would like to express my appreciation and sincere thanks to my supervisor, Professor Markus Vinzent who has supervised and encouraged me to do my work successfully all the time. He has read my thesis with patience and kindness, and also provided me with theological and philosophical insights. Surely, it was impossible to finish this work without his help.

I also give thanks to many friends who have studied with me for a long time. They are Seung-kyu Lee, Bong-do Choi, Yun-tae Kim, Eun-hee Cha, and Yen-yi Lee who I have shared inexhaustible friendship and theological and philosophical insight for a long time.

I am also most grateful to Rev. Terry Jin, Rev. Min Lee, Rev. Jong-kyun Kim, Rev. Sun Chae Whang, Rev. Seon-jong Park, Rev. Min-soo Jo who gave me financial and moral support, encouragement, and prayer. I would also thank many people, especially some members of Jesus Vision Church, and Birmingham Korean Church for their financial and moral support.

Most of all, my warmest thanks goes to my father, Sung-yup Park, who has

passed away during my study, and my mother, Young-soon Lee and my parents-in-law, Myoung-Koo Kim and Ok-ja Song, who have encouraged and supported me without cease. Many thanks are also due to my two brothers, Jung-june Park and Jung-sun Park, who have taken charge of the biggest part of financial support. During my study, they have been my biggest and the most solid supporters. I would finally like to thank my wife, Sook-Mi Kim, and two daughters, Hae-yun and Hae-joon, and a son, Hae-min for their patience and warm support. Without their love and prayer, it would have been impossible for me to complete this thesis.

Tables

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Description of the Study

Contrary to the proposition of "secularization theory",[1] Christianity has not disappeared. Rather, it has transformed itself into new forms with new characteristics, and continues to play a significant role in the public sphere by engaging in society through new ways,[2] a development that unleashes its potential as a reflexive agent for individuals, society, and the global community.[3] The imperative to reflect upon the transformative landscapes of Christianity in today's context is the starting point of this research project. This study will explore the trajectory of the transformation of Christianity through a new approach, and attempt to reconstruct the substantial meaning of Christianity as a reflexive agent by examining its potential on the one hand, and establishing a foothold to overcome its intrinsic defects as a religion on the other. In doing so, this study delves deeper into a sociology of religious meaning in society rather than a sociology of religion, and socio-philosophical

1 Steve Bruce (ed.), *Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992); *God is Dead: Secularization in the West* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Rajeev Bhargava (ed.), *Secularism and Its Critics* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998); See also Hugh McLeod, "Introduction", in Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf (eds.), *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, c1750-2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003).

For almost a century, the classic secularization thesis was the dominant agenda in social scientific disciplines, religious research and history for the understanding of the relationship between religion and society in the modern world. I will deal with this subject in detail in Chapter 2: Two Pivotal Epistemological Paradigm Changes.

2 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Hans Joas, *Faith as an Option: Possible Futures for Christianity*, trans. by Alex Skinner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012).

3 Markus Vinzent, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, Vol. 32. 2 (August 2011): 143–160; Marius C. Felderhof, *Revisiting Christianity: Theological Reflections* (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011); Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

theology rather than philosophy of religion.

In contrast to the expectation expressed both by academia and by the popular press that religion would weaken and dissipate, from the final decades of the twentieth century religion has been revisited and rethought, and now appears before the wider public in wide-ranging guises. Indeed, recent years have seen an increase in the number of theoretical, empirical and normative challenges to the master narrative of the secularization thesis, the assumption that with modernization religion had become both irrelevant to how we live and increasingly privatized, and consequently would cease to exist, or at least become invisible. From the 1980s a wide range of empirical observation, especially from a global comparative perspective,[4] has indicated the opposite of secularization, what can be termed "the return of religion" or "religious revival", and it is also generally agreed that there has been a turning point in terms of the visibility of religion in the public sphere.[5] While sociologists like Steve Bruce and David Voas still insist on "the death of God", pointing to statistical evidence showing a decline in participation in religious institutions,[6]

4 Grace Davie, *Europe: The Exceptional Case: Parameters of Faith in the Modern World* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002); Peter L. Berger (ed.), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999); Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

5 The most salient attempt to untangle the complex of meaning used in sociological discourse is that undertaken by the Spanish-American sociologist of religion José Casanova, *Public Religion in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Hans Joas, "The Future of Christianity", *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 13.1 (Spring, 2011): 74-82

6 Steve Bruce, *God is Dead: Secularization in the West* (Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, 2002); David Voas, "The Continuing Secular Transition", in Detlef Pollack and Daniel V. A. Olson (eds.), *The Role of Religion in Modern*

this secularist theory is being undermined by other sociologists; indeed, the classic secularization thesis is no longer tenable either empirically or normatively. Sociologists such as Peter L. Berger, Zygmunt Bauman and Jürgen Habermas, or more recently, José Casanova, Charles Taylor, and Hans Joas, are pointing toward a new cultural landscape and employing terms such as "post-secular"[7] to describe it. Peter Berger, one of the pioneers of secularization theory, describes this situation with a rueful tone:

> *Certain religious institutions have lost power and influence in many societies, but both old and new religious beliefs and practices have nevertheless continued in the lives of individuals, sometimes taking new institutional forms and sometimes leading to great explosions of religious fervor. Conversely, religiously identified institutions can play social or political roles even when very few people believe or practice the religion that the institutions represent. To say the least, the relation between religion and modernity is rather complicated.* [8]

This latter statement is very suggestive in terms of reflexion on morphological transformation. Similar changes in attitude and attention can be found throughout the world, not least in the European societies that form the heartland of secularization. If these phenomena are in any way indicative of

---

Societies (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 25-48.

7 See Chapter 2.2.

8 Peter L. Berger, "The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview", in Peter L. Berger (ed.), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans,1999), p.3.

where we are temporally, then it is little wonder that there is talk of the "post-secular",[9] and increasing discussion of the new visibility of religion in the public sphere. Indeed, the study of religion, rather than being considered marginal in many humanities faculties, or disregarded in social science, will increasingly be seen as necessary.

In this new context the sociology of religion should be less obsessed with the decline of religion and more attuned to the new forms assumed by all the world religions. These new forms can be found at three levels: 1) in individual mysticism, invisible religion and cults of the individual; 2) in congregational religion, from new religious movements to the global expansion of Pentecostalism and charismatic communities; and 3) in a re-emergence of the world religions as transnational imagined communities, vying with, if not replacing, the nation-state for a prominent role on the global stage.

Meanwhile, from another viewpoint, the events of 11 September 2001, subsequent religious-based political events, and the terror attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011 have driven the new interest in religion to the fore, so that the place of religion in the public realm is once again the subject of lively and urgent debate. There has been increasing academic interest both in an

9 Whatever the wider meaning of that term, the most important concept is a reflexive response to classic secularization thesis. The definition to be used in this thesis will be discussed in Chapter 2.

ostensible religious resurgence and in the very features of secularism itself. Various major conferences or forums on religion are being planned around the world, and newly funded research centres and research projects on "religion and politics" are being launched.[10] Without doubt, religion has returned as a contentious issue in the public sphere.[11] As Craig Calhoun, a prominent American sociologist, indicates, religion encompasses contradictory figures, such as threat or inspiration, enslavement or emancipation, making war or making peace, destruction or revitalization, unreflective conviction or prophetic challenge. He maintains that while the darker aspects of this character cannot easily be absorbed into the public sphere, and should not be, nevertheless, prophetic religion, i.e. righteous indignation against injustice and vital passion to engage critically with existing institutions and dangerous trends, demands and deserves our critical attention.[12]

In this respect, Ulrich Beck stresses that the secular society must become post-secular, i.e. critical and open-minded towards the voices of religion. He argues that:

10 See Chapter 2.2.3.

11 Jürgen Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere", *European Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.14.1 (2006): 1-25; "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society", *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (2008): 17-29. The paper, "Religion in the Public Sphere" was presented at The Holberg Prize Seminar, Bergen, Norway, 30 November, 2005). Available at: http://www.holbergprisen.no/images/materiell/2005_symposium_habermas.pdf#nameddest=habermas;

12 Craig Calhoun, "Afterword: Religion's Many Powers", in Edurado Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen (eds.) The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp.118-133.

> *Permitting religious language to enter the public sphere should be regarded as enrichment, not as an intrusion. Such a change is no less ambitious than the general toleration of secular nihilism by the religions. (…) We need a sociology of the effect of religion on society; to examine the cultural productivity and destructiveness of religious belief, and to capture the power and hold that religion has today.*[13]

As Ulrich Beck correctly points out, the loss of function as a result of differentiation and the trend toward "individualization"[14] does not necessarily imply that religion has lost influence and relevance, either in the political arena and the culture of a society or in individuals' personal conduct. Rather, religion, and for the purposes of this thesis Christianity in particular, transforms in its form and characteristics, re-invents itself, and takes new shape in a changed world, to act in society in new ways.

In order to engage in diagnosis and prognosis about the transformation of religion, we must replace "the secularization theory" with more plausible accounts of the place and role of religion in the public sphere, and of its present and future significance. Furthermore, we need a new theoretical approach to the relationship between religion and its engagement with politics. Finally,

13 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p.156.

14 The concept of "Individualization" is discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. For the more precise and analytical concept of "individualization", as distinct from privatization, see Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), pp.79-84, 93-131; Detlef Pollack and Daniel V.A. Olson (eds.), *The Role of Religion in Modern Societies* (NY and Abingdon: Routledge, 2008).

each one of us has a responsibility to revisit and rethink the core of the disciplines in which we work, in order to accommodate religion and religious issues in our analyses of late modern societies as both central theoretical difficulties and urgent practical considerations. In this respect, my own scholarly interest in the changing religious scene focuses on the morphological transformation of Christianity, including movements emerging outside of institutional religion, and on its socio-political engagement with and relevance to socio-political issues[15] in a contemporary paradigm.

1.2. The Objective of the Study

The purpose of this research is to examine the current social location and role of Christianity, focusing on the trajectories of its morphological transformation, the challenges it faces, and its socio-political engagement. The direction of the thesis is guided by two aims: First, the intention is to explore the most recent typologies of religious transformation of Christianity through a new approach, as opposed to a "numbers game" account of the growth and decline of Christianity, or a simple exploration of the grand scenario of the secularization

15 The importance of the socio-historical variability underlying the public/private dichotomy has been widely acknowledged in the literature. See, for example: Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); Jürgen Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere", in Craig Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1992), pp.421-461; Craig Calhoun, "Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere", in Craig Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp.1-48; Thomas G. Goodnight, "Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Controversy", *International Journal of Public Opinion*, Vol.4. 3 (1992): 243-255; Simon Susen, "The Philosophical Significance of Binary Categories in Habermas's Discourse Ethics", *Sociological Analysis*, Vol.3. 2 (2009): 97-125; "Remarks on the Concept of Critique in Habermasian Thought", *Journal of Global Ethics*, Vol. 6. 2 (2010): 103-126.

thesis or of religious resurgence as a testimony to de-secularization. Secondly, the thesis will explore the relevance and value of substantial Christianity in terms of its socio-political engagement and activities in civil society. The overall aim is to develop theoretical insights into the role of religion in society, and into the interrelations between Christianity and society, especially in the current context.

It is necessary to explain my initial motivation for engaging in this study. At the outset of my undergraduate studies in theology and sociology, as a Christian believer I was confronted with two troubling issues, one relating to the internal problems within Christianity, and the other to the relationship between Christianity and the wider society:[16] First, the Korean churches and Christian institutions such as theological colleges, various united organizations and the religious press have been deeply fractured, and cannot find a common ground for the development of individuals and the whole society; more seriously, this has become a source of conflict within inter-religious and extra-religious, as

16 My personal experience is contextualized by the following historical observations and sociological analyses. See, for example: The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *A History of Christianity in Korea* Vol.III (Seoul: The institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, 2009); Chi-jun Noh, *Hanguk Gaesingyo Sahoehak: Hanguk Gyohoeui Wigiwa Jeonmang [Korea Protestant Sociology: Crisis and Prospect of Korean Church (Seoul: Hanul Academi, 1998)*; Soo-in Lee, "Gaesingyo Bosubunpaui Jeongchijeok Haengwi : Sahoehakjeok Gochal" [Political Activity of Conservative Protestant: Sociological Analysis], in *KyongJe wa Sahoe [Economy and Society]*, Vol.64 (Seoul: Winter, 2004); Soo-in Lee, *Hangukui Kugga, Simin Sahoiwa Gaesinkyoui Jeongchi Sahoijeog Teado Byundong: 1960s-1990s* [State, Civil Society and the Change of Socio-political Attitude of Protestants: 1960s-1990s, PhD thesis (Ewha Womans University, 2002); Won-gyu Lee, *Hankuk Gyohoiui Hyeonsilgwa Jeonmang* [The Reality and Prospect of the Korean Church] (Seoul: SeongSeo Yungusa, 1996), Hanguk Kidokgyoui Jeongchijeok Teado [The Political Attitude of Korean Protestantism, 1972-1990 (II)], *KyongJe wa Sahoe* [Economy and Society], Vol.16 (Seoul: Winter,1992).

well as intra-religious relationships.[17] Secondly, I could not ignore the fact that although the churches in South Korea still show numerical strength as an example of successful religious resurgence, nevertheless, as Philip Jenkins, David Martin, Grace Davie and Minho Chung note,[18] there is a deep and growing antipathy to the Korean churches in Korean society, and a strong and widespread tendency to consider them as an obstacle to social progressive development. This adversarial picture of the relation of Christian faith to Korean society has arisen not only from the modern paradigmatic society, but also from numerous problems caused by Christian action: religious fundamentalism, political conservatism combined with red-complex, nepotism, and graft and corruption.[19]

This historical picture reveals many perplexing disparities between the Christian denominations (intra-religious), between Christianity and the other

17 For example, the churches and religious institutions are divided into conservatives and progressives, each appropriating the Bible according to their own purposes and situations. The polarization between the two groups reflects the hostile reality of Korean politics and society. The two parties barely know, let alone understand, each other. The friction and conflict in the Korean church worsened under postcolonial rule, while the Korean War and division into North and South so strained Korean society that the country has suffered gravely since, undergoing trials such as military regime, human rights abuses and economic polarization.

18 Grace Davie, *Europe: The Exceptional Case* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002); David Martin, **"**Evangelical Expansion in Global Society**"**, in Donald M. Lewis (ed.), *Christianity Reborn: The Global Expansion of Evangelicalism in the Twentieth Century* (Michigan and Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2004); Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Min-ho Chung, *The Spirit of Capitalism in Korea: Tracking the Rapid Growth and Stagnation of the Korean Protestant Church in the 90s* (The University of Birmingham, Ph.D. Diss., 2005).

19 Soo-in Lee, *Hangukui Kugga, Simin Sahoiwa Gaesinkyoui Jeongchi Sahoijeog Teado Byundong: 1960s-1990s* [State, Civil Society and the Change of Socio-political Attitude of Protestants: 1960s-1990s, PhD thesis (Ewha Womans University, 2002); In-Chul Kang, *Hankukui Gaesingyowa Bangongjuui* [Korean Protestantism and Anti-communism] (Seoul: Jung Sim, 2006). Korean Protestantism apparently grew expeditiously between the 1960s and the early 1990s, across the whole range of Protestant denominations. However, I doubt whether the Korean church is still growing.

religions (inter-religious), and between Christianity and the non-religious society (extra-religious), and indicates a lack of integrity that has elements of irony and tragedy. Together, these phenomena have undermined the credibility of the church in contemporary society;[20] indeed, the Korean churches and their theologies are on the verge of losing their power and influence in the public sphere.

In this social context, where some individuals seem to have far too much religious faith and others far too little, and where there is mutual incomprehension and antagonism between the two groups, I struggled to find a way to solve my inner conflict. I had reached a crisis point at which I would either stop believing and studying theology, or must search for a new horizon of recognition for the substantial value of Christianity. In order to concretize my faith, I finally decided to participate in a student Christian movement that organizes a volunteer mission for disenfranchised people in the rural area and metro Seoul, and to try to illuminate from a holistic perspective the relation between church and society and the role of Christianity in the contemporary world. After graduating from college I remained active in the Christian student movement, now as part of the general staff.

20 In-chul Kang, "Soolyeom Hogeun Hegemony?: 1990 yondea Eehoo Gaesingyo Jihyeongui Byeonhwa" [Convergence or Hegemony?: The transformation of Protestant Topography since 1990], *Kyungjewa Sahoe [Economic and Society],* Vol. 62 (Summer, 2004).

At that time, I reached out to various Christian organizations to bridge the estranged Christian groups. Through this process I observed many misunderstandings and distrust between the Christian denominations and between liberal and conservative Christian groups, and prejudiced reading of the Bible by Korean churches. I also realized that there exist many differences in the interpretation of Christian mission, and in what people put into action. In response to this situation, I organized the Forest and Tree Forum, which aims to shed light on the relation between church and society and on the role of Christianity in 21st century Korea, from a holistic perspective. My experiences provided me with stepping stones to embody a Christian faith in the world. They further showed me that faith and practice must go hand in hand, and that different traditions must come to reconciliation and broaden the common ground among them, transforming fractured existence through communicative dialogue and holistic understanding, if the churches or religious communities are truly to serve the larger society.

My personal faith journey brought me to consider more deeply a major concern: Is Christianity still important for individuals, the whole society, and the global community? My personal and colloquial concerns residing in the main question deepened my thinking on the potential of Christianity, and encouraged me to reconsider Christianity as a foothold for a new movement in the contemporary social and historical context. This continually developing train of thought about

the role of Christianity and related themes finally began to crystalize into more detailed academic interests and the following questions:

An Overarching Research Question: Is Christianity still important for individuals, the whole society, and the global community today and for the future?

Does Christianity still possess possibility, sustainability and significance in the public sphere? What is the potential value of Christianity?

This research is mainly interested in examining any assurance, sustainability and possibility of Christianity under current conditions, focusing on: 1) the trajectories of morphological transformation of Christianity; 2) the social presence of Christianity bound up with faith-based praxis in the public sphere; 3) discussion of the potential of Christianity as a reflexive agent.

Question 1 (Chapter 2): What sort of methodological approach is most appropriate to answer my research questions?

Above all, this research needs to construct two new approaches: 1) the post-secular, in order to understand the trajectories of morphological transformation of Christianity and to explore in depth the secular condition that is not captured by the classic secularization theory; and 2) the post-postmodern, beyond the non-committed and deconstructive postmodern, to enable us to rediscover the potential of Christianity, making sense of how we can best live our lives in

today's global capitalist society.

Question 2 (Chapter 3): How does Christianity transform in the modern world?

- How does the encounter of Christian faith with modernity change the nature and experience of faith?

- What negatively ferments the religious atmosphere, or, for that matter, modernity itself, or religiosity itself?

- Should the transformation of Christianity be considered a religious crisis, or does it present new possibilities?

The aim is to trace the trajectories of morphological transformation of Christianity, with reference also to the changing condition of religious milieus, through a new approach based on a more fundamental understanding of both the substantial features of Christianity[21] and the secular condition that is not captured by the classic secularization theory.[22] Examination of this morphological transformation is not limited to institutionalized religion, but is broadened to encompass diverse types of Christianity existing today.

Question 3 (Chapter 4): How does Christian faith engage in the public sphere?[23]

21 Markus Vinzent, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, Vol. 32. 2 (August 2011): 143–160; Marius C. Felderhof, *Revisiting Christianity: Theological Reflections* (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011); Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

22 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Hans Joas, *Faith as an Option: Possible Futures for Christianity*, trans. by Alex Skinner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012).

23 How would I, as a Christian believer, embody my faith both in my personal life and in the social context? A similar

- Where is Christianity located in the public sphere?

- What is the role of Christianity today? How does Christianity play a substantial role in contemporary society?

- What are the characteristics of its faith and its main attitudes to socio-political issues in the modernization process?

The third question aims to re-illuminate the position and role of Christianity in the public sphere by examining its socio-political engagement through faith-based praxis in historical and sociological aspects, and to find its potential and relevance to socio-political issues in the normative view of the contemporary modern paradigm. Consequently, the study attempts to reconstruct the substantial value and significance of Christianity in life.

Question 4 (Chapter 4): How can we locate Christianity as a reflexive agent in a post-postmodern paradigm?

- Can we conceive of a Christian faith that will once again inspire and impact on the formation of human being in today's global capitalist society?

- What is the potential of Christianity as a reflexive agent in that global capitalist society?

- How should Christianity overcome its intrinsic defects - religious dogma, exclusive truth, metaphysical absoluteness, top-down-oriented authority - in order to be reintroduced as a legitimate actor of civil society?

---

question, that of mediation or, in D. Bonhoeffer's words, of "who is Christ for us today?", is still very much alive.

- How can Christianity be concerned with finding authentic truth, justice, intrinsic values and significance in the many perplexing disparities of values in intra-religious, inter-religious, and extra-religious relationships; and how are we best advised to live in today's global capitalist society?

The fourth aim of this research is to investigate how we can relocate Christianity as a reflexive agent in a post-postmodern paradigm. To do so, first, this research attempts to examine why Christianity has emerged as a focal point of recent radical socio-political philosophy, and to explore the fascination with the potential of Christianity as a reflexive agent in a re-modern perspective, not from a simple self-congratulatory position within a religious perspective, but with the intention of re-assessment through a co-operative appreciation of radical social philosophy and theology. Secondly, this research attempts to make radical proposals to overcome the inherent defects of Christianity, in order that it might be reintroduced as a legitimate actor of civil society. To accomplish this, the study engages in dialogue between theology and social philosophy in the post-postmodern context, focusing on the challenging discussion of radical intellectuals, including Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, Giorgio Agamben and Ulrich Beck, discussion that is concerned not with religions' claims to truth from a religious perspective, but with the connections between religion and the social world.

In summary, the objective of this research is to revisit and re-articulate the

sustainability and potential, the substantial value of Christianity, by examining the trajectories of a morphological transformation of Christianity in the latest modern world through a new post-secular approach beyond both the discourse of “secularization” and that of “religious resurgence”, and the public presence of Christianity based on the socio-political engagement of Christianity in the public sphere in both empirical and normative aspects; and to reconstruct the substantial meaning of Christianity as a reflexive agent by examining its potential through discussion of how the Christian faith can inspire and impact on the formation of human being in today’s global capitalist society on the one hand, and establishing a foothold to overcome its intrinsic defects as a religion through radical reflection in the post-postmodern paradigm by on the other.

1.3. Hypothesis of the Study

The central hypothesis of this research includes the following considerations:

1) A re-assessment of the sustainability, relevance and substantial value of Christianity, which can be made through two pivotal epistemological paradigm changes: i) from the modern and the postmodern to the post-postmodern, and ii) from the secular to post-secular re-modern paradigm (Chapter 2).
2) Christianity can be re-embedded as a defence of lost causes and a reflexive agent in the latest crisis in post-postmodern thinking (Chapter

2.1 & Chapter 4).

3) “Secularization theory” as an evolutional and inevitable historical model must be modified and deconstructed (Chapter 2.2 & Chapter 3).

• Conversely, the growth and resurgence of Christianity does not always mean the success of religiosity over the secular. The judgment that interprets the explosive growth of conservativism as the triumph of religious authenticity over modernization, maintaining that what has occurred is that, by and large, religious institutions have survived and even flourished insofar as they have not tried to adapt themselves to the alleged requirements of a secularized world, is both self-triumphant and reductive.

• The numerical fluctuation of Christianity should not be regarded as a result of contemporary interest in religiosity itself or the challenge of the outside itself, but as caused by the conjunction of socio-political particularities and the unique characteristics of the particular Christianity. In other words, people are neither more nor less religious today than they may have been in the past. It does not make sense that human existence becomes more religious or more secular depending on a particular context. Rather, the retention of the religious movement’s social influence depends on how it deals with new social change, that is, its attitude to the challenge and intervention from spheres beyond religion, such as so-called modernism or postmodernism.[24]

4) The profound epistemological paradigm shift from secularization to

24 For example, the impetus to the powerful movement of counter-secularization was neither evangelical Protestantism itself nor universal modernity itself; rather, the driving factor behind its establishment as probably the most vibrant religious force in Korea today is the encounter between the evangelical character in Korea and its socio-political activity in contemporary modernization.

post-secular offers a plausible framework for understanding present-day religious topics and their relevance. In opposition to the grand scenario of “secularization”, Christianity does not disappear, but takes on new forms in a changing world (Chapter 3).

• Recognition of the transformation of Christianity reminds us that the fact that people attend religious services less frequently does not mean that their lives are less shaped by religious ideas.

• The church as an institution is giving way to a more community-oriented and life-oriented religiosity, which is emancipating itself from ecclesiastical control and religious norms. The 20th and early 21st centuries have proved not only the decline but also the reinvention and resurgence of traditional religions alongside the rise of new forms of religion and spirituality.

5) The classification of religion as an essentially private matter is misguided; indeed, religion has never been essentially private. Christianity became not privatized, but individualized. The re-entering of religion into the public sphere does not represent a return to a previous order, but the taking on of a new role in a civil society (Chapter 4).

•Christianity’s encounter with the public arena takes place through a new way: no longer dominant and controlling, it becomes a movement challenging and being challenged, serving and being served.

6) Christianity can develop into a reflexive agent through faith-based praxis, by overcoming religious dogma, exclusive truth, metaphysical

absoluteness and top-down-oriented authority in the contemporary modern paradigm (Chapter4).

1.4. Methodology Employed

1.4.1. Key Concepts

1.4.1.1. The Transformation of Christianity

Transformation is usually defined as an act, process, or operation to change the form, appearance, nature, or character of something.[25] The concept of transformation, which is mainly used in biology, refers to the genetic alteration of a cell that occurs naturally in an entity in a state of competence, resulting from the direct uptake and incorporation of exogenous change from its surroundings.[26]

This study uses the concept of transformation in order to capture the trend of the change in Christianity in the contemporary world. In the sense of a process that is occurring naturally, transformation of Christianity is different from reformation, and in the sense of alteration it is different from obsolescence or degeneration. Moreover, transformation implies the mutual interaction of

25 Albert Sydney Hornby, Michael Ashby and Sally Wehmeier (eds.), *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

26 Transformation was first demonstrated in 1928 by a British bacteriologist, Frederick Griffith. Details are available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transformation_(genetics) .

Christianity with exogenous social changes, neither only dependent variables nor only independent variables. Thus, in order to fully understand the transformation of Christianity, it is necessary to develop a better understanding of the secular and of the prototypes of the further stages of Christianity in a post-secular perspective, going beyond the secular and the non-secular.

In this respect, transformation of Christianity is a discursive and multi-dimensional picture that is not captured by an account of numerical fluctuation of religious institutions and their members. Transformation of Christianity can be delineated in two aspects: in morphological form and in its activating way in human life.

When post-secular means neither the secular nor the non-secular, but a religious transformation that depicts religion as a social significance within the civil society, what are the prototypes of the further stages of Christianity in the contemporary context? As previously stated, it is impossible to delineate a simple and general pattern of transformation of Christianity, and none of the many possible definitions of church, as a Christian morphology seem to describe a single one of the churches analysed in this study.[27] The differences run much deeper than surface level, and the types of contemporary modern

27 José Casanova, *Public Religion in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); David Martin, *The Future of Christianity: Reflection on Violence and Democracy, Religion and Secularization* (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011).

Christianity in both morphological existence and a way of expressing its faith are so various, depending on historical processes, the socio-political environment, cultural patterns, denominational positions, and self-definitions, that the tighter to describe what Christianity is today is, the more contradictions surface; the more confined to sketch its portrait is, the more elusive the notion of 'the' church becomes; and the more confined to shape a way Christian faith exist and engaged in is, the less beneficial in understanding the role and meaning of Christianity in the public sphere of civil society.

However, there is no doubt that the transformation of a religious typology is in progress, one that is renewing the visibility of religion in the public sphere and will have far-reaching effects upon both the study and the practice of religion. Casanova argues that sociology of religion should be more attuned to the new forms into which religion is being transformed in diverse ways, rather than the exaggerated triumph of religious revival or obsession with the decline of religion.[28] While contemporary religious phenomena have disproved the classical secularization expectation that with the rise of modernization religion will decline, they do not demonstrate the reverse idea of a continued rise of the public importance of religion. Werner Ustorf contends that words such as "secular" and "religious" have increasingly become language fossils,

28 José Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective", *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 8 (Spring & Summer, 2006): 7-22

terminological survivals of the power games of the established churches and the culture of agnostic liberalism, which are both currently losing their previous dominant position and power to control minds.[29] Therefore, in order to examine the transforming Christianity in the contemporary paradigm, we need a more appropriate and persuasive concept to replace the outdated and vague classifications of “secular” and “religious”, or “decline” and “revival”.[30] In this circumstance, in order to capture the transformation of Christian organizations, rather than articulating clear definitions or typology the crucial tasks are to locate these “religious mobilizations” as points of social energy,[31] and to discern just where such changes are leading.

Perhaps the most salient phenomenon to be observed in the contemporary religious transformation is the development and massive dissemination of a religiosity that is based increasingly on individualization, whereby people are “persuaded, pushed, dragooned, or bullied into new forms of social association".[32] The thesis of religious individualization proceeds from the assumption that with increasing modernization, the religious do not disappear, but change their appearance. This can be observed in the various types of

29 Werner Ustorf, “Global Christianity, New Empire and Old Europe”, in Frans Wijsen and Robert Schreiter (eds.), *Global Christianity Contested Claims* (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi B. V., 2007).

30 José Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective”, *The Hedgehog Review* , Vol. 18.2 (2006): 281-300

31 Charles Taylor, “Religious Mobilizations”, *Public Culture*, Vol. 18.2 (2006): 281-300.

32 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p.445

resilient or persistent Christian morphology, as will be presented in subsections of Chapter 3: 1) re-invention of explicit Christianity: the global expansion of more conservative forms of Christianity; 2) the new vitalization of implicit Christianity such as faith communities; and 3) integrating Christianity into the civil society movement as social capital at the civil society level.[33]

Accordingly, we can point to two clear trends in the theorem of religious individualization, developing both inside and outside the churches: "resurgent Christianity" as a transformation of institutionalized Christianity, and "disestablished Christianity"[34] as an anomalous transformation. In this dissertation on the transformation of Christianity in the context of a post-secular and re-modern world, particular consideration will be given to this apparent paradox, where one picture comprises two contradictory parts.[35] I assume that the themes of post-postmodern transition and ecclesial identity come together in a newly transforming Christianity. It should be noted that we are not dealing with a postmodern concept. The God of one's own is the

33 This agenda will be presented empirically in Chapter 3.

34 I have borrowed the concept "disestablishement" from James W. Heisig's interesting article "Christianity Today: The Transition to Disestablishment", *Inter-religio*, Vol.30 (1996): pp.63-79. Dr. James W. Heisig is a philosopher who specializes in the field of philosophy of religion. He is director of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, Nanzan Univeristy, Nagoya, Japan. This article is a translation of a lecture delivered on 29 October 1996, the second of a series of talks on "The Significance of the World Religions Today" sponsored by the Institute for Oriental Philosophy (Sōka University, Japan).

35 Traditional institutionalized religiosity and forms are going down on the one hand, individualized religiosity are increasing, including individual spiritual forms of new Christian faith communities and movements and the churches embedded by individualized religiosity although it still has institutional forms. Ex) some of evangelical Pentecostal churches (See 3.2.2)

pinnacle of a long process embedded in the Christian tradition itself.

1.4.1.2. The Public Presence of Christianity

This research employs the concept of “public presence of Christianity” to understand and re-illuminate the place and role of Christianity in the public sphere, as a countervailing argument to the privatization thesis. During the latter half of the twentieth century scholars have observed a growing visibility of religion in civil society, contrary to the expectations of the privatization view. However, the visibility of religion in the public sphere is not always a positive feature. Sometimes it becomes the source of social trouble.

In this thesis, “public presence of Christianity” refers to the situation in which religious institutions, the churches, and various groups and individuals identified with Christianity have a role and influence in civil society via involvement in social agenda issues through the process of “entanglement” and “intertwinement” with the whole society. In this context, it is important to note first that the subject of action designates every entity that has Christian faith, or acts under the influence of Christian faith, not only the churches or religious institutions. Thus, our concern is not with who the subject of action is, but with the content of the action. Assessment of the public presence of religion is not concerned with whether religion is *(re-)*entering the public sphere, but rather with whether the socio-political actions that religion is taking are valid and relevant to individual life and the whole society. A second point

concerns the way Christian entities engage in social agenda. As stated above, the public presence of Christianity denotes social participation and solidarity of Christianity through the process of entanglement and intertwinement, neither dominance, nor a political assertion or coercion of strong Christianity. Finally, public presence of Christianity designates not an action participating in religious agenda, but an action participating in life-oriented social matters. To take an example, Casanova's notion of public religions clings too closely to the traditional location of religion rather than its substantial action, and focuses solely on religion rather than religiosity or religious faith. Therefore, instead of the term "public religions", this study will use "public presence of religion" in order to describe the kind of role that certain characteristics of religions or the religious play in the development of global human society, through social participation, solidarity, and entanglement. It does not seek to answer the question of to what extent religion holds a dominant position over the secular challenge, but what religiosity of Christian faith inspire and impact in the formation of human being in the contemporary world.

Indeed, when considering social influence or place it is difficult to express the result numerically. In addition, because "faith" itself is an invisible substance, a social scientific approach to this discourse has inherent limits. Therefore, a sociological approach should be supplemented by socio-philosophical discussion.

1.4.2. Methodology

The most important methodological approach of this research is concerned with the mapping of two pivotal epistemological paradigm changes to construct the theoretical framework: 1) from the modern and the postmodern to the post-postmodern, and 2) from the secular to the post-secular. The post-postmodern and the post-secular frameworks respectively are applied to two agendas in the social study of religion undertaken by this research: first, the ongoing morphological transformation of Christianity, and second, the potential value of Christianity in terms of its social presence in the public sphere.

In addressing the former agenda this research employs a mainly sociological-empirical approach, through analysis of historical sources and sociological materials and statistics. Of course, a contemporary treatment of these issues cannot remain limited to Europe or the North Atlantic area, but must adopt a global comparative perspective. An ethnocentric attitude is no longer tenable once it becomes evident that throughout much of the world processes of modernization are accompanied by processes of religious revitalization. Together with such empirical considerations, in investigating the meaning of the phenomenological trajectories this thesis also employs a theoretical approach developed through discussion of a wider sociological literature on contemporary society and religion, focusing on the individualization theory of religion. This research needs the interdisciplinary study between theology and

social philosophy and the insights gained from religious sociology studies, but more importantly, it must advance deep into the territory of various methodologies and literatures.

With regard to the second agenda, this dissertation investigates how Christianity is engaged and re-embedded in the public sphere as a response to contemporary socio-political issues, and what constitutes goodness, truth, and justice in the socio-political attitudes and activities Christianity brings to civil society. More significantly, it explores the potential value of Christianity as a reflexive agent in the world. These complex interrelations demand closer scrutiny from an inter-disciplinary methodology that draws on sociological and political theories, social philosophy, and theology. Specifically, I will ground my analysis in a careful reading of progressive intellectual literature, seeking to gain an understanding of the wider progressive milieu from which it has emerged; in empirical study of progressive spirituality groups and networks; and in discussion of a wider sociological literature on contemporary society and religion. Moreover, with regard to normative concerns, the interweaving of social philosophical and sociological understanding is crucial. This research is concerned not with claims to truth from a Christian perspective, but with the connections between religion and the social world and with the extent, limits and future of Christianity.

This research adopts two new approaches to the social study of religion by reflecting upon the concepts of the post-postmodern and the post-secular. First, the post-postmodern will be set as a framework to analyse the development of Christianity from the object of modern demystification or a lost cause of postmodern deconstruction into a reflexive agent, particularly in the context of what Beck terms the “risk society”. Secondly, the post-secular will be set as a framework to explore the trajectories of the transformation of Christianity, with an academic interest in understanding the change of the wider religious milieu from which it has emerged, and more significantly, its position and role in civil society. The two pivotal frameworks are not inconsistent with each other, but are closely related, and on the same epistemological horizon.

In terms of methodological principles, this dissertation will make particular use of inter-disciplinary methodologies situated between a sociology of religion and a social philosophy relevant to a study of the transformation of Christianity and the substantial meaning of Christianity as regards its social presence in the public sphere. Research questions on these two central topics will provide not only possible answers located between the universal and the particular, the constant and the variable, but also a very important marker as a subject for study in relation to the gap between Christianity and the church. We have to emphasize a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach to the

relationship between religion and society, and then question whether the crisis applies to the organized and established churches only, or to Christianity as a whole. Concrete methodology will be introduced in each chapter.

1.5. Structure of the Study

The thesis is divided into five chapters, each composed of a number of subsections. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the work. It states the objectives of the study, including my personal background and initial motivation for engaging in this research, describes the hypotheses and methodology, including two key concepts, and sets out the structure of the dissertation. Finally, it states the contribution and limitations of the study.

Chapter 2 aims at mapping two pivotal epistemological paradigm changes as the theoretical frameworks for the research: the shift from the modern and the postmodern to the “post-postmodern”, and from the classic secularization theory to the so-called “post-secular”. After briefly considering the historical development of the modern and the postmodern on the one hand, and of secularization theory on the other, the chapter critically examines the various meanings attributed to the “post-secular” and “post-postmodern”, finally setting out the most relevant definitions for this research concerning the potential of Christianity. Both these concepts provide new approaches, not only for

understanding the ongoing morphological transformation of Christianity beyond the secularization thesis and the notion of triumphant religious resurgence, but also for empirical analysis and normative interpretation of the social presence of Christianity, related to a faith-based praxis in the public sphere; and for investigation of the potential of Christianity as a reflexive agent in post-postmodern discourse. The final subsection of Chapter 2 deals with the relationship of Christianity to modernity, postmodernity, and re-modernities respectively.

Chapter 3 presents a descriptive account of the ongoing morphological transformation of Christianity, including the changes of religious milieus. Finally, in order to interpret this phenomenon, the chapter examines theories of individualization of religion within the sociology of religion. Chapter 3 is consecutively historical, sociological, and partly analytical in nature. Despite the descriptive unfolding of the argument, this research is structured by that argument, and not by chronological narration for its own sake.

Chapter 4 comprises a reconfiguration of the place and role of Christianity in the public sphere. This chapter seeks in particular to specify the challenges and complexities associated with recent attempts to empirically and normatively reconfigure the place of religion against the privatization of religion. The first subsection analyses conceptually how far a more relaxed stance on

the public uses of religion can be systematized into a post-secular stance on public justification. The second subsection uses concrete cases to explore how Christianity assumes important public roles in the justification of political stances and how diverse Christian actors interact with other organizations, humanists, and secularists within the secularized social structures of late capitalism. The third subsection presents a normative approach to the social presence of Christianity, specifying religious reason-giving in theories of ethical citizenship, political discourse, and the public sphere, and engaging critically with the recent work of Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor. In doing so it reveals that one challenge currently faced by Christianity is the intellectual discussion that thematises both a more transformative process of mutual engagement and the wider generation of social solidarities that integrates political communities.

The Forth section examines the potential of Christianity as a reflexive agent in a re-modern perspective, and offers radical proposals to overcome the intrinsic defects of the religion in order that it might be reintroduced as a legitimate actor of civil society in the public sphere. The chapter focuses on the challenging ideas of radical intellectuals, including Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek. The discussion is based on a new re-modern approach. In the first, I examine why Christianity has emerged as a focal point of recent radical socio-political philosophy, and seek to explain the new fascination with its worldly potential. The second analyses possible solutions to the inherent deficiencies

of Christianity, and tries to reformulate its religious intrinsic attributes, such as subject, truth, and transcendence, through dialogue between theology and social philosophy in a re-modern paradigm.

Chapter 5 provides a brief summary of the main arguments, and offers recommendations.

1.6. Contributions and Limitations

1.6.1. Contributions

Firstly, this research tries to demonstrate that theology has a contribution to make to the debates of the sociologists and social philosophers about the way they understand the place of religion in contemporary society. This contribution is first and foremost a critical review of these ways of understanding and, subsequently, a widening or an enrichment of the scholarly repertories.

Secondly, it is intended that by subjecting the classic secularization theory and the concept of religious resurgence to thorough scrutiny, the research will offer two new methodological approaches to religious studies.

Thirdly, this research will present the possibility, sustainability and significance of Christianity, by re-illuminating its location and role in the world through a

new post-secular approach.

Finally, a re-modern approach to the study of Christianity will contribute both to finding possible clues as to how individuals and the global community can live well in the global capitalist society, and to paving a way for the process of reconciliation in extra religious, inter-religious, and intra-religious conflicts by overcoming the intrinsic defects of Christianity, namely religious dogma, exclusive truth, metaphysical absoluteness, and top-down-oriented authority.

1.6.2. Limitations of the Research

Firstly, this research is limited to analysing the contemporary developments and changes within the fold of Christianity, so that it can be different from the religious phenomena occurred in the other religions.

Secondly, since this study is focused on the two main branches of Christianity, Catholicism and Protestantism, it can function alongside a relatively unreflexive categorization of religion.

Thirdly, because this research is mainly focused on the transformation of Christianity in developed civil society, it rules out the contemporary developments and changes of religion in society where basic condition for civil society is not yet developed, such as communist countries, Islam where

religion and politics is not differentiated, and undemocratic societies. Thus, it seems to be oriented to the western religious situation, and to prevent us from fully comprehending the contemporary changes of Christianity in non-Western societies. However, it does not start from the view point of the heritage of modern Western thought, but holds careful consideration to the changes of religious milieus in multiple modernities on a global scale.

Chapter 2. Two Pivotal Epistemological Paradigm Changes: Mapping the Theoretical Frameworks

How can we re-locate Christianity as a reflexive agent in the historical and social context of the early 21st century?

This chapter is concerned with the development of a conceptual framework that will enable a proper understanding of the contemporary modern world and of the place of religion within it. The research approach is based on two profound epistemological paradigm shifts: 1) from the modern and the postmodern to the post-postmodern,[36] and 2) from the secular to the post-secular.[37]

First, the idea of the modern, a strand of intellectual life that dominated Western culture from the late 1970s, has run out of steam. Since the appearance of Zygmunt Bauman's important book *Modernity and Holocaust*,[38]

36 The "post-postmodernity" concepts in the field of social science are numerous, diverse and rarely in full agreement with each other. In this study I mainly employ the post-postmodern constellation entailed in Markus Vinzent's concept of "re-modernities".

37 I refer to the term in Habermas's article, "Notes on a post-secular society", even though I would differ with regard to the perspective of the term.

38 Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Polity, 1989); *Postmodernity and its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997); See also Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knoebl, *Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 475-84.

Whether barbarism constitutes a separate breakdown of civilization or whether it is very much part of modern rationalization and bureaucratization, has produced a lively theoretical debate. Rather than viewing the Holocaust as a deviation from an emancipatory path, barbarism and civilizational breaks are perceived as inherent qualities, and for some even as inevitable outcomes of modernity and Enlightenment. Zygmunt Bauman's arguments in his book *Holocaust and Modernity* (1989) express a radicalization of the aforementioned modernity equals barbarization thesis. For Bauman, the Holocaust is no longer a perversion of the principles of rationality, but rather it represents a civilizational break of modernity, and its direct outcome insofar as it provides the necessary logistics for its execution.

it has been apparent that modernity is problematic, a way of thinking that has implicitly endorsed an ethos of tolerance and non-violent coexistence, but has been unable to provide a foundation for that ethos. Questions of truths, structure and rightness have been deconstructed and dismantled by postmodern scepticism, while religiosity has secured its own position and gone its own way regardless of criticism.

Secondly, during the 1990's, around the time that postmodernism reached its height in Europe and North America and their respective academia, there appeared another strange appellation sharing the "post" prefix – "the post-secular", suggesting the end or another stage of classic secularization theory.[39] The return of religion in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, and in particular the resurgence of politicized religion on the world stage, marked a break with the conventional theory of secularization that had prevailed for two hundred years. Over the last two decades, these developments have prompted much critical debate among doubters, sceptics and open adversaries. Historians and sociologists who claim no longer to accept the secularization theory, at least in its modern form, have created a valuable body of alternative scholarship, recognizing that the turn to the "post-secular"[40] is indeed a contested and multifaceted trend.

---

39 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence*, trans. Rodney Livingstone, (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), pp.19-46, 156.

40 Jürgen Habermas, "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society", *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (2008): 17-29. It is also available at http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html. Accessed on 3 January 2015. This is the text of a lecture that he delivered at the Nexus Institute of the University of Tilburg in March 2008.

The present thesis takes a pragmatic approach to these conceptual difficulties. Neither in the case of the post-secular nor in that of the post-postmodern can we impose clarity of usage by definite decree. Thus, what is required is sensitivity to the different ways in which the term is used, and a willingness to see the diversity of the designated objects in the diversity of meaning itself.

The purpose of this chapter is not to state clear and unambiguous definitions of the key terms, but rather to examine “re-modernities” and “the post-secular” as responses to modernism and postmodernism and to secularism, and to scrutinize both post-postmodern implications with regard to the renewal of modernity, going beyond the modern and the postmodern, and the central arguments of the post-secular as a reformulating of secularization and religious transformation, by reflecting briefly on the historical situation from which our questions arise and provisionally clarifying the recent academic usage.

2.1. From the Modern and the Postmodern to the Post-postmodern

What phase of history are we living in today? How can we define the period captured in this research?

Since the late 1980s numerous attempts have been made to understand the world as it has evolved out of modernity and postmodernity, and scholars continue to generate important questions concerning the current features of

modernity. Now it is widely accepted that the modern and the postmodern are no longer tenable. As Markus Vinzent points out, “the contemporary discourses have developed beyond modernity and postmodernity”.[41]

How can we best conceptualize the contemporary condition, if it is neither modern nor postmodern? In order to grasp this configuration, this research will attempt to reformulate a conceptual tool that will enable a proper understanding of today’s world and of the place of Christianity within it. However, this will neither revolve around terminological issues, nor explore a protracted and tedious discourse about the value of modern or postmodern paradigms per se.

2.1.1. Discussion regarding Modernity and Postmodernity

Before looking more closely at the main themes, it is worth considering briefly the relation of the postmodern to the modern, because it is not possible to draw the whole picture of the social transformation of the latter part of the twentieth and the early twenty-first century without engaging the contemporary vision and sensibilities through the modern and the postmodern, even given the great diversity of opinion on what constitutes modernity or postmodernity. Taking example questions, can it be true that postmodernity is a new era marking the end of modernity, and has modernity collapsed under the pressure

41 Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”, *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, Vol. 32. 2 (August 2011): 143–160; He also takes note of the pointer provided twenty seven years ago by Italian design theorist Andrea Branzi, to a world that was to be no longer postmodern, but post-postmodern. See Andrea Branzi, *Learning from Milan: Design and the Second Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1988).

of the postmodern?

2.1.1.1. The modern thinking / modernity

The term “modern” generally refers to the narrative of a new era, distinct from the medieval world view, feudalistic authority or conventional tradition, and characterized by rationalization, industrialization, capitalism, secularization, and the nation-state,[42] which has been reached through a process of historical transition marked by Renaissance, Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.[43]

Modernity in terms of economic and social structures may also refer to tendencies in the new economic, social, cultural and political conditions of an emerging fully industrialized civilization, as in Anthony Giddens’ description of modernity.[44] In this context, modernity has been associated with cultural and intellectual movements intertwined with technological culture and industrial life. More specifically, it is associated with a complex of economic institutions, especially technology, scientific advancement, industrial production and a

42 Chris Barker, *Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice* (London: Sage, 2005), p. 444.

43 The term "modern" emerged in the 5th century, originally distinguishing the newly Christianized Roman era from two forms of paganism, the heathens of antiquity and the unregenerate Jews. Etymologically, the term comes from the Latin “modernus” rooted in “modo”, "just now". However, the term entered general usage only in the 17th century, in the debate centred around the question "Is Modern culture superior to the classical Greek and Roman culture?" In these usages, "modernity" denoted renunciation of the recent past, favouring a new beginning, and a re-interpretation of historical origin. In general, it is safe to say that modernity implies civilization and the era cultivated by the West, which germinated with the Renaissance in the 16th century and was accelerated by the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century. See Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *Patterns of Modernity, Volume. 1: The West* (London: Continuum International Publishing, 1987).

44 Anthony Giddens, *Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford UP,1998).

market economy, and a range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy.[45]

Of course, modernity has always been a highly relativist term; the aspect of modern historical process varies considerably according to particular indigenous culture and historical context, and there are myriad opinions on the issues raised.[46] Nevertheless, at the theoretical level we can explain the concept of modernity with reference to the points of agreement among the divergent approaches to it. What is peculiar to modernity is typically understood by three shifts of philosophical consciousness, as the fundamental principles of a new historical phase.

According to the sociological tradition, the first indicative parameter of modernity is the progress of “rationality” in all social spheres. Max Weber (1860-1920) and Émile Durkheim (1858-1907) assumed that the phenomena of rationality would become dominant in the arts, the state, academia and the economy. Here, the most ardent academic approach is based on positivism,[47]

45 *Ibid.*

46 J.C.A. Pocock, “Modernity and Anti-Modernity in the Anglophone Political Traditions”, in Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *Patterns of Modernity, Vol. 1: The West* (London: Continuum International Publishing, 1987); Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity versus Postmodernity”, trans. Seyla Ben-Habib, *New German Critique*, Vol.22 (1981): 3-14; F. Bourricaud, “Universal Reference and the Process of Modernization”, in Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *Patterns of Modernity*.

47 Positivism is a philosophy of science based on the view that in the social as well as natural sciences, data derived from sensory experience, and logical and mathematical treatments of such data, are together the exclusive source of all authentic knowledge. Data that is received through the senses and then "verified" is known as empirical evidence. According to this view society is like the physical world in that it operates according to laws. Introspective and intuitional attempts to gain knowledge are rejected. Although the positivist approach has been a recurrent theme in the history of Western thought, the concept was developed in the early 19th century by the philosopher and founding sociologist, Auguste Comte. Comte argued that society operates according to its own laws, much as the physical world operates according to gravity and other laws of nature.

derived from the rationalist concept. The positive natural sciences direct us to a conclusion that the exclusive source of all authentic knowledge in the social as well as natural sciences is the data derived from sensory experience, and logical and mathematical treatments of such data, based on the empirical method of natural science. The main task undertaken by modern rationality was to remove the mysterious myth and magic regarded as inherited from traditional religion. Human beings were now attempting to hold the omniscient and almighty power once attributed to gods, explaining their disenchantment as reason's independence, leading to liberation from mystery.

The second marker of modernity is understood as the principle of "individual subjectivity"[48] and "autonomy". This structure of subjectivity is rooted in Descartes' (1596-1650) "abstractive subjectivity" represented in his famous aphorism, "cogito ergo sum",[49] and in Kant's (1724 -1804) idea of absolute self-consciousness.[50] For Kant, the human being is the subject of consciousness, able to reflect himself by setting himself as the object. Moreover, Kant's "critical reason", justified as the rationale of the critique of pure reason, the critique of practical reason, and the critique of judgment,[51]

48 In general, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution are regarded as historical turning points that invoke subjectivity in the cultural and civilizational history of humankind. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge : Polity Press, 1987), p.37.

49 René Descartes, *Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy* (Fourth Edition), (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1998)

50 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* [*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 1781], trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (NY, London; Penguin, 2007).

51 Kant's magnum opus, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, aimed to unite reason with experience to move beyond what he took to be failures of traditional philosophy and metaphysics. Kant published other important works on ethics, religion, law, aesthetics, astronomy, and history. These included the *Critique of Practical Reason* [*Kritik der*

has confidence in the subjective ability of oneself and acts as judge upon the whole culture.

Within the sociological tradition, it has frequently been claimed that the consequence of subjectivity is increasing differentiation. In the context of the discussion on modernity, this refers to social differentiation, the separating out of each social sphere from ecclesiastical control. However, in the modern paradigm, to create order means neither to cultivate nor to extirpate differences; rather, it means licensing them, and this implies a licensing authority. Obversely, it also means de-legalizing unlicensed differences. Order must be an all-inclusive category. It must also remain forever a belligerent camp, surrounded by enemies and waging wars on all its frontiers. The unlicensed difference is the main enemy. In the shape of the unlicensed difference, modernity fought the real enemy: the grey area of ambivalence, indeterminacy and undecidability.[52]

The third marker of modernity is the strong conviction, created through the combination of these concepts and a certain set of attitudes towards the world, of the ability to build an improved society. This serves as a driving force for the coming to maturity of a nation or culture, as seen in higher levels of civilization, social development and decency; industrial society and the capitalist market; more complex social organizations and political differentiation; heterogeneous

praktischen Vernunft, 1788], the *Metaphysics of Morals* [*Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, 1797], which deals with ethics, and the *Critique of Judgment* [*Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 1790], which looks at aesthetics and teleology.

52 Zygmunt Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity* (London: Routledge, 1992).

cities and urbanization, and the media of mass communication.

These multiplicities of modernity all refer to existential matter, and indicate a decisive cognitive shift whereby the modern is separated from the normative implications of the past. Largely as a result of these characteristics, modernity is vastly more dynamic than the past.

Talcott Parsons, as the leading theorist of this tradition, viewed modernity as a uniform, unambiguously structured pattern in progress towards harmonious integration.[53] The historical evolution to modernity was viewed as likely to succeed, thus assuring that traditional societies would be provided with the resources for what Parsons called a general process of adaptive "upgrading", including economic take-off to industrialization, democratization via law, and secularization and science via education.[54]

From this perspective, the term modernity encompasses the activities and output of human self-realization, variously understood as the story of progress, or reason and freedom, or human rights. With the Enlightenment modernity became identified with rationality, subjectivity, and a master narrative of progress, while the collapse of the preordained order was celebrated as liberation. The meaning of this development lies in the bigger picture, which extends across space but also across time. These changes were expected to lead to the adoption of new values and modern life-styles, which would be

53 Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*, (New York: Free Press, 1960); *Sociological Theory and Modern Society* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

54 Talcott Parsons, *The System of Modern Societies* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971).

intrinsically superior to whatever preceded them, and would clash sharply with religious traditions, intellectual bondage, and conventional social systems. Some commentators define modernism as a socially progressive trend of thought that affirms the power of human beings to create, improve and reshape their environment with the aid of practical experimentation, scientific knowledge, or technology.

In the long run, so deeply did the narrative of human progress become embedded in our world, that the spread of modernization, it was hypothesized, would indeed lead to the long-term and inevitable demise of religion at both the social and the individual level. The withdrawal of god would mean a triumphant entry of man.

2.1.1.2. The relation of the postmodern to the modern

However, the Western European disillusionment induced by fascism, Nazism and the Second World War cast critical doubt on the historical achievement of the modern civilization. The dissatisfaction with subsequent historical experience reached a peak in the late 1960s, and prompted a revisiting of modern themes such as reason, subjectivity, and progress as the reigning paradigm of world development.[55]

The so-called postmodern thinking as a criticism on the modern was severe. It revealed the violent and spurious nature of the truth chased after by modern

55 Postmodernism refers to a resistant movement to modernism, formulated in a broader sense from the second world war to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and in a narrower sense from 1968 through the 1990s.

thinking, the brutality and unreasonableness of the human beings revered as rational, and how human society realized by human reason had turned into a new uncivilized society rife with repression, discrimination, and exploitation, not with morality and justice. Graham Ward describes this landscape in detail:

> *Modernity's implosion occurs when the process of mediation – dialogue, dialectic, and debate – can no longer be held to operate; when certain incommensurable perspectives become apparent; when the subject increasingly loses the distinctiveness of its position and likewise the object; when the natural is seen as already cultivated; when the private is increasingly subject to social policy and internalizes a public surveillance; when the universal is recognized as representing a certain power/knowledge interest which necessarily marginalizes other interests. And so the hierarchy of values implodes, with no appeal possible to an authority outside the system itself – no principle, no shared ontology, no grounding epistemology, no transcendental meditation.* [56]

Here, we can capture postmodern thinking as a unique way of seeing a world which, after the 1960s, appeared broken by historical events.[57] However, it is not desirable to categorize the diverse postmodern thinking as one trend. Indeed, the concept of postmodernism is particularly difficult to capture, because the starting point of postmodernism, modernism itself, is already

---

56 Graham Ward, "Introduction, 'Where We Stand'", in Graham Ward (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology* (Malden and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), p. xix.

57 Frederic Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke UP,1992); David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

vague and confusing. While we cannot easily reach consensus on what postmodernism means, we can certainly agree that it is a response to modernism.[58] Thus, it will be helpful to grasp postmodernism as a kind of mental attitude or atmosphere in the late modern society, rather than a theory.[59]

Therefore, here, we can understand that the term postmodernism may refer to "a style of thought" that doubts and takes a critical attitude towards modern rationales based on the Enlightenment norms of reason, objective truth, subjectivity, universal progress, and a grand narrative.[60]

From this it follows that our world is contingent, diverse and unstable, that our knowledge is relative, subjective and fallible rather than certain and absolute, and that truth is neither objective nor valid, but inherently ambiguous, and that no single narrative can be predominant. Received ideas that are the products of a particular historical and cultural milieu must, therefore, be stringently deconstructed.

How is postmodernism different from modernism? Postmodernism as a style of contemplating in the post-capitalism world may be differentiated from modernism in four aspects: 1) a general suspicion of reason; 2) the death of modern subjectivity; 3) the doubt of the master narrative; and 4) the emphasis

58 Postmodernism literally means after the modern movement.

59 Stuart Sim, "Preface to the third edition: The Modern, the Postmodern and the Post-postmodern", in Stuart Sim (ed.), *The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism* (London and NY: Routledge, 2011), p.vii.

60 Terry Eagleton, *The Illusions of Postmodernism* (Malden, Oxford, Melbourne and Berlin: Wiley-Blackwell, 1996), p.vii.

on difference. These act as clues to the theory and thought of postmodernism. Thus, they provide an invaluable starting point for our examination.

1) A General Suspicion of Reason

One distinguishing feature of postmodern thinking is the questioning of the idea central to the Enlightenment project, the supremacy of human reason.[61] That is, postmodern thinking attempts to deconstruct the concept of self-reflective human being as the subjectivity of thinking and doing according to reasonable principles, pointing out that the faculty of reason and rationality has never been the fundamental foundation to resolve the problems faced by humankind; on the contrary, it is considered that the present crisis in contemporary culture and civilization may be a result of the oppressive role played by reason and rationality. Postmodernism has alerted us to the fact that the attempt born out of the Enlightenment to discover universal truth through reason alone has been abandoned. One current manifestation of this is the persistent assault on foundationalism.

Postmodernists point out that rationalism as a particular discourse scheme of the modern thinking represses all dissenting viewpoints as inferior in the name of rationality and reason. Such argumentations are articulated particularly in the work of French philosophers such as Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998), Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), Jacques Derrida

61 Yet, one ought to ask whether postmodernity is a rejection of rationality or rather the recognition of its limitations.

(1930-2004), and Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), and in spite of many differences between them, they share a common stance in terms of their critical destruction of the legitimate role of reason.[62]

Foucault, for example, argues from a historical perspective, that the ideology of universal reason is a product spawned by the power-knowledge connection of a particular time, and the determination of what counts as reason or knowledge and what does not is a result of the discourse formulated by the norms of rationality that constitute the dominant social life in a certain context.[63] Thus, in the dominant epistasis of a particular reason the other dissenting reason must be silenced, excluded, and seen as unreason in the social and public domain. In Foucault's analysis, reason as the normative foundation for critical assessment reveals its limitations and crisis, urging us to reject the universal justification of instrumental rationality.

As a consequence, it is contended that our knowledge is relative, subjective and fallible rather than certain and absolute, and that truth is inherently ambiguous. In line with criticism of reason, a postmodern way of thinking also forces us to doubt objective truth, historical subjectivity, and overarching and totalizing blueprints for human progress in the form of grand-narratives. The late modern and postmodern condition becomes fluid, open-ended,

62 Hyo-nyeong Yoon (et al.), *Critique on The Concept of the Subject: Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault* (Seoul: Seoul UP, 1996), pp.1-14.

63 In his analysis, Foucault refers to the way in which particular truths and norms appear in relation to the types of universality and absoluteness in history as the "micro-physics of power" or "genealogy of power-knowledge". See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (New York: Vintage,1977); *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* (NY: Pantheon Books, 1978); *Power and Knowledge* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980).

incommensurably more so than in earlier phases of modernity. Received ideas that are the products of a particular historical and cultural milieu must, therefore, be stringently deconstructed.

However, the crisis of reason that offered the normative foundation for critical assessment produces further serious problems: a lethargy of criticism pervaded with cynicism, and fundamentalism.[64]

2) The Death of the Modern Subject

Whereas modernism began with the birth of the subject who makes a decision by himself and acts autonomously, postmodernism declares the death of the subject. One important issue common to the various strands of postmodern thought is the dismissal of subjectivity, which is closely related to the postmodern criticism of reason. Postmodern thinking focuses on the distortion and dislocation of the historical continuity that was promised by the realization of modern subjectivity. It is contended that although we seem to live as autonomous subjects, in fact, we are only social figments fabricated by the social structure.

Michel Foucault argues that the subject articulated by the modern thinking is no more than an intellectual product formulated in the episteme context, by

64 While postmodernists believe that they have to find a way of criticism without rational justification, because crisis of criticism comes from reason, Habermas thinks that it is possible to offer a new normative ground for criticism by replacing reason of the modern subject with communicative reason. Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,* trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).

differentiating oneself from the other through an ideology in order to maintain political and economic power.[65] Lacan describes a subconscious subject who is far from a rational human being.[66] Emmanuel Levinas argues that the conscious "I", as the subject of thought, the starting point of traditional metaphysics, is the absolute subject with self-identity, the subject of Selbstheit (ipséité), which, however, excludes the object as the other and is therefore restricted and not what it pretends to be.[67] Taking a similar line to Levinas, Derrida is deeply suspicious of the fixed, binary polarities between the absolute subject with self-identity and the other. He criticizes the absolute subject with self-identity as a fiction formulated by the contrastive structure of traditional metaphysics, one that denigrates and excludes the other as a secondary derivation by illuminating differences between subject and other. He argues that the other is not just opposite to the subject, but is concealed by the subject, a constitutive immanent fragment included within it.[68]

Rather than upholding the authenticity of the individual, via Levinas, Derrida, Foucault and Lacan, postmodernism announced the death of the subject. The argument common to all of them is that the subject as the conception of a unique, private self is not the substance; subjective individuals with reflexive

---

65 Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (NY and Toronto: Random House, 1998). Foucault calls the knowledge system that produces power “discourse”. It is no more than the social process that constantly regulates and defines the object.

66 Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: A selection*, trans. A. Sheridan (NY: Norton, 1977).

67 Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1978).

68 Jacques Derrida, “différance” (1968), *Speech and Phenomena*, trans. David B. Allison (Evanstone: Northwestern UP, 1973).

reason can be subordinate to structural power, and the consequences for the self-defining human being can be damaging. In this intellectual environment social science is cast into the same boat as that in which the humanities have been adrift during the modern period of uncertainty and unreliability.

Hence, postmodern thinking is caught in a predicament. The sort of postmodern thought outlined above is meaningful in its acute analysis of the modern project as repressive, a form of producing power, yet in deconstructing the subject as a social actor or agent it reveals its limitation in terms of ability to make a new social transformation. On the questions of what valuable destination we should pursue, and how, postmodernism is silent. Its low estimation of individual actors and moral responsibility makes an answer impossible. The critical problem with postmodernism is the lack of ethical perspective to monitor authority and resist the structural power. Can we struggle against repressive conditions without postulating the subject of our action?

3) A Grave Doubt about Grand Narratives and the Centralization of Scepticism

The most important feature of postmodernism is the denial of grand narratives. According to Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, accepted as one of the most comprehensive accounts of postmodern critique in this respect,[69] the grand narratives of the Enlightenment created universal

69 See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and

truth, human progress, the maturity of civilization towards a one-dimensional world, and universal discourses. Postmodern thinking, then, attacked the grand narrative stories that tried to explain the whole of society and history, because those who had experienced totalitarianism could not believe in the possibility and progress of human being and history expressed in those narratives were considered to be no longer tenable. That is, postmodern thinking was for Lyotard a welcome new opening which meant the flourishing of alternative cultural interpretations and identities based on the various newly emerging local narratives, and a reflection on boundless possibility of human progress centred on reason. Hence, this has led many postmodernists to abandon belief in universal truth, convinced that there is nothing more than conflicting and incompatible local narratives.[70]

In the same vein, postmodern debate criticises the very backbone of modern society and culture: reason, truth reality and essence. Thus, postmodernism tends to be relativistic and anti-foundationalistic, because the attempt born out of the Enlightenment to discover universal truth through reason alone has been abandoned. In this regard, postmodernism follows Nietzsche, who disintegrated the metaphysical foundation itself, resulting in nihilism. For Derrida, the “metaphysics of presence” that argues that all words have a corresponding reality is a philosophical grand narrative that must be

Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

70 Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty, among others.

deconstructed. In this regard, the followers of Lyotard and Derrida place their trust in relativism rather than universalism, and various mini narratives rather than meta-theory that can examine objectively. Hence, because postmodernism has a negative attitude toward a comprehensive philosophical truth and political justice, grand stories dissipate into mini narratives. As a result of this stance, by absolutizing deconstruction of a critical method, confusing essence with essentialism, fundament with fundamentalism, and totality with totalitarianism, postmodernism has lost its capability to reconstruct an alternative reality.

4) The Emphasis on Difference

The postmodern dismisses central discourses such as dominant culture, essential constituent, and overall plan, and pays more attention to diversity rather than unity, periphery part rather than central part, the others rather than the self. The postmodern view illuminates the world as composed of a play of difference and as an indefinite number of meaning-generating agencies. Consequently, in this postmodern perspective society can be reduced to a relatively self-sustained and autonomous text, and all subjects with their own respective logics are armed with their own facilities of truth-validation.[71]

Postmodern invalidation of any dominant ideology or central concept allows space for the so-called “politics of difference”, including the various and

71 Zygmunt Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity*, pp.35-39.

dispersive stories made by outsider groups to ensure their own identity against the governing discourse. This can be seen in the postmodern concern with the stories of the other driven away into the periphery: women's protest against patriarchy, homosexuals' revolt against heterosexism, non-Western resistance to the Western orientalism that manipulates difference to maintain status.

The postmodern perception that the other is excluded from the symbolic order and regulated by the sovereign discourse as the relatively inferior allows that other, decentralized by existing power relationships, to be embedded as a new centre of political action. Here, postmodernism is effective in analysing and investigating the causes of the exclusion of periphery groups. Its worldview has contributed to the dissipation of fixed ideas on sex, ethnicity and religion, and to the expansion of the individual's conscious horizons. There is now a general understanding that to accept the other and to admit difference in communities is a postmodern condition.

On the other hand, whereas postmodernism contributed to the diversification of society by admitting unique voices alienated in social discourse, it made an error in devaluating the solidarity of community; by absolutizing difference it produced socio-cultural separatism. Postmodernism that insists on the universalization of difference discounts the possibility of community. Moreover, we should note that clinging to a certain bond does not necessarily mean

failure to admit difference. As “the subject within community”,[72] we embody our identity in community, and at the same time have close links with the other.

2.1.1.3. The inheritance and limits of the postmodern thinking

We have examined the four main points of postmodernism: a suspicion of classical notions of reason, the death of the subject, the end of grand narratives, and the emphasis on difference. This sort of postmodern thinking is still valid, valuable, and successful, both in terms of offering the critical conceptual frame necessary to overcome the limitations of modern thinking, and in respect of critically assessing and analysing the historical condition and the current changes in our 21st century capitalist society.

Whereas postmodernism has had aesthetic success in its cultural analysis of the late capitalist society, it has failed politically, since it offers no indicator or ideology, and deconstructs the subject that takes the lead in social transformation. The motivation of postmodernism is political, but its expression and method are aesthetic. Such internal contradictions have resulted in a natural failure to build an ideological alternative for a new age.

In postmodern phenomena, people’s interest shifts from social, ethical, and political matters to aesthetic matters; image overwhelms narratives; the uncertainty of daily life denies ultimate truth, and scientific decision has

72 Honi Fern Haber, *Beyond Postmodern Politics: Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault: Selves, Community and the Politics of Difference* (New York: Routledge, 1994). The term, “the subject within community” is equivalent to Enrique Dussel’s concept: “solipsistic subjectivity without community”, which implies reductionist propagation of subjectivity. Enrique Dussel, Ethics and Community, trans. R. Barr (New York: Orbis Books, 1998), p.17.

been decoupled from moral decision.

As has been said before, postmodernism discarded rational dialectic and rendered itself vulnerable to accusations of relativism and nihilism by criticizing indiscriminately reason, rationality and truth; exorcized all possible action of the subject, actors and agents from society by reducing the subject to a particular social construction, an illusion of individuality or self-presence; and, misunderstanding recognition of the whole as a turning toward totalitarianism, ignored foundation, essence and grammar so as to be able to integrate mini narratives and diverse stories. When the social is reduced to a mere system of differences, and difference is absolutized as universality, then relativism and dissolution easily fall into the trap of irresponsibility and omission. Such postmodern rhetoric cannot adequately explain the meaning of social action and change, and does not face the political and economic reality and the context of global power.[73] Hence, we cannot find the potential for the future development of society in the postmodern cultural phenomena, because postmodernism denies any unifying concept. In this respect, Eagleton makes the significant observation that the postmodern project that aims just for difference may be an illusion, and ultimately may be an excessively impractical reaction to modernity.[74]

As a result, so-called progressive postmodernism may be viewed as a

73 David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p.117.

74 Terry Eagleton, *The Illusion of Postmodernism*, pp.118-121

conservative ideology that affirms the maintenance of the status quo. This reveals the limitation of the postmodern project. I believe that instead of giving up on modernity and its project as a lost cause, we should learn from the mistakes of those extravagant programs that have tried to negate modernity.[75] We should recognize that postmodern thinking is indicative of rather than a solution to present problems.[76] Perhaps post-postmodern discourses may provide an indication at least of the direction forward.

2.1.2. Post-postmodern Discourses beyond the Modern and the Postmodern: Reflexive Modernity, Liquid Modernity, Multiple Modernities, and Re-modernities

As we have seen, from the late 1980s dissatisfaction with postmodernism has prompted the rethinking of postmodern statements and modern themes.[77] More broadly, there has been a revisiting of changing social trends, not only in terms of the historical sequence of waves of modernization, but also with regard to a reassessment of far-reaching contemporary discourses, which can no longer be captured by the previous framework.

Attempts to grasp the changing nature of modernity and its discourse have been made in diverse fields. Andrea Branzi, an Italian design theorist,

75 Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity versus Postmodernity”, p.11.

76 Terry Eagleton, *The Illusion of Postmodernism*, p.135.

77 Jeffry C. Alexander, “Modern, Anti, Post and Neo”, *New Left Review*, Vol. 210 (1995): 63-101/ p. 86.

proposed that the contemporary world was no longer postmodern, but post-postmodern; in his booklet *Learning from Milan* (1989), he introduced the term "second modernity", and 17 years later he altered this to "new modernity".[78] The German architecture theorist, Heinrich Klotz, captured the new situation as the "second modernity" (1994),[79] as did music scholar Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf (1998, 2005, 2008).[80] Indeed, the term "second modernity", referring to a phase after postmodernity, has appeared in theories of art, film, new music and architecture.[81] If this term captures the current change correctly, then can it be regarded as the harbinger of a post-postmodern trend, and what is emerging from it?

Intensive sociological study of these new approaches really began in 1994, with the publication of *Reflexive Modernization: Politic, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order,* which contains contributions from three of the most important theorists in contemporary European sociology: Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash. In their joint Preface, the authors

78 Andrea Branzi, *Learning from Milan: Design and the Second Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1989); *Weak and Diffuse Modernity: The World of Projects at the Beginning of the 21st Century* (Milan: Skira, 2006).

79 Heinrich Klotz, *Kunst im 20. Jahrhundert: Moderne—Postmoderne—Zweite Moderne* (Munich: Beck 1994).

80 Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf, *Kritik der neuen Musik. Entwurf einer Musik des 21. Jahrhunderts* (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1998); "Neue Musik am Beginn der Zweiten Moderne", *Merkur,* Vol. 594/595 (1998); "Thesen zur Zweiten Moderne", *Musik & Ästhetik,* Vol. 36 (2005); "Second Modernity - An Attempted Assessment", in Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf, Frank Cox, Wolfram Schurig (eds.), *Facets of the Second Modernity: New Music and Aesthetics in the 21st Century*, Vol. 6 (Hofheim: Wolke, 2008).

81 Cf. Tom Turner, *City as Landscape: A Post Post-modern View of Design and Planning* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1995); Oliver Fahle, *Bilder der Zweiten Moderne: Serie moderner film, Vol. 3* (Weimar, 2005); Peter Ruzicka, "Zweite Moderne und Musiktheater", *Musik & Ästhetik,* Vol. 30 (2004); Tom Turner is an English landscape architect, garden designer and garden historian teaching at the University of Greenwich in London. Oliver Fahle is a theorist of film and media teaching at Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Institut für Medienwissenschaft. Peter Ruzicka was artistic director of the Salzburger Festspiele at the time, who chose "Second Modernity" as the New Music focus of the festival in 2005.

make the welcome suggestion that "the protracted debate about modernity versus postmodernity has become wearisome".[82] Referring to the concept that goes beyond the modern and the postmodern, Ulrich Beck coined the phrase "reflexive modernity or second modernity", and together with his associates diffused the topic of "reflexive (second) modernity".[83] Other notable readings of the new approaches to the changing nature of modernity beyond the limitations of modernism and postmodernism include the "light" or "liquid modernity" of Zygmunt Bauman and Sven Kesselring;[84] Israeli sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt's "multiple modernities";[85] and the "re-modernities" of theologian Markus Vinzent.[86]

---

82 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order* (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 1994).

83 Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a new Modernity*, trans. Mark Ritter (London: Sage, 1992); Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization*; Scott Lash, *Another Modernity: a Different Rationality* (Oxford: Wiley-VHC, 1999); Ulrich Beck and Cristoph Lau, "Second Modernity as a Research Agenda: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations in the 'Meta-Change' of Modern Society", *British Journal of Sociology,* Vol.56.4, (2005): 525–57; Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, "Varieties of Second Modernity: the Cosmopolitan Turn in Social and Political Theory and Research", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol.61.3 (2010): 409–43.

In a recent statement, Beck, Bonss and Lau re-conceptualized reflexive modernization as the second modernity to question and analyse the construction of boundaries within and between societies. This constitutes a programmatic effort to identify the nature of boundary construction and the power to change boundaries. Family, politics, science, and religion were all institutions that promised protection from risks - both natural risks (earthquakes, floods, pandemics, environmental issues) and social risks (unemployment, divorce). In second modernity these systems become part of the problem, not the solution, since they cannot offer the same social integration as they did prior to the 1960s. Finally realizing that this is the case, people can reassess the situation and try to come up with new solutions that better reflect the changes brought by this reflexive modernization. More recently, a special issue of *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 20.2 (2003) was dedicated to various applications of the concept; See Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonss and Cristoph Lau, "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme", *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 20.2 2003:1-33.

84 Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000); *Liquid Life* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005); See also Sven Kesselring, "The Mobile Risk Society", in Weert Canzler, Vincent Kaufmann and Sven Kesselring (eds.), *Tracing Mobilities: Towards a Cosmopolitan Perspective* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008).

85 Shmuel Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities", *Daedalus*, Vol.129.1 (2000):1-30; *Patterns of Modernity*.

86 Markus Vinzent, "'Re-modernity': Overcoming the Divide of Denominations, Religions and Ideological Categories", in Jürgen Court and Michael Klöcker (eds.), *Wege und Welten der Religionen: Forschungen und Vermittlungen* (Frankfurt: Verlag Otto Lembeck, 2009), pp.635-45; "Remodernities" (2010).

While these new approaches may not necessarily provide a convergent perspective on the changing nature of contemporaneity and its discourse, each concept offers decisive implications for a response to postmodernity and different visions of what the whole of the modern entails, as distinct from classical modernity. Thus, the specific concepts reinvented by the new approaches can be regarded as post-postmodern views to grasp the configuration beyond the modern and the postmodern. That is, each of these approaches can be construed as, on the one hand, an attempt to re-conceptualize the continual grounding of the whole modern theme, balanced by revising the modern problems posed by the postmodern critiques; and on the other, to grasp the transformative and discursive modernity under late capitalism and globalism, which previous frameworks were unable to capture. More than anything else, the new approaches engage in reflective speculation on the changes.

Such post-postmodern thinking results from the recognition that the postmodern was not a final solution for social problems produced by the modern, and that "modernity has not vanished but has entered a new phase".[87] Yet while post-postmodern thinking criticises the postmodern, it does not reject the postmodern critique of the modern worldview, and also does not insist on

87 Indeed, there has been no movement beyond the realm of the modern to its opposite, and no clear break with the basic principles of modernity, but rather a transformation of basic institutions of modernity. Laymond L.M. Lee, "In Search of Second Modernity: Reinterpreting Reflexive Modernization in the Context of Multiple Modernities", *Social Science Information*, Vol. 47.1 (2008): 55-69, p.56.

a return to the modern as one single theme.

Consequently, it is not replicates of modernity, nor do they provide a simple conflation of modernity and postmodernity, but rather an understanding of their usage in the context of the decline of postmodernism and the contests over the meaning of modernity. In this context it is beneficial to outline each of the new approaches. In the sub-sections below, this research briefly examines three productive concepts: 1) reflexive/ second Modernity, 2) liquid modernity, and 3) multiple modernities; and then attempts to reformulate "re-modernities" as a complementary and further developed concept.

2.1.2.1 Reflexive / second modernity

Reflexive, or second, modernity is a theory that is pragmatically oriented to questions of reconstruction, as a concern of the political agenda, rather than to deconstruction as in postmodernism. It is embedded within an action-oriented approach to social change that sharpens the awareness of social responsibility and culpability.

Reflexive modernity, as the name implies, involves "rational self-reflection" as the very possibility of rational inquiry, in order to overcome the misreading of the ideal of objectivity advanced by modernist scholarly paradigms.[88] Unlike the anti-foundational perspective of postmodernism, reflexive modernization is decisively programmatic in the sense of utilizing individual freedom to address

88 As Jörn Rüsen rightly points out, postmodernist thinkers fail to recognize that the postmodernist critique of the historical discipline's claim to rationality was itself a form of rational self-reflection.

the risks incurred in the modern context. Individual actors are capable of self-monitoring activities and self-confrontation.[89] The reflexive modernization stands as a first-line of defence against postmodernism in its insistence on the role of rational agency in a world characterized by the runaway effects of modernity.

Reflexive modernity sets itself apart from postmodernity. While postmodernity expressly discarded the truth-claims of classical modernity and the avant-garde, reflexive modernity negates the negation of truth; indeed, it is committed to the guiding principle of truth, and can produce convincing works once again because this self-commitment is much more serious than the emphatic truth claimed in classical modernity.

The issue of uncertainty that lies at the heart of postmodernism is also a major concern in the reflexive modern perspective, but there is a decisive difference in that according to reflexive modernity, this uncertainty must be accepted, or can be pragmatically managed as part of self-monitoring activities that contribute to the way social situations are perceived, assessed and changed. This constitutes a programmatic effort to identify the nature of boundary construction and the power to change boundaries.

2.1.2.2. Liquid modernity

Liquid modernity, which Bauman substitutes for postmodernity, is critically

89 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization*, p.5.

concerned with liquidity, fluidity and lightness of contemporary social conditions. At first glance, the idea of liquid modernity seems to be linked with the postmodern stress on the flexibility and mutability of all relationships as opposed to the inadequacies of solid modernity. However, this new discourse on a liquid foundation can be interpreted as a challenge beyond modernism and postmodernism, in that Bauman criticizes the inability of postmodernism to confront the emerging conditions of inequality in the West and elsewhere, by intensively illuminating the dark side of liquid modernity.[90]

On the other hand, this new approach to the entire modernity is not completely disconnected from postmodernity, because the sense of flexibility and uncertainty implicit in the postmodern has continuity with the concept of social fluidity and liquidity, without abandoning some of its ideas.[91] In other words, the postmodern contains possibility that gives us pause for thought: to take one example, the modern problem of institutional stability has been reinterpreted within certain terms inherent to the postmodern perspective.

This new sense of liquefaction and desultoriness reflects the diminishing role of the spatial dimensions of social life and highlights the central importance of the flow of time and social change. In the time-space duality, it is time associated with change, flexibility, mobility and overall 'lightness' that matters in liquid society. Information moves with the speed of the electronic signal and

90 Bauman is in effect declaring that the present world is still empirically modern and the modern era is not yet over. Moreover, we are not limited to a condition of différance, i.e. an infinite regress of perceptual differences.

91 Bryan S. Turner, "Social Fluids: Metaphors and Meanings of Society", *Body & Society*, Vol. 9.1, 2003: 1-10.

has eroded territorial state power. The liquid and fluid condition suggests that fixed categories have become otiose, unable to reflect rapidly changing circumstances and social cultural upheavals.

In this respect, it can be said that liquid modernity supersedes the growing stability of the modern and de-stability of the postmodern with growing liquidity; form and formlessness with flexible form; solid boundaries and the dismantling of boundaries with flexible boundaries; deconstruction of identity with the flexibility of identity.

Fluidity of identity brings with it a new sense of freedom, as well as challenges to preconceived notions of institutional stability. Liquid situations provide ample opportunities for innovation, thus undermining all efforts to establish formal bases in collective projects.[92] Social change is not just an intrinsic part of any society; it also produces a tendency towards the acceptance of new values underlying our conception of existence.

Modernity appears solid in the sense that the rapid centralization of institutional power overwhelms any individual effort to keep tradition in place, and makes “Western expansion seemingly irresistible”.[93] However, Bauman construed the reflexive process inherent in modernity as having ‘softening’ effects on institutional structures. Thus, new knowledge generated by modernity can be applied reflexively to undermine its apparent solidity.

---

92 Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*.

93 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990), p.63.

2.1.2.3. Multiple modernities

"Multiple modernities",[94] as espoused by Shmuel Eisenstadt, posits a new notion of worldwide modernity that cannot be accounted for by the Eurocentric theories of modernity. The term involves an understanding of modernity entirely different from the idea of singular, homogeneous, teleological convergence in the modernization process, advocating that modernity is not a uniform idea, but takes different forms in different places. In his article based on the comparative sociological approach to modernity, Eisenstadt argues that the best way to understand the modern world is "to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs".[95] By taking into account the plurality, multiplicity, and complexity of world societies and cultures, the idea of multiple modernities allows the possibility of ways of being modern other than one arrived at through a convergent route to an original European modernity. As a result, the unilinear, universal vision of modernity is now seen as having been largely abandoned in the social sciences, in favour of these "multiple modernities".

The viewpoints attributed to multiple modernities seem to represent an extension of the postmodern discourse, undermining modernity's foundation by questioning a universal, unilinear myth of modernity. Yet the idea of multiple modernities is basically a concept of cultural diversity or

94 See Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities", *Daedalus*, Vol.129.1 (2000): 1-30.

95 *Ibid.* p.6.

multiplicity that disputes a universal approach to modernity biased by Western experience, whereas postmodernism poses critical questions for overcoming modernity altogether. For this reason, the implications of multiple modernities are not explicitly critical of modernity as a metanarrative, but rather as a vehicle of Western domination. Hence, this new concept can be regarded as an outcome of globalization issues, focusing on the spread of modernity by challenging the assumption that it is equivalent to the West, but not arguing its demise.[96]

Furthermore, while the idea of multiple modernities recognizes a new complex condition of worldwide modernity, the possibility of other modernities cannot be accounted for by postmodern theorists, because postmodernism does not engage with questions concerning the global spread of modernity and its mutation into multiple forms; rather, it focuses exclusively on propounding the end of modernity.[97]

To summarize, each concept – we deal with 're-modernities' separately below – connotes a particular response to modernism and postmodernism, and represents a different vision and stage of what modernity as a whole entails. Reflexive, liquid and multiple modernities are, however, neither replicates of modernism, nor the inheritance of postmodernism.

Reflexive modernization represents an attempt to reconstruct the foundation

96 Ibahim Kaya, "Modernity, Openness, Interpretation: A perspective on Multiple Modernities", *Social Science Information,* Vol.43.1 (2004): 35-57, p.50.

97 Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities"; Kaya, "Modernity, Openness, Interpretation".

of the first modernity. Liquid modernity offers a view of modernity with a fluid rather than a solid foundation. The idea of multiple modernities suggests the unlimited interconnecting of the modern and the traditional, the local and the global, under the condition of variability. Although these new approaches do not necessarily suggest a convergence of views with regard to reformulating the modern discourse, new empirical studies may possibly demonstrate the varying levels to which these concepts operate as checks and balances in contemporary processes of modern development, such as labour, migration, consumerism, technology transfer and class/ethnic formation. From this comparative exploration it can at least be said that these new approaches to modernity, whatever nomenclature is used, attest to the possibility of re-conceptualizing the foundation of modernity that has been undermined by postmodern scepticism, and may indicate a way to represent various paradigms of what modernity entails in the contemporary world.

As has been seen, these new approaches suggest that modernity is unlikely to return to a singular vision of world-mastery, and it is futile to return to another round of postmodern deconstruction. More importantly, reflexivity, liquidity and diversity, the perspectives informed by the new concepts, place modernity on a multidimensional path that leads not to a single destiny but to a variety of outcomes yet to be systematically studied. Nevertheless, there remains the need to push each of the three concepts further, and to being out their complementarity. If we can reformulate modernity in the light of how reflexivity,

fluidity and diversity will contribute to new social patterns, this is likely to provide a better picture of the direction modernity is taking in different social contexts.

The fact that post-postmodern discourse has been posited in various fields means that while we still live in a time of postmodern habits of thought, the momentum is building for us to break out from the postmodern paradigm. Post-postmodernism is a dialectic attempt to challenge the pervading postmodern worldview.

2.1.3. Reformulating Re-modernities as a Complementary Concept of the Post-postmodern in a Multiple Modernities Context and in a Globalizing Age

If we need a further developed theoretical framework with which to embrace all these gyrations of modern and postmodern thinking, as a tool complementary to the three concepts, how can we conceptualize this? How can we best explicate its basic assumption instilled by the change in contemporary society after modernity and postmodernity?

This dissertation deploys the concept of “re-modernities” for the new challenges that have arisen in the epistemological paradigm shift beyond modernity and postmodernity, and attempts to reformulate the concept as an appropriate theoretical framework, complementary to the comments on

"reflexive/second modernity", "liquid modernity", and "multiple modernities" in philosophy and social theory.

"Re-modernities" was originally developed by Markus Vinzent.[98] His approach shows how the concept is complementarily relevant to a reinterpretation of the major assumptions held by reflexive, liquid, or multiple modernities. Although re-modernities bears a likeness to all three, it also recognizes some limitations to them.[99] For example, the re-modern idea attempts to overcome the fact that reflexive modernity and liquid modernity are biased to the postmodern, and that multiple modernities, in the postcolonial perspective, negates the so-called modern, insofar as multiple modernities hold on to opposite stance against the general modern development. In this respect, the foremost assumption of re-modernities is that modernity is not dead but has entered a new phase, one that has not detached itself from the principles of modernity, but is manifesting critical transformations. As Vinzent argues:

The new, second, liquid or re-modernities are not replicates of modernity, nor

98 Markus Vinzent, "'Re-modernity': Overcoming the Divide of Denominations, Religions and Ideological Categories", in Jürgen Court and Michael Klöcker (eds.), *Wege und Welten der Religionen: Forschungen und Vermittlungen* (Frankfurt: Verlag Otto Lembeck, 2009), pp.635-45; "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, Vol. 32. 2 (August 2011): 143–160. Bruno Latour suggested that the tongue-twisting 'reflexive modernization' might be shortened to 're-modernization': See Bruno Latour, "Is Re-modernization Occurring – And If so, How to Prove It?", *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol.20.2 (2003):35-48.

99 Markus Vinzent first termed the post-postmodern as "re-modernity", and then two years later re-termed it as "re-modernities" in consideration of the contemporary nature of "multiple modernities". Here I will employ "re-modernities". Markus Vinzent is sceptical of naming our contemporary discourse "second modernity" as the child of reflexive modernity because he believes the term "second modernity" rather clouds the continuing importance of postmodernity and deconstructivism, as their contributions are not limited to the "historical achievement of breaking out of a modernity that had become orthodox – blind, stubborn and unproductive – and the retrieval of the medium", or other elements of first modernity. Postmodernity, although an enrichment in debate and literature, was simultaneously an enhancement of theory in its claim of "reductionism" in the sense of an overload of theory that truncates artistic freedom, and similar "centrism", for example the "insistence on a 'strong thought' or a grand narrative that aimed for unity, self-identity and inner systematic".

do they provide a synthesis of modernity and post-modernity. While modernity worked as a 'semantic reduction', constraining and proving truth with 'a desire to cloak its own legitimate creative choices with a sort of scientific and therefore moral justification' by uncovering the reality of society and life, either evolutionally or structurally, a replacement of the earlier revelation of ultimate being, re-modern approaches go beyond an integration of post-modern elements into an outdated modern frame, and rather project unprecedented, 'possible identities.[100]

For Vinzent, the notion of "re-modernities" denotes a certain view of the contemporary world that goes against the classic theories of the modern that were so long prevalent, and the postmodern discourses that succeeded them; it is, rather, a transformative discipline, a sort of combination "between the return to grammar, to the frame, to coordinates and the unstable, free, creative power". In the re-modern viewpoint, postmodernity and modernity are no longer seen as directionally opposite; rather, both tendencies coexist side by side with mutual influence in the transformation of modern history.[101] His re-modern approach attempts "to integrate the critical core questions and suggestions made by postmodern and deconstructive thinkers without

100 Markus Vinzent, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", p.149. The concept of "re-modernities" exactly represents the feature of Markus Vinzent's approach to theology as a fundamentally transformational discipline which by its very nature bridges the concepts of "core" and "periphery".

101 Non-Western societies, especially those in Asian countries, that have imported postmodernity simultaneously with other modern trends developed in the West, do not recognize the inherent antagonism between the postmodern and the modern. In those societies, the two tendencies have developed alongside each other. Jin Woo Lee, Philosophical Understanding of Postmodernism (Seoul: Seokwangsa, 1993)

remaining within their antagonistic frameworks".[102]

What then, is the unique contribution of the re-modern concept? To help answer this question Table 1 sets out distinctions between modernity, postmodernity and re-modernities in order to capture the ways in which the re-modern might be portrayed as a reaction to both the modern and the postmodern. In the table, I draw on Ihab Hassan for differences between modernism and postmodernism (1985),[103] and Sven Kesselring for differences between first and second modernity (2008),[104] while following the analysis of my teacher, Markus Vinzent (2012),[105] for further distinctions between modernity, postmodernity and re-modernities. To the terms provided by Hassan, Kesselring, and more significantly, Vinzent, I add a few of my own for good measure. I say that the re-modern *might* be portrayed as a reaction to the modern and the postmodern because I consider it dangerous and ill-founded to depict complex relations as simple classification and essentialist, when almost certainly the true state of sensibility, the real "structure of feeling" in the modern, the postmodern, and the re-modern, lies in the manner in which these stylistic distinctions are synthesized or reformulated. Nevertheless, I

102 Markus Vinzent, "'Re-modernity': Overcoming the Divide of Denominations, Religions and Ideological Categories", p.635.

103 Ihab Hassan, "The Culture of Postmodernism", *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol.2.3 (1985): 119-32, pp.123-124.

104 Seven Kesselring, "The Mobile Risk Society", in Weert Canzler, Vincent Kaufmann, and Sven Kesselring (eds.), *Tracing Mobilities: Towards a Cosmopolitan Perspective* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008), p.91.

105 Markus Vinzent, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", p.153.

think this tabular schema provides a useful starting point that captures a sense of what the differences might be.

<Table 1-1> Distinction between Modernity, Postmodernity and Re-modernities

Modern	Postmodern	Re-modern (Post-postmodern)
Rationality	**Irrationality**	**Rationality + Irrationality**
Ultimate truth /	Relativism of truth /	Eventual reconstruction of truth
Critique of ambivalence / Certainty	Ambivalence as core concept / Uncertainty	Ambivalence as part of rationality / Certainty and Uncertainty
Cause and Effect	Traces	Inter-disciplinary Reflection
Thesis, Synthesis	Antithesis	Hypothesis
Purpose / Semantics	Play / Rhetoric	Purpose + Play
Subject	**The Death of Subject**	**Emerging Subject, not as Being**
Descriptive/ perfunctory individualism	Expressive/ Atomic individualism	Reflexive Individualism
Essentialism	Existentialism	
Universality	Particularity	Balancing Universality and Particularity
Structure and Rule	Fragmentation and Floating	Rule-based Creativity / Network and Flows
Stability	De-stability	Growing Liquidity
Authoritarian state / Dictatorship	Anarchies	Democracies
Order / Hierarchy	Disorder / Anarchy	Parallelism of Order and Disorder
Grand Narrative	**Mini Narratives**	**Strategic Narratives**
Directional Mobility / Target-oriented	Non-directional / Dispersal without orientation	Multiple-directional Mobility / Process-oriented
Design	Chance	Design-based Creativity and Chance
Expectation Determinism / Determinacy	Unexpected Contingency Indeterminism / Indeterminacy	Expected Contingency Determinism + Indeterminism
Continuity and Evolution	Discontinuity and Disruption	Development
Construction / Innovative Avant-gardism	Destruction / Self-oriented Inventiveness	Re-construction / Refurbishment
Uniformity	**Differences as Relativism**	**Co-operation of Differences**
Form / Type	Anti-form / Mutant, Poly-morphology	Multiplicities of form
Unambiguous and Solid Boundary / Institutionally guaranteed boundaries	The Dissolution of Boundaries	Multiplicities of Boundaries / Contextually determined boundaries
Constancy / Constant	Volatility	Managed Fluidity
Unique Culture	Multiculturalism	Entanglement of Multiple Cultures
Hypo taxis	Para taxis	Multi-dimensional taxis

In contrast to Hassan and Kesselring's comparison, shown in austere counterpoint between the first and the second column, the re-

modern approach goes beyond fixed binary polarities.[106] While postmodernity and second modernity take an opposite stance to the prototypes in classic modernity and first modernity respectively, re-modernities takes partly synthetic prototypes, part co-existence, partly transformative types.

Most importantly, re-modernities represents a new recognition and program that goes beyond the modern and the postmodern. Re-modernities accepts and underlines the importance of what modernity stood for and postmodernism defied: structure, form, grammar, history, and truth; while it equally embraces the achievements of postmodernity, the contradictory discourses fragmented by de-constructivism.[107]

Markus Vinzent has summed up that aspect of the theory of "re-modernities" as follows:

> *The new epistemology does no longer avoid ontological or generic structures, rational rules, natural and traditional settings, but can embrace and make use of even incomplete, imperfect and disarticulated types of cognizance and transform them into new, surprising and complex inventions. Anonymous and distinct, weak and strong, liquid and stable, continuous and ephemeral, natural and supra-natural, science and humanities are no longer opposites or evolutionary stages as in Modernity, neither do they have to avoid or disregard their natures as in Post-modernity, but they can relate to each other*

106 See Hassan and Kesselring's Table.

107 Markus Vinzent, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion".

in prism-like manners to form links and powerful networks.[108]

Here it is clear that the project to understand the nature of this tendency requires recognition of its double-sided aspects, and that it is necessary to integrate reflection on the world as well as to reconstruct what has been dismantled by the postmodern. In this respect, we can understand re-modernities as a re-modelling and refurbishment of modernity, where the original, unique, structure and form for which it was valued are conceived again, not for the sake of preserving fossilized tracks in modern history, but to put to further use in response to changed demands and requirements.

Such distinctions may run the risk of caricature, but there is scarcely an arena of present intellectual practice where we cannot spot some of them at work. In what follows I attempt to take up a few elements of the re-modern in the richer detail they deserve, and to demonstrate their mutually reinforcing character.

First, perhaps the most important concept of re-modernities is the restoration of reflexivity that the postmodern defied, but a reflexivity that sets itself apart from modern self-centred rationality, as emphasized in the concept of "reflexive modernization". Reflexivity is a possibility of revisiting or rethinking the very essence of what human being creates, and the initiative point for full responsibility for that. In this vein, re-modernities is committed to the guiding principle of truth, and this self-commitment is much more serious than the emphatic truth-claims in classical modernity and the avant-garde that

108 *Ibid.* p.7.

postmodernity expressly discarded.

On the other hand, re-modernities takes into account that post-industrial society necessitates "the recognition of ambivalence".[109] The simple modernization followed a logic of ordering and acting that drew sharp distinctions between categories of human beings, religions, things and activities, spheres of action and forms of life that facilitated the unambiguous ascription of competence and responsibilities. Today, however, "the question of system formations that are multivalent, permitting and marking possible ambivalence and transcending borders is now becoming central".[110] The institutionalized dualities and coordinates of national and international, we and others, are dissolved and recast. The logic of non-ambiguity is now being replaced by the logic of ambiguity, which has also become integrated into the objects of thought. Markus Vinzent grasps this as follows:

> *Ambivalence is not only critiqued, nor venerated, but recognized as part of human rationality and therefore embedded in any epistemology. Ambivalence as a marker of our world will continue and overshadow any attempt to develop simple solutions, coherent narratives, logical arguments and global ethics.*[111]

In this respect, as Beck claims with regard to reflexive modernization, re-modernities "essentially means a rationality reform which does justice to the

109 Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991); Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization*, p.10.

110 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization*, p.29.

111 Markus Vinzent, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", p.154.

historical a priori of ambivalence in a modernity which is abolishing its own ordering categories".[112]

Secondly, re-modern appreciation of reflexive rationality indicates the emergence of "the subject" as a reflexive agent, as modernity is presented as "the result of a dialogue between Reason and Subject" by Touraine.[113] The early modern subject can be defined by the subject's struggles against irrational authority, especially, the sacred order, religion in which the subject and rationalism were allies. And then, the alliance between the subject and rationality was renounced after defeating the common foe. From that time, the inherited subjectivity and order gave way to the authority and the organization of productive apparatuses approved by rational mechanism.[114] That is, rationalism reinforces the logic of social integration and therefore, increases an enlightened power's hold over members of society, who are in that sense the subjects of new princes or new ruling forces. This issue right is the point that Foucault highlights. As a result, the postmodern subject transits from the modern procedural subject to the subject to struggle against rationalizing models. In this process, the subject sometimes falls back upon a self-

112 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization*, p.33.

113 Alain Touraine, *Critique of Modernity*, trans. David Macey, (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p.6. In its introduction, he analyses the relationship of the subject to rationality as follows: "the Critique of modernity presented here is intended to extricate modernity from a historical tradition which has reduced it to rationalization, and to introduce the theme of the personal subject and subjectivation. (…) Without Reason, the Subject is trapped in to an obsession with identity; without the Subject, Reason becomes an instrument of might. In this century, we have seen both the dictatorship of Reason and totalitarian perversions of the Subject. Is it at last possible for both figures of modernity, which have either fought or ignored one another, to begin to speak to one another and to learn to live together?"

114 Touraine, *Critique of Modernity*, pp.235, 296-297.

expressive subject without undertaking social roles and responsibility and can manifest itself to the individual only if one possesses exclusively the value, meaning, and even the truth, with distancing themselves from commitment.[115] In re-modern thinking, the subject reconfigures oneself by escaping the subject subordinated to powerful authority or monothetic logic approved by rational mechanism and the self-expressive and atomic subject without commitment, and more significantly by reflecting on one's own actions and situation, to see and experience modes of behaviour as components in a personal life history and by struggling to re-connect the individual to community as an actor. Here, however, the subject does not exist as itself, but emerges through the event.

In this vein, modern individualization can be defined as the procedural/ formal individualization; postmodern individualization as expressive/ atomic individualization; re-modern individualization as reflexive/ community-oriented individualization.

In re-modernities, as multiple boundaries, ambivalence, ambiguity and uncertainty expand, there arises the decisive question of how the new ambivalence can be made acceptable and capable of forming a consensus. The answer in the ongoing process is through communicative process and networks. In the re-modern perspective, the structural presence is maintained, but now the differences are communicative space within and between religions,

115 Touraine, *Critique of Modernity*, pp.282-289.

and within and between denominations. Re-modernization implies the advent of the network society, and the re-modernities concept is called upon to define new boundaries through communicative process. Jürgen Habermas demonstrates its importance as follows:

> *Normally, members of a life world draw solidarity from inherited values and norms, and form established and standardized communicative patterns. In the course of the rationalization of the life world, however, this ascriptive background consensus shrinks or shatters. It has to be replaced by the interpretative accomplishments of communication participants themselves…. in the sphere of the life world, 'rationalization' does not plug the wellsprings of solidarity; rather, it discovers new ones as the old ones run dry. This productive force of communication is also significant for the challenge of 'reflexive modernization'.*[116]

Re-modernities makes one alert to the importance of giving up self-centred scholarship and of stretching out to a cross-disciplinary creative discourse. As Vinzent puts it: "Re-modernity advocates that religious studies can no longer be done without appreciating the inter-connectedness of the economic, the political, the scientific and the environment as well as the ritual, ethnic, linguistic and reflexive levels of human existence." [117] In this respect, communicative process provides ample opportunities for innovation, thus

116 Jürgen Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, trans. Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp.154-155.

117 Markus Vinzent, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion".

undermining all efforts to establish firm bases in collective projects. Beck regards this process as inter-systemic mediating institutions.[118]

Thirdly, the re-modern "decision-making process becomes formulated by both the expectation of unexpected effects"[119] and the expected effect, which means that the epistemological frame shifts from target-oriented directional mobility and non-directional mobility to process-oriented multiple-directional mobility; from determined expectation and unexpected contingency to expected contingency; from continual evolution and discontinued disruption; from development by design and development by chance to design-based creativity and chance; and finally from grand narrative and mini narratives to strategic narratives.

The juxtaposition of the expected and the unexpected reverberate throughout the whole of society in such a way that they have become intractable. Beck defines the expectation of the unexpected consequence in terms of the negative side-effects, as the "risk society".[120] The theorem of unintended consequences and uncertainty becomes, in practice, inseparable from the meaning of initial facts. It envisages that creative development springs from a maze of unexpected associations between heterogeneous elements in multiple dimensions. In this respect, another way of stating what is common to

118 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization*, p.28.

119 Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonss and Christoph Lau, "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization", 21.

120 *Ibid.* pp.1-33.

re-modernities is to use the astronomers' notion of deviation.[121] Deviations are produced by any calculation as whatever cannot be taken into account; they can be positive or negative. Put simply, the re-modern is the expected of the modern plus the unexpected of the postmodern: the law generates laws and something else, and everything that had been put aside as irrelevant or impossible to calculate is back in. Vinzent calls the chaotic element deviation, which we could also call creation. He points out that creativity is a chaotic element inherent in the cosmos, referring to whatever deviates from the straight path of reason and control to trace a labyrinth. Without deviation, there would be no plurality, no cosmos. Thus, we become conscious that consciousness does not mean full control, and the theory of re-modernities opens the way for a productive critique of the theories of modernity and postmodernity; indeed, it necessitates such critiques.

---

121 I owe my development of the theory of Re-modernities to my teacher, Markus Vinzent. He introduced me to a one of the world's most eminent astrophysicists and cosmologists, Martin Rees, and his notion of deviation. In his book, *Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces That Shape the Universe*, Rees explains that the evolution (both physical and biological) of our universe is remarkably sensitive to the values of six numbers. If any of their values were to be 'untuned," there would be no stars or life as we know it in our current universe. He states that during the expansion of the universe after the big bang, if there had been no deviation from the natural laws, nothing would have happened at all. Small deviations from the uniform field of energy precipitated the formation of galaxies and stars, which created the possibility for anything to happen. He says, therefore, that our cosmos came to exist due to the unsharpness of natural laws that would have been. "There are strong reasons for believing that space goes on beyond the limits of our observational horizon. There are strong reasons because if you look in opposite directions, conditions are the same to within one part in 100,000. So if we are part of some finite structure then, if the gradient is so shallow, it is likely to go on much further." See Martin Rees, *Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces That Shape the Universe* (NY: Basic Books, 1999); *From Here to Infinity: A Vision for the Future of Scienc*e (NY: W. W. Norton, 2012).

In a social science perspective, this interpretation can be applied to the notion of "contingency", in a re-modern framework. It can be described as the following equation: One + One is not an exact Two, but 2.00000000….1; that is to say, One + One are Two + something else, which is something that cannot be expected. See Markus Vinzent, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, Vol. 32.2 (August, 2011): 143-160; Hans Joas, "The Age of Contingency", in *Faith as an Option: Possible Futures for Christianity*, trans. by Alex Skinner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012), pp.63-77. Bruno Latour explains the same idea with the economist's notion of externalities; Bruno Latour, "Is Re-modernization Occurring and If so, How to Prove It?", 35-48.

Fourthly, the central argument of "re-modernities" revolves around multiplicity and diversity in the context of multidimensional globalization.[122] The re-modernities theory embraces cultural multiplicity and diversity; indeed, it is impossible to discuss the multifaceted topography without referring to variations in the cultural patterns across our cosmopolitan and global horizon.[123] Rather than the dissolution of boundaries asserted by sceptical postmodernism, or the typical and unambiguous boundary of the modern, re-modernities conceptualizes a multiplicity of contextually determined boundaries, since in its current phase modernity is no longer considered to be an exclusively Western phenomenon, but is undeniably global, and cannot be isolated from the multiple dimensions of the contemporary world. Beck explains that "what we have to explore is precisely the law governing the pluralization of religion with its tendency to abolish old boundaries and redraw new ones".[124] In the same way, unlike modern attempts, re-modernities recognizes that considerations of a complex nature will not necessarily lead to a grand narrative of an all-encompassing theory of time, but rather demand that we overcome categorical thinking.[125]

To summarize, if simple modernization means the "disembedding" of traditional social forms followed by the "re-embedding" of industrial social forms, then re-

122 Markus Vinzent, "Re-modernities"; Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization*.

123 Globalization and Cosmopolitanization are distinct concepts, but here I use the terms as interchangeable.

124 Ulrich Beck (2008) *A God of One's Own*, p.68.

125 Markus Vinzent, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", p.10.

modernities means the “disembedding” and then “re-embedding” [126] of industrial social forms through reflexivity against both the modern and the postmodern paradigms. Its virtues as a critical theory lie in its creative departure from the seemingly endless debates between modernists and postmodernists. Moreover, in contrast to the high abstraction of both modernist and postmodernist versions of critical theory, it has an immediate applicability to social analysis, in that it constitutes a turn towards sociology to diagnose the times.[127]

One of the most important innovations of re-modernities over and against postmodernity is the centrality given to finance and economy. It is the complex sciences that emerged from economics that have become important for the interpretation of the world.[128] Ironically, globalization is both a process of recognition of multiplicity, and simultaneously a process of homogenization stemming from the unimpeded flow of global capital. As developments in science, technology and rationality, bolstered by global capital, exert pressures on all societies and cultures to modernize, reflexivity may be all but obliterated by the juggernaut that sets out to crush boundaries and difference. Scott Lash concentrates on the growing proportion of social, cultural and political interaction going on outside institutions in our increasingly

126 The terms “disembedding” and “reembedding” are from Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck.

127 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization*.

128 Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”, p.14.

disorganized capitalist world.[129] Thus, in re-modern frameworks, global economics represents a crucial agenda for all disciplines, one that requires critical reflection for the future of the global community.

2.1.4. Revisiting Christianity in the Re-modernities Context

How can we re-locate Christianity and theology in our contemporary discourse? Can we bring in a Christian faith that will once again inspire and impact on the formation of the human being as reflexive agent?

Certainly, Christianity and Christian thinking have struggled with the disturbing ideas created by both the modern theorem and the postmodern deconstruction, but in different ways. The essentials of the argument are set out in Table 2. Its contents must, however, be approached with caution, bearing in mind that the distinctions illustrated are essentially fluid, and do not postulate a set of necessary relationships.

In the case of classical modernity, secular certainty was in complete antithesis to religious faith; for example: scientific rationalism vs religious exclusive truth; subjectivity vs religious authority; human progress vs God's providence. On the other hand, postmodern approaches to Christian faith undermine universal truth itself, whether religious or secular, and the postmodern doubt about grand narratives rebuts the modern God as the ultimate other, omnipotent and omniscient. Ironically, however, postmodernism is also averse to an atheism

129 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization*.

that makes absolute, totalistic claims. In this sense, conviction or confidence itself is condemned as dogmatic. As a result, the postmodern deconstruction of truth and subject made it move from substantive grounds of how to live well, to a non-committed aesthetic style of life.

<Table 2> Distinction of Religion between Modernity, Postmodernity and Re-modernities.[130]

Modern	Postmodern	Re-modern (Post-postmodern)
Religion or Religious Institution	Religiosities and Spirituality	Reflexive religions
Monopoly on truth / Exclusive truth narratives	Relative truth Denial of universal truth	Re-construction of truth from the events
Institutional churches / Morphological fundamentalism	Varied forms of the sacred Morphological deconstruction	Institutional religion + Individualized religion
Political religion + Privatized religion	Cultural religion + Political religion Privatized religion	Socio-political religion (public) + Privatized religion
Religious obligation	Industrialization of religion / Culturification of religious industry	Religious responsibility
Progress	Healing, Well-being	Well-doing
Secularization	Secularities	Post-secular
Anti-religious /	De-centring of the religious narratives, but also of the secular	Religion as an option
Atheism	Polytheism / Agnosticism	Reflexive theism or reflexive atheism
Religion vs Scientific rationalism	Denial of universal value	One resource of life's intrinsic worth
As socially redundant	As a recreation	As responsible partner

Nevertheless, the perception that Christianity and its faith are undergoing continual transformations and epistemological paradigm shifts from the modern and the postmodern to the re-modern enables us to revisit Christianity as the re-discovery of religious potentiality.

In the changing contemporary circumstances when post-postmodern thinking

130 Table 2 is adapted from two schematic analyses: Grace Davie, "New Approaches in the Sociology of Religion: A Western Perspective", *Social Compass*, Vol. 51.1 (2004): 73–84, p.76; Markus Vinzent, "Re-modernities", p.153.

is being keenly called upon, it is also increasingly clear that reflection on the role of religion and religious issues is being cast, not as a re-interpretation of idiosyncratic theology or the return to pre-modern and modern dogmatic design, but as the continuation of search and re-discovery to unleash the potential for individuals and the global community to live well.

As a case in point, Marius C. Felderhof's recent book, *Revisiting Christianity: Theological Reflection*, draws on his long experience of teaching theology to university students in extra-religious and multi-religious settings to present a reflection on Christianity and Christian thinking.[131] The book had its beginning in "a common starting point that all people have": "everyone's interest in living well, in effect, in living life to the full", as a teaching method for a diverse audience with different backgrounds.[132] Thus, his revisiting of Christianity is not to defend it from the point of view of a Christian insider, nor to attack it from the perspective of an outsider, but to communicate between the insider and the outsider, and more importantly to abstract from Christian faith and its commitment new insights on how to live well. On this point, Felderhof argues that it is characteristic of religion to provide the overarching frame to "life's intrinsic worth". Consequently, "religious practice is designed to give one the

131 Marius C. Felderhof, *Revisiting Christianity: Theological Reflections* (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011). As he mentions in the Preface, this book is born of his experience teaching Christian theology in higher education to students of diverse background, religious and non-religious, Christian and non-Christian faiths, including Muslims, Jews, Sikhs and Hindus, amongst others.

132 Felderhof, *Revisiting Christianity*, p. vii; See also William S. Campbell, "Marius Felderhof's Contribution to the World of Religious Education", *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, Vol.32.2 (2011):119-123.

confidence to live from it and for it".[133]

As sketched in Table 2, such value-driven theological thinking goes against the postmodern mood that is allergic to the idea of certainty and denies the existence of universal values in the name of cultural difference. Some of those who dislike religion do so because they are suspicious of conviction per se. The line between holding certain noxious beliefs, and holding strong beliefs at all, then becomes dangerously unclear. Certainties may indeed destroy. But they may also liberate.[134]

Moreover, "we cannot keep our mind open forever; we have to start forming an option somewhere".[135] Although we face "significant disagreements on what really matters and no assured methods of gaining agreement", and "a challenge to understand how we can incorporate the valued insights of other traditions", we must choose "which form of life is it to be", and doubtless it is better to take a reflective and self-conscious way rather than be pushed unwittingly into a mould. According to Felderhof, "the purpose of good theology is to help with the examination of our life and to enable us to live more confidently".[136] In this context, the re-modern approach to religious studies entails the confident finalities and underpinning beyond the postmodern thinking. In his answer to the introductory question, "what is the point of

133 Felderhof, *Revisiting Christianity*, p. vii.

134 Jacques Derrida, with his quasi-pathological distaste for certainty and foundation, never seemed capable of grasping that point.

135 Mary Midgley, *Science as Salvation: A Modern Myth and its Meaning* (London: Routledge, 1992), p.50.

136 Felderhof, *Revisiting Christianity*, p. viii.

revisiting generally?", Felderhof presents the new challenge of Christianity as being bound up with the re-modern intellect's striving for groundings and finalities:

> *For those who take an aesthetic approach*[137] *to life, the challenge is to maximize what life has to offer and always to do and to experience something new and different. In such a case 'revisiting' will be seen as going over the same old ground and just a waste of valuable time.*
>
> *Another position might be to see that the world in which we live is always changing whether we like it or not. As one of the ancient Greeks observed, one cannot step into the same river twice. There are no genuine constants. Even when we think we have a firm intellectual grip on something, we know that the meaning of the object of our attention is held fast by what surrounds it. As the surroundings change so does the object itself. In fact Christianity is, and has been, profoundly changed by the world which surrounds it, i.e. by the culture in which it is located. Its sense never remains exactly the same even when we seek to be faithful to its original vision and impetus.*[138]

In this communicative narrative, we find that Christianity can be postulated as a challenge going over the same old ground, and simultaneously, as committed thinking and praxis overcoming "the implicit disengagement from life found in reflective theorizing and in the sheer provisionality of all intellectual conclusions", although Felderhof finished the answer without transparent

137 For the meaning of the aesthetic life as set out by Kierkegaard, See Søren Kierkegaard, *Either–or*, Part 1 and 2, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

138 Felderhof, *Revisiting Christianity*, p. 1.

expression. We can regard his thinking as a re-modern moulding of the search for finiteness.

In this respect, Vinzent's concluding comments on his searching of the volcanic landscape of religion through the critical reading of re-modernities are full of suggestion:

> *Confidence, the opening mood of a re-modern theology, is bound together with responsibility, engagement and involvement, with honesty and the struggle for it. It is not a recipe book for likes and dislikes, but is to be measured against the transformative power that opens futures, not for particular interests or groups, not in accordance with particular beliefs and dogmatic positions, not in random selections, but in an austere and academic process of critical self-reflection and scepticism towards modern and postmodern concepts.*[139]

He demonstrates that a re-modern approach to religious studies enables us to revisit Christianity as a frame of confident reference for responsibility, engagement and involvement. Here, confidence has neither the monothetic determination based on absolute truth, nor the antagonism of the postmodern. What is important now, according with his proposition, is the "need to differentiate between final certainties and orthodox dogmatism".[140] While the latter is a pre-modern or modern concept based on the premise that religion claims exclusive truth and a monopoly on rightness, the former is an honest

139 Markus Vinzent, "Re-modernities", pp.157-158.

140 *Ibid.* p.155.

response to historical events and residual risks through life-embracing reflection. It is based on a principled openness inherited from postmodern thinking, but does not deploy the openness itself as a closed concept, which could become self-destructive.

In this sense, re-modern thinking invites theological thinking to take part in cross-disciplinary academic reflection, because when religious studies or theology appreciate the inter-connectedness of the economic, the political, the scientific and the environmental, as well as the ritual, ethnic, linguistic and reflexive levels of human existence, then religion combined with theology as reflexive religion can become an ally of critical thinking against illusions. A re-modern approach to the study of Christianity leads to confidence in taking responsibility for the potential of living well, for individuals and for the global community.

2.2. From Secularization to Post-secularization

In order to stipulate the specific concept of the post-secular used in this research, we will look briefly into the development of secularization theory, and then examine the growing variety of meanings attributed to the “post-secular”. It would be impossible to locate all the meanings on a single map, but the need to manage the sheer variety has become pressing. The range of meanings draws on many academic disciplines, but here the post-secular concept is concerned with sociological religious studies, social philosophy, and theology.

2.2.1. The Historical Current on Secularization

The classic secularization thesis was proffered around 1900 by Weber and Durkheim,[141] while the modern form emerged in the 1960s,[142] when we notice a decisive turning point through the pioneering work of sociologists such as Peter Berger[143] and Bryan Wilson.[144] They argued that "modernization" would inevitably led to a reduced significance of religion at both the societal and individual levels. The social dislocation, differentiation, specialization and socialization caused by the onset of economic and social modernization would necessarily lead to the eventual collapse of organized religion and the disappearance of Christianity from the public domain. The historical experiences of Europe have been regarded as clear evidence for the validity of "the secularization theory" proposed in the 1950s and 1960s by many sociologists of religion, who were greatly exercised by the collation and

141 See B.R . Wilson, *Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment* (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1969); Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (London: Methuen, [1922] 1966); *The Theology of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: The Free Press, 1947); Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life: A Study in Religious Sociology*, trans. Carol Cosman (New York: Oxford UP, [1915] 2001).

142 Hugh McLeod has emphasized the importance of the 1960s as follows: "In the first half of the twentieth century a fine balance between the forces of religion and secularity remained characteristic of Western Europe and this continued until the 1960s. Only then did the balance tip more decisively in a secular direction." Callum Brown maintains that secularization has indeed happened on a drastic scale only since the 1960s, in spite of the decline in church-going since about 1890; Hugh McLeod, *The Religious Crisis of 1960s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.17; Callum G. Brown, *The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularization 1800-2000* (London: Routledge, 2001). To understand the whole atmosphere of the 1960s, it is necessary to take account of specific changes in terms of religion. This period saw major efforts at church reform and theological modernization. Of these by far the most important was the Second Vatican Council, which took place in Rome from 1962 to 1965. Influential books of liberal theology, such as John Robinson's *Honest to God* (1963), Harvey Cox's *Secular City* (1965), and Joseph Fletcher's *Situation Ethics* (1996) cast doubt on the traditional image and reality of God, causing widespread furore and deep personal anguish to thousands of Christians. There was also the rediscovery of Bonhoeffer.

143 Peter L. Berger, *The Social Reality of Religion* (London: Faber&Faber, 1967).

144 Bryan R. Wilson, *Religion in Secular Society* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969); Bryan R. Wilson (ed.), *Religion: Contemporary Issues: The All Souls Seminars in the Sociology of Religion* (London: Bellew, 1992).

measurement of religiosity, particularly institutional membership and practice.[145] Steve Bruce, a British sociologist of religion who vociferously advocates this quantitative approach and predictive measurement, argues that "this process has accelerated over the last century", and that "in so far as we can measure any aspect of religious interest, belief or action and can compare 1995 with 1895, the only description for the change between the two points is decline".[146] With regard to this assumption, some ardent advocates of the secularist narrative have focused on the impact of industrialization and urbanization in the nineteenth century, others have highlighted the significance of the Enlightenment and the rise of modern science, while yet others have pointed to the French Revolution and the complex of economic, social and political changes that came about in the years around 1900. In spite of these differences, they agree that secularization was the central theme in the religious history of the modern West, and that the roots of this secularization lay deep in the nineteenth, or even the eighteenth, century. The advocates of this secularization theory draw a conclusion based on two assumptions: first, although emerging out of the European context, modernization has become universal, and irresistibly brings about similar social evolution all over the world;

145 Apparently, there remain problematic issues with regard to the secularist's statistic and census data. Taking an example, the data used in the argument about the secularization thesis were selectively chosen and interpreted. Contestation turns on what conclusions can be drawn, and predictions made, from data on falling church membership, Sunday attendance, and use of church-based rites of passage. To scrutinize appropriately the phenomenon of Christian decline, careful consideration is needed, even with regard to the statistics themselves. For example, despite predictions of decay, when the British were asked in the 2001 census "What is your religion?", over 70% identified themselves as Christian. See Hugh McLeod, "Introduction", *The Religious Crisis of 1960s*, p.1.

146 Steve Bruce, *God is Dead: Secularization in the West* (Oxford, Blackwell, 2002).

and second, due to modernization a long-term historical decline in the social significance of religion is inevitable.

However, by the 1990s it had become apparent that religion was not going away, and critics of secularization, who had previously been largely ignored, moved centre-stage in critical social theory and theology. The return of religion in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century defied the conventional theory that had prevailed for two hundred years, and as a result, secularization theory has become the subject of critical discussion among doubters, sceptics and open adversaries. Among the most surprising of reassessments and reversals has been that of Peter Berger, one of the most thoughtful advocates of secularization theory in the 1960s, who in 1999 stated that the "whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labelled secularization theory is essentially mistaken".[147]

Remarkably, the accumulation of a wide range of research has shown that modernization does not always lead to the disappearance of Christianity from the public domain. Indeed, the negative trend seems actually to have been reversed. Furthermore, the fact that Christianity in the United States of America still displays strong vitality and dynamic power tackles the scholars who support secularization theory. A number of researches of religious resurgence in the late twentieth century regarded "American exceptionalism"

147 Peter L. Berger, "The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview", in Peter L. Berger (ed.), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999).

as replacing “European exceptionalism” as the exceptional case of secularization theory.[148] However, as a historian Philip Jenkins points out in his book, *The Coming of Global Christianity*, the revitalization of the Evangelical movement, including Pentecostal charismatic enthusiasm, has expanded not just in the US, but also to an extraordinary degree in Africa, Asia and Latin America.[149] Jenkins’ analysis focuses on the non-Western world, especially “southern Christianity”, and rejects the assumptions of the secularization thesis.[150] In order to make his point, Jenkins puts great emphasis on statistical data, and reflects in some detail on the sociological task, as well as providing various examples. With this in mind, Jenkins is critical of Bruce’s implicit teleology. Thus, historians and sociologists of the late twentieth century have challenged the theory of secularization because of its illogicality in assuming secularization as an inevitable consequence of modernization. This new global vitalization of Christianity has been studied by a number of scholars, notably David Martin (1990, 1999, 2002, 2004), Harvey Cox (1996), Paul Freston (2001), Grace Davie (2002) and Philip Jenkins (2002, 2006).[151]

When we go beyond the statistics to examine the change in institutional

148 Grace Davie, *Europe: The Exceptional case: Parameters of Faith in the Modern World* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002).

149 See Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

150 See Jenkins, *Ibid.*

151 See Bibliography.

topography, what is considered more important is the cultural trend towards overcoming the division between what have been labelled as secular and religious. Callum Brown, the prominent historian who challenged a statistically and institutionally focused approach, forcefully stated that although churchgoing had been in decline in Britain since at least the 1890s, until around 1960 Britain entirely retained its Christian culture and discourse, which shaped individual life-narratives, inculcated moral norms and a sense of sin and guilt, imposed notions of respectability and, in particular, defined concepts of femininity.[152] Moreover, this was leading to a revaluation of the religious history of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, with more emphasis on the central social role of Christianity and the churches and less on secularization. Brown's overarching category of "discursive Christianity" incorporates various elements, such as ritual, economic activity, dress and speech.[153] Similarly, Gordon Lynch speaks not of crisis of faith or churches, but of a cultural trend.[154] Moreover, Grace Davie, in her sociological research, advocates an examination of the persistence of "the beliefs of ordinary British people and the significance of these beliefs in everyday life".[155] Those who have no involvement in the church still continue to believe in God, to pray, and to call themselves Christians. It is useful to recall Davie's famous aphorism,

152 Callum G. Brown, *The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularization 1800-2000* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp.16-34.

153 Hugh McLeod, "Introduction", *The Religious Crisis of 1960s*, p.4.

154 See Gordon Lynch, *Generation X* (London: Darton, 2002).

155 Grace Davie, *Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing without Belonging* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p.5.

"believing without belonging", which acknowledges the persistence of the sacred memory, despite an undeniable decline in church activity.[156] Reinterpreting census data and analysis of rites of passage, and drawing on anthropological insights, she contends that while many Britons have ceased to directly connect with or belong to their religious institutions in a formal and active sense, they have not abandoned "their deep-seated religious aspirations or latent sense of belonging", and as the institutional disciplines decline, "belief not only persists, but becomes increasingly personal, detached and heterogeneous".[157] The movement away from regular church attendance and institutional practice is linked by Davie to broader social movements, such as changes in the use of leisure time, and rejection of institutional authority and associational culture, rather than being seen as a proof of secularization.[158]

At the interpretative level, during the 1990s commentators such as Jeffrey Cox,[159] David Martin and Werner Ustorf[160] led a more radical attack that questioned the whole concept of secularization thesis.[161] They identified a

156 *Ibid* pp.93-116.

157 Grace Davie, *Europe: The Exceptional Case - Parameters of Faith in the Modern World* (London: Darton Longman & Todd, 2002), pp.2-8.

158 Grace Davie, "Praying Alone? Church-going in Britain and Social Capital: A Reply to Steve Bruce", *Journal of Contemporary Religion*", Vol.17.3 (2002): 329-334.

159 Jeffrey Cox, "Secularization and other master-narratives of religion in modern Europe", *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte*, Vol.14. 1 (2001): 24-35.

160 Werner Ustorf, "Global Christianity, New Empire and Old Europe", in Frans Wijsen and Robert Schreiter (eds.), *Global Christianity Contested Claims* (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi B. V., 2007).

161 This comprehensive understanding and insight came from my teacher Hugh McLeod's Lecture. Hugh McLeod, "CIHEC and The Development of Modern Church History since 1950". The paper was presented at conference on Ecclesiastical History in Stockholm, 27-28 February, 2008.

need to escape the confines of the all-too pervasive master narratives, which are not only "teleological, Eurocentric, deterministic and deceptively value-laden",[162] but their narration of the rise and fall of religion is inadequate, since it reflects only their secularist ideological conceptions, without allowing for the possibility of transformation.[163]

This discussion begins with the following radical questions: What is the central social role of Christianity and the churches in contemporary modernization? What is the difference between statistical change and the transformation of religious consciousness? Are we facing "a religious crisis" or "a new possibility"? Are the modern culture and social structure essentially incompatible with the organized religious institutions, or the whole of Christianity? These questions lead to a revaluation of the Christian history of the latter half of the twentieth century, with more emphasis on the central social role of Christianity and the churches, and less on secularization.

2.2.2. A Critical Reflection on the Secularization Theories, and Re-defining Secularization

Unfortunately, the term "secularization" has long been used in so many different ways that there is a great danger of misunderstanding. We must

162 Jeffrey Cox, "Master Narratives of Long-Term Religious Change", in Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf, *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.205.

163 David Martin, "Secularization and the Future of Christianity", *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, Vol. 20.2 (2005): 154-160, p.145.

distinguish between the diverse philosophical, political, social, and theological uses of the term, because the claims in the secularization debate very much depend on one's definition of secularization. The Spanish-American sociologist of religion, José Casanova, rearticulates the concept of secularization by making clear distinctions between three different uses of the term: 1) the decline in the importance of religion, 2) the privatization of religion, and 3) the liberation of the socio-political spheres.[164]

First, the term refers to a decline in the importance of religion. However, as Hans Joas points out, it is not clear whether this means a decline in the significance of religious practices, a fall in the number of those belonging to churches and religious communities, or the fact that fewer people adhere to certain articles of faith. Habermas maintains that the reason for these phenomena is that "scientifically enlightened minds cannot be easily reconciled with theocentric and metaphysical worldviews".[165] In this respect, it is useful to consider Simon Green's point: "conventional wisdom and common sense suggest that the people stopped going to church because they no longer believed what the churches taught them. Perhaps the causal mechanism was really closer to the opposite: they stopped believing because they stopped going."[166]

---

164 José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

165 Jürgen Habermas, "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society", p.17

166 Simon J.D. Green, *Religion in the Age of Decline: Organization and Experience in Industrial Yorkshire,1870-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.390-1.

The second usage of the term refers to the privatization of religion, with functional differentiation of social subsystems. The churches and other religious institutions lose their control over law, politics, public welfare, education and science; they restrict themselves to their proper function of administering the means of salvation, withdraw into the private sphere, and in general lose public influence and relevance.

Finally, secularization can refer to the emancipation of societal spheres from direct religious control, which means that the exercise of legitimate state power takes place in secular terms, while all citizens can freely exercise their religious freedom and worship one God, another God or no God at all, and the churches and state are neatly separated. This is political secularism in the sense captured by the French term “laïcité”: “religious neutrality”.

It is evident that any or all of the three dimensions outlined by Casanova make the broad secularization theories considerably more precise as well as more empirically manageable, and these distinctions offer valuable assistance to any evaluation of whether secularization has in fact occurred in any given context, albeit that there remain important disagreements. However, these distinct articulations can be regarded only as a first step towards fathoming the concept, as further uncertainties immediately arise. There are, for example, other ways in which secularization could be conceptualized: as a weakening in the authority of the faith that is still embraced or as the re-symbolization of ancient creeds in ways that accommodate the modern world. Further, each

one of these sub theses should be empirically and separately studied in the context of concrete historical cases.

Nevertheless, Casanova's clarification enables scholars writing on the topic today to begin with the premise that secularism is not simply the absence of religion, but rather an intellectual and political category that must itself be understood as a historical construction. It also tends to render the place of religion in public life more accessible to modification by means of law and public policy, without doing much to mute the significance of the deeper currents of religion. Historians and sociologists who claim they no longer accept the classic secularization theory, at least in its modern form, have created a valuable body of alternative scholarship. Now, secularization, understood as the expectation that religious conduct would first confine itself within private walls and subsequently would disappear from modernized societies, has given way to a "post-secular" appreciation of the persistence and increased visibility of religion.

2.2.3. Notes on the "Post-secular"

Why are we beginning to use the term "post-secular"?[167] It is because it is

167 The notion of "post-secular" has emerged to great surprise in the recent writing of Jürgen Habermas. For a detailed list, see footnotes 163 & 165.

This paper proposes a definition of the term "post-secular". It discards two possible modes of understanding: that the post-secular means de-secularization, and that it means post-secularity, a regime change that brings society back to religion. Instead, it suggests that the post-secular is a condition of co-existence of the secular and religion, which can be conceptualized in three dimensions: normative, sociological-political-historical, and phenomenological. Each of these three dimensions is characterized by a tension: Kantian vs. Hegelian tradition in the normative; model vs. practice in the sociological-political-historical; and individual vs. collective in the phenomenological post-secular.

increasingly apparent that the secularization theories should no longer be taken for granted, and we are now settling down into a new phase of secularism.

In recent years the concept of the post-secular, as initiated by Jürgen Habermas,[168] has steadily been proliferating in the social sciences, philosophy and cultural criticism, in the humanities as well as theology.[169] The issue has been contemplated at numerous conferences and seminars: University of Groningen, The Netherlands, International and Multidisciplinary Conference*, Religion, Politics and the Post-secular City,* 12-15 November 2008; Yale University, *Exploring the Post-secular*, 3-4 April 2009; NYU Institute for Public Knowledge and the Social Science Research Council, *Rethinking Secularism: Exploring the Post-Secular*, 12 February 2009; Washington University in Saint Louis (Missouri), Religious Studies Conference, *Debating Secularism in a Post-Secular Age*, 9-10 April 2010; Åbo Akademi University, Finland, *Exploring the Post-secular,* 24 May 2010; Roskilde University, Department of Society and Globalization, Denmark, *Post-secular Conditions?: Challenges to Citizenship, Democracy, Law and Social Cohesion*, 8-10 December 2010; The University of Bologna, Faenza, in the Centre for the Study and Documentation of Religion and Political Institutions in Post-secular

168 Jürgen Habermas, "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society".

169 For a helpful overview of various uses of the term “post-secular”, see James A. Beckford, “Public Religions and the Postsecular: Critical Reflections”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 51.1 (2012):1–19. See also Joh D. Boy, “What we talk about when we talk about the postsecular”, *The Immanent Frame*, 15 March, 2011, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/03/15/what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-the-postsecular/.

Society, *Politics, Culture and Religion in the Post-secular Society*, 12-13 May 2011.

Furthermore, the list of book titles containing the term "post-secular" is continually lengthening. It includes, for instance, *Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology; Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World; The Politics of Postsecular Religion; Milton and the Post-Secular Present: Ethics, Politics, Terrorism;* and *The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society*.[170]

In that case, what exactly do we mean when we refer to the post-secular? Although we cannot easily reach a point of agreement on the meaning of post-secular, it can certainly be said that the piling up of references to it signals an important epistemic change in thinking about religion and secularism, and a willingness among scholars to go beyond classic secularization theory in their academic endeavour.

The purpose here is first to assess the variety of meanings attributed to the term, to articulate theoretically what it means in the description of contemporary modern societies, and then to raise questions about the extent to which the meanings attributed to the post-secular are coherent and

170 Phillip Blond (ed.), *Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology* (London and NY: Routledge, 1997); Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds.), *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World* (New York: Fordham UP, 2006); Ananda Abeysekara, *The Politics of Postsecular Religion: Mourning Secular Futures* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2008); Feisal G. Mohamed, *Milton and the Post-Secular Present: Ethics, Politics, Terrorism* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2011); Philip S. Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society* (NY and London: New York University Press and SSRC, 2012).

consistent, because the widespread fashion of distinguishing all kinds of new phenomena from familiar phenomena merely by adding the preposition “post” has the disadvantage of indeterminacy.

Let us begin with Jürgen Habermas, who is usually credited with developing a “post-secular” perspective. Since his 2001 lecture on Faith and Knowledge,[171] Habermas has included post-secular perspectives in his diagnoses of current problems in politics, social life and morality, and thus the term can no longer be ignored. Habermas’s notion of a post-secular constellation has appeared in a number of his English language publications,[172] but the clearest statement of his thinking about the relation between secularization and post-secularity is his article “Notes on a Post-Secular Society”.[173] Habermas refers to a post-secular turn as “a change in consciousness” arising from three phenomena in recent modern society:

First, contrary to a long belief that the disappearance of religion is inevitable, a widespread recognition that religious communities still play an important public role in very many regions of the world, and awareness of the global religious conflicts arising from the increasing influence of religion in public life,

171 The term first appeared in his German Peace Prize lecture under the title, “Glauben und Wissen” in October 2001. Habermas characterizes a post-secular society as one in which “religious communities persist in a secularized environment”; a constellation which in his opinion refutes earlier and stricter formulations of the secularization thesis.

172 Jürgen Habermas, *The Future of Human Nature* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); “Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism”, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol.13.1 (2005):1-28; “Religion in the Public Sphere”, *European Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.14.1 (2006):1-25; Jürgen Habermas (et al.), *An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-secular Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).

173 Jürgen Habermas, "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society".

change public consciousness. As Jürgen Habermas argues, “the awareness of living in a secular society is no longer bound up with the certainty that cultural and social modernization can advance only at the cost of the public influence and personal relevance of religion”.[174]

Secondly, religion is gaining influence not only internationally but also locally. Habermas argues that churches and religious organizations are increasingly assuming the role of “communities of interpretation” in the public arena of secular societies.[175] For many people religion functions as a source of values and norms, and in many societies today religion has social and political implications. Therefore, Habermas argues, post-secular culture must openly recognize religion not just as a set of private beliefs but as an all-embracing source of energy for the devout, and, in fact, for the wider society.

Thirdly, the growing numbers of immigrants from “traditional cultural backgrounds”, and the presence of their communities within a disparate society, bring about changes in public consciousness, raising questions of how such immigrant cultures can be integrated into the wider society and how different religious communities can coexist amicably. New immigrant communities shape the individual practical attitudes of human beings in a variety of cultural ways; they influence cultural life, and they are part of public discourses and political processes.[176]

---

174 *Ibid.* p.20.

175 *Ibid.* p.19.

176 Jürgen Habermas, “Faith and Knowledge”, in *The Future of Human Nature* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).

Based on a new perception of these changes, Habermas uses the post-secular concept to signal the persistence of religion in contemporary society and its renewed visibility in the public sphere, to denote religious potential as a new ethical and political resource, and to imply a new global context in which we face the question of how we can incorporate the relativity and diversity of the valued insight offered by religion under the circumstance of its increasing influence in public life.

As Habermas notes, the post-secular as primarily a matter of consciousness also gives us pivotal pause to rethink the secularist conviction that religion will eventually disappear in the continuing process of modernization. What he is promoting is a post-secular self-understanding of society as a whole, in which the vigorous continuation of religion in a continually secularizing environment must be reckoned with.

More significantly, his post-secular concept implies the corresponding need to rethink the relationship between faith and politics by reflecting upon political-philosophical convictions that were taken for granted in earlier discussions, notably those associated with the liberal-secular nation state. Taking a normative stance, this poses a challenging question about how to participate in a post-secular society. Habermas asks:

> *How should we see ourselves as members of a post-secular society and what must we reciprocally expect from one another in order to ensure that in firmly entrenched nation states, social relations remain civil despite the growth of a*

plurality of cultures and religious world views?[177]

Habermas's proposal that the key task is to get deeply religious people and naturalistically inclined minds to take a more consciously charitable attitude towards one another is unpromising. [178] The agenda has now changed, with new questions being raised about tolerance and the development of effective and ethical social relations.

Habermas remains firmly committed to a number of residual secularist beliefs, both in the descriptive guise of European modernization-as-secularization and in the normative guise that a successful modernization should result in a polity based on secularist principles.

However, Habermas's assertion of the post-secular has some problematic factors, not least the conceptual vagueness of the "post" in the term postmodern: is it to be taken as a signal of anti-secularism, does it mean what comes after secularization, or does it imply a new phenomenon beyond secularism? Above all, by mixing up empirical and normative assumptions, his post-secular argument raises doubt as to whether the post-secular is an empirical concept, a normative ideal, or a mere catchphrase not backed by any substantial philosophical argument or analysis.

More specifically, from an empirical standpoint, one can question the extent to which we have had a secular era, and if so, whether we have indeed passed

177 Jürgen Habermas, "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society", p.17.

178 Jürgen Habermas, "Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism", *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol.13.1 (2005): 1-28, p.26.

through a secular period to emerge into something beyond the secular. Have we really entered into a post-secular age? In particular, I wonder whether Habermas believes that phenomena implying "the return of religion" in the public sphere signify an increase in religious thought, feeling and action, or merely an increase in the salience of questions about religion in political circles, in the media, and among the public.

In the same vein, the chronology of the "post-secular" remains unclear: how are we to demarcate before and after? Again, one can question whether we are dealing just with a change in cultural current, or with a new era in terms of social structure.

Another problematic point concerns the normative aspect of his post-secular concept. Indeed, his post-secular constellation is closer to a normative notion than to the empirical or historical. That is, his primary concern is how we use the potential value of religion for sound morality and politics in the public sphere, rather than how religion has transformed in the late modern period; he is interested only in the functional value of religion, without respecting its intrinsic substantial value.[179] This recognition that religious and spiritual arguments have a right to be heard in civil society is probably why he felt the need to use the term "post-secular". His standpoint is deeply rooted in

179 Candice Dias and Justin Beaumont, "Postsecularism or Late Secularism? Faith Creating Place in the US", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban* (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2010), pp.267-80.

secularist and modernist assumptions rather than a neutral analytical category. As a result, his examination of the process of religious transformation is necessarily limited; from his secular viewpoint, it is not possible to gain the deep understanding of the religious that is required to truly comprehend religious possibility.

Nonetheless, his framing continues to have widespread impact on the discussion regarding the relationship between the secular and the religious and the location and role of religion in the public sphere. Of course, the discussion of the 'post-secular' ranges beyond Habermas, where perhaps more nuanced variations on the theme, capable of promoting a better understanding of the secular, are being developed.

Now, let us move on to the growing variety of concepts attributed to the post-secular. This term has often been employed in two interconnected ways, blending the empirical and the normative, as Habermas did. However, as aforementioned, such usages of the term introduce confusion and misconceptions, hindering our understanding of both the religious and the secular. Thus, to clarify the concept, we need to analyse the different stances of post-secular ideas according to the way of approaching religion and its phenomena.

First, in empirical description, particularly in studies that undertake global comparative observation and wide analytical overview, the post-secular

concept has been used to explain the return of religion in the modern world, and the persistence of religious influence in the public sphere. Once again, this observation is divided into two different phenomena, but these overlap one another. On the one hand, the post-secular provides a conceptual framework that can account for the unexpected resilience and development of religion beyond the paradigmatic assumptions of the secularization theory. In this case, secularization theory is seen as an unreliable guide to processes of religious change and as nothing more than an ideological obfuscation or a self-serving ploy implemented by rationalist intellectuals, while the post-secular position is seen as an abandonment of or a corrective to secularization.[180] On the other hand, the post-secular turn derives from a new visibility of religion in the public sphere, and the relevance of religious views to socio-political issues. This conceptual core of post-secularity is closely related to the persistent location and role of religion in civil society, as described in José Casanova's terms "public religion" and "de-privatization" as opposed to the "privatization of religion".[181] Extending this argument, Justin Beaumont notes that the post-secular involves more than the persistence of religious influence in the public sphere; it also means the interplay of diverse religious actors and organizations, humanists and secularists, within "the secularized social

180 David Martin, *The Religious and the Secular: Studies in Secularization* (Oxford: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969); *On Secularization: Toward a Revised General Theory* (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2005).

181 José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*.

structures of modern late capitalism".[182]

Concomitantly, the post-secular refers to the change of epistemological horizon in the understanding of religion. A closely related view of the post-secular is that it amounts merely to a "revision of a previously overconfidently secularist outlook rather than a 'return' of religion to a stage on which it had once been absent".[183] This sense of the post-secular is similar to that attributed to Hans Joas:

> *After all, the term post-secular, if it is to be meaningful, must refer to a change vis-à-vis an earlier phase. But it is not clear when this earlier secular society is supposed to have existed and what one can actually mean by the term. . . . [Secularization] might refer to religion's loss of significance but also to the emergence of modern, religiously neutralized statehood. By no means do these two always coincide. From a global perspective, it would be quite wrong to say that religion is declining in importance. Despite the further spread of industrialization, urbanization, and education of the past few decades, all world religions have retained or increased their vitality. . . .*
>
> *But if the assumption that modernization necessarily leads to the retreat of religions is losing its plausibility, the term post-secular, together with the notion that Islam is out of sync with technological advances, is also beginning to look shaky. Post-secular now expresses not a sudden increase in*

182 Justin Beaumont, "Transcending the particular in postsecular cities", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban*, p.6.

183 Austin Harrington, "Habermas and the 'post-secular' society", *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol.10.4, (2007):543–560, p.547.

religiosity following its epoch-making decline - but rather a shift in the consciousness of those who had felt justified in regarding religions as moribund. For Habermas, a society that "adapts to the fact that religious communities continue to exist in a context of ongoing secularization" is post-secular. But who exactly had failed to adapt to this continued existence? It would perhaps have been better to admit in self-critical fashion that one had underestimated religion - rather than dressing one's mistake up in a term redolent of epochal change.

The second possible meaning of secularization comes into play here. This spotlights not the decline of religion but the restrictions put on its potential impact in a secularized, that is, religiously neutralized, state. Here, post-secular does not mean that religion is becoming increasingly important or that people have begun to pay it more attention but that the secular state or the public has changed its attitude toward the continued existence of religious communities and the ideas generated by them. Once again, though, the question is whether post-secular is the right word for such a transformation. It is not the secular state that is being overcome but merely a secularist self-image.[184]

According to Joas' argument, the concept of the post-secular does not imply that we now live in a radically different age compared with the mid-1960s, when Harvey Cox's *The Secular City* first appeared; people are no more or

184Hans Joas, "Post-Secular Religion: On Jürgen Habermas," in *Do We Need Religion: On the Experience of Self-Transcendence* (Boulder, Col: Paradigm Publishers, 2008), pp.106-107/124. See also Hans Joas, "Society, State and Religion: Their Relationship from the Perspective of the World Religions: An Introduction", in Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (eds.), *Secularization and the World Religions* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), pp.1-22.

less religious than they were before, it is just the cognition of religion that has transformed. In this sense, even Europe can be regarded as post-secular. The errors of secularization theories have supposedly been corrected and assimilated into scholarly knowledge; and scholars have been sensitized to the flourishing of predominantly individualized and highly diverse forms of religiosity. In this vein, some thinkers prefer to see it as a progressive development that builds on the achievements of both religion and secularism. Kim Knott, for example, argues that "religious, secular, but also postsecular positions were coproduced and contested".[185] This leads her to the view that British cities can be "simultaneously more religious, more secular (or secularist), and postsecular".[186]

The second concept of the post-secular is a normative stance, which has emerged as a form of radical theorizing and critique prompted by contemporary socio-political questions of what the relationship between the religious and civil society should be; how political secularism should be applied, and how generally we are best advised to live under the coexisting circumstances of the religious and the secular. These questions are not concerned with the trajectories of phenomenological transition of religion itself, but rather with the socio-political context encountered with the changes of

185 Kim Knott, "Cutting through the postsecular city: A spatial interrogation", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban* (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2010), p.21.

186 Kim Knott, "Cutting through the postsecular city", p.34.

religious landscape. Such a post-secular position casts doubt upon whether values such as democracy, freedom, equality, inclusion, and justice are necessarily best pursued within an exclusively unreflective secular framework. These ideas are at the centre of the recent writings of Habermas.

In the same vein, but as a useful complement to Habermas' conception, Charles Taylor specifies three types of secularity: the first comprises the separation of church and state, where the religious is removed from the explicit state; the second type of secularity is one where religious practice and belief decline, while in the third faith is "one human possibility among others". Taylor calls this last mode, 'Secularity 3'. Here, he describes a secularity that is flexible and responsive, a phenomenological transformation of the experience of believing, not the death of religion (Christianity). In other words, the root of the notion of the secular is a contrast not to religion, but to transcendence. In his book *A Secular Age*,[187] Taylor argues that we are living in a world in which the intrinsically secularizing "immanent frame"[188] has become a perfectly reasonable option, and perhaps even the "default setting" for many people. What matters is that the subjective experience of believing has changed entirely; people have come to see this immanent frame as the normal, natural, tacit context for much or all of their action, and this changes both religious belief and religious engagement. That experience has undergone a

187 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007).

188 *Ibid.* pp.539-93.

transformation from being the unquestioned framework shared by everybody in a natural, unreflective way, to being one among many options available, none of which can be seen as having a privileged status within society. People may continue to believe, not any longer in the unreflective and naïve way that characterizes societies that are not secularized, but with consciousness of and experience from and within what Taylor calls the prevailing immanent frame, that is, a whole cultural horizon that identifies the good life with human flourishing, and accepts no allegiance or obligation to anything beyond human flourishing.

More radically, the renewed interest in the role of religion in social life can also be traced to a post-secular turn in social philosophy, for instance Marion's God without Being or religion as a saturated phenomenon; Gauchet's Christianity as the religion at the end of religion or of the exit from religion; Blond's set of alternatives to relativism and nihilism; Derrida's religion without religion.[189]

In summary, the meanings associated with the "post-secular" are so varied and shot through with uncertainty as to whether it refers to a concept or a reality, and in some cases mutually incompatible, that it is impossible to articulate a general concept implied by the term. In a very general sense, post-secular discourse derives from perception of the limits of the classic

189 Jean-Luc Marion, *God without Being*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson, with a forward by David Tracy (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, trans. Oscar Burge (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997); Phillip Blond (ed.), *Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology* (London and NY: Routledge, 1997); Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo(eds.), *Religion,* trans. David Webb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

secularization theory in its conceits and ontological assumptions, particularly the very possibility of a clear-cut distinction between religious and secular in a broader context of identity formation and ethical engagement with deep-seated sensitivities. However, here we need to be sure that to speak of the post-secular does not necessarily lead to a stance opposite to the secular, one driven largely by anti-secular rhetoric. The distinctiveness of this approach to secularism rests neither upon a sweeping condemnation of the hegemony of the secular outlook, nor upon a simplistic multicultural appeal for peaceful coexistence between secular and religious perspectives. Rather, the post-secular thinking represents a refinement - or a more productive phase - of secularity.

In order to help resolve any long-running debates or questions in the scientific study of religion, we need to draw distinctions between and assess the relevance of the different usages of the term post-secular: empirical or normative, albeit that the possibility of a questionable conflation between the concept and the things to which it is supposed to refer cannot be denied. Therefore, the question of the post-secular should be posed in a new way, not in an approach that mixes up the empirical and the normative, but separately, with appropriate methods applied to each.

2.2.4. Redefining Post-secular: not as anti-secular, but as infra/ultra-secular beyond Habermas's Post-secular[190]

What points of the post-secular discussion can we set as an appropriate and relevant method to this research? Does the establishment of a useful new approach to the study of religion imply a shift towards social philosophy or "post-secular social science"? What implications, if any, does this have for the social sciences?

In this research, in pursuit of a proper understanding of the current transformation of Christianity and the potential value of Christianity as a reflexive agent in the public sphere, rather than stating a general definition of the post-secular, I will seek to establish a specific post-secular concept through two different ways of approaching it, namely, the empirical and the normative.

Here, the post-secular idea is not concerned with turning back the clock or simply opening ourselves up anew to the all-embracing joys of the religious life and spiritually driven enquiry. Rather, it is a matter of applying to secularism the sort of probing and sceptical analysis previously meted out to religious apologetics, whenever the latter was thought excessively to govern empirical or philosophical understanding. This research takes the post-secular to signal at least a reflexive stance towards secularism/secularity.

190 Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere", p.3. For a critique of Habermas's notion of a post-secular constellation, see Hans Joas, "Post-Secular Religion", pp.105-111.

From an empirical-sociological point of view, it would be self-supportive to interpret a worldwide resurgence of “global religions” as the “return of religion” or “God is back”; and claims that we are now living in a “post-secular age” or a “post-secular society”, implying the dominance of religion over the secular, could only be based on a false assumption, derived from antagonistic perspectives between the religious and the secular. Statistics of rise and fall in mainstream religious institutions simply illustrate disparities according to particular social contexts, rather than the relative merits of religiosity and modern secularity. Hence, it would make little sense to try to assess whether any particular country or region had actually entered a post-secular age, or whether any one period was more or less religious than any other. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the resurgence of religious phenomena in a global comparative perspective is a return to traditional institutionalized forms of religion that feature enchantment and religious authority, or a movement towards newly emerging non-dogmatic or “spiritual” forms of religion. Although reflexive exploration on both the religious and the secular weakens the notion of an automatically advancing process of secularization, and certainly opens up opportunities to faith, today’s religious resurgence cannot and should not be equated with de-secularization of the world. Therefore, the post-secular may signify “at most a revision of a previously over-confidently secularist outlook, rather than a return of religion to a stage

on which it had once been absent".[191]

With regard to the sociological phenomena of the growing visibility and influence of religion in the public sphere, there is a widespread perception that religious voice and action are still sustainable and valuable, especially in social service delivery, irrespective of the type of religious institution or other type of religious group, such as faith based organizations or individual actors. Here, the post-secular concept is used to explain how religion interacts with modern societies on the basis of structural independence from the state but in reaction to requests from the civil society.[192] Thus, it is much more acceptable and relevant to see the post-secular concept, with regard to the new visibility of religion in the public sphere, as a change in the way that religion engages with the civil society: "from dominance to movement", rather than "de-privatization" or "resurgent status of public religion".[193]

With regard to the normative aspect of the post-secular, the copious literature on the topic is shot through with the normative orientation that refers to a concept rather than a reality, which means that concern with empirical evidence and analysis may remain relatively underdeveloped, just theoretical

191 Austin Harrington, "Habermas and the "post-secular" society", p.547; Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (eds.), *Secularization and the World Religions* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009).

192 Jürgen Habermas, "Faith and Knowledge", in the acceptance speech delivered on the occasion of the awarding of *the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade* in Frankfurt on October 14, 2001. In his speech, Habermas focussed on the role of religions in the modern society.

See also Hans-Georg Zieberts and Ulrich Riegel (eds.), *Europe: Secular or post-secular?* (London, New Brunswick: Lit Verlag, 2008), p.26; D. Herbert, *Religion and Civil Society: Rethinking Public Religion in the Contemporary World* (Aldershot: Ashgate); R. Neville (ed.), *Religion in Late Modernity* (Albany: Suny, 2002).

193 See Chapter 4 for detailed discussion of this subject.

and speculative. Nevertheless, in normative terms the post-secular idea still poses the significant challenge of how we should incorporate relativity and diversity in a multi-dimensional society, and where we should find alternative inspiration when all the norms have evaporated. From a normative stance, Habermas argues that the post-secular idea must openly recognize religion not as a set of private beliefs but as an all-embracing source of energy, not only for the devout but for the whole society.[194] In this vein, a post-secular approach to religious studies allows the possibility of subject, truth, and universal value, poses the question of how to live well in the non-committed and non-directional condition dismantled by postmodernism, and offers the potential value of Christianity as a reflexive agent in the public sphere.

We have to note here, however, that the post-secular idea of this research lies on the line of the post-postmodern approach established earlier in the study. The re-modern post-secularity differs from the post-secular concepts developed by postmodernism. Indeed, as Eagleton points out, a vitriolic attack by the postmodern on modern secularism was in part responsible for launching the post-secular stance at both the empirical-sociological and the normative levels. The continuing realization of radically plural societies in terms of religions, faiths and beliefs within diverse urban societies appeals for peaceful coexistence. Postmodern theology challenges the assumption that secularism is irreversible; some have suggested that we are now entering a post-secular

194 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, 7-10.

age, but have also made it clear that the religion that is being revitalized must be different from modern faith. Let me exemplify this claim by examining one "postmodernist" expression of post-secularism, noting first that several prominent figures within poststructuralist social theory have pointed to new forms of "re-enchantment" in the world, or highlighted the sacred forms of "bare life", or insisted that the received view of modernity itself as being thoroughly disenchanted is plain mistaken.[195] On this account, the post-secular idea of the postmodern simply comes from anti-sympathy to secular reason and aversion to an atheism that makes absolute, totalistic claims, that is, an anti-secular stance rather than revision or renovation of rigid classic secularization. Such phenomena could indicate a postmodern post-secular turn.

In contrast, here, when we speak of "post-secular", this means a reconstructive refurbished potential and possibility of religion, as an attempt to defend the modern project against the danger of its own secularist derailment, not involvement in re-enchantment phenomena while abandoning the possibility of modern reflexivity on religion.[196]

In conclusion, with regard to empirical-sociological diagnoses, despite the ill-defined delineation, if the post-secular is taken not as another attempt at religious reformulation from an anti-secular perspective nor as historical

195 Jacques Derrida, *Acts of Religion*, edited with an introduction by Gil Anidjar (London: Routledge, 2001); Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo(eds.), *Religion,* trans. David Webb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Jane Bennett, *The Enchantment of Modern Life* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001).

196 See Jürgen Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2008), Chapter 4.

periodization, but rather as a project to shift perception and a marker for a timely theoretical and pragmatic problem, this opens up a new vantage point on its interpretation and potential uses, one that might allow new forms of engagement with religion as an ambiguous and abiding phenomenon in the global public domain. In that sense, post-secular questioning surpasses the antinomy between faith and reason, between the immanent and the transcendent, and between the private and the public. It seems to me that a more productive way forward is to look for alternative, less problematic ways of understanding transformation and continuity in religion - without necessarily implying a radical antagonism between the religious and the secular, or referring to a certain era or area. Consequently, the thesis of secularization has yet to be replaced with plausible scenarios of a religious future related to the transformation of Christianity, not the death of God, or the return of God. This will be dealt with empirically and hermeneutically in Chapter 3 of this research.

From the normative perspective, the salient point of the post-secular is that religion retains its significance. The insights and praxis commitments of religion should be appreciated in the public sphere. Thus, it can be said that religion in a post-secular context offers a world view and principles of life in the form of reasoning rather than obligation.[197]

197 Hans-Georg Zieberts and Ulrich Riegel (eds.), *Europe: Secular or post-secular?* (London, New Brunswick: Lit Verlag, 2008).

In conclusion, in this research, post-secular discourse can be best understood as a change in the spectrum of consciousness and possibilities, "epistemologically attuned" to re-modernities by a thoroughly reflexive infra-secularity, not as a clear position driven by a strong anti-secular thrust.[198]

198 Gregor McLennan, "The Postsecular Turn", *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol.27.4 (2010): 3-20; Gregor McLennan, "Spaces of Post-secularism", in J. Beaumont, A. Molendijk and C. Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: the Religious, the Political, the Urban* (Leiden: Boston, 2010); Jürgen Habermas, "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society".

Chapter 3. The Transformation of Christianity

Contrary to the most recent arguments of the secularization theory, that at long last religion is beginning to disappear, it is becoming increasingly evident that Christianity is still a feature of our world, and has been transforming itself into new forms with new characteristics and new religiosity. In addition, its current visibility is arousing renewed interest in the place and role of religion in the public sphere. We need to note here that such an undeniable social fact will have far-reaching effects upon the faith, practice, and study of religion.[199] Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that, instead of focusing on trends of growth or decline in religious belief and practices throughout the world, study should be directed towards the changing morphology of Christianity and its religiosity. This approach is based on the post-secular perspective discussed in the previous chapters. Here, "post-secular" does not denote any generalized definition or meaning, but refers to the specific concept applied in this research. It means neither the secular nor the non-secular, neither the death of the religious nor the triumph of the religious over modernity, but rather a transformation of religion that entails new forms, religiosity, features, locations, and roles of religion, and a new consciousness according to those changes.[200] How then, is Christianity transforming itself in the world today? What are the

199 Hans Joas, *Faith as an Option: Possible Futures for Christianity*, trans. by Alex Skinner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012).

200 See chapter 2.2.4.

typologies of the most recent stages of Christianity? How can we best explicate the transformation of Christianity and understand it in a post-secular perspective? What is the place of Christianity in contemporary society?

It is generally agreed that it is impossible to denote one single, uniform, and all embracing pattern in Christian church transformation, and none of the many possible definitions of Christian faith seem to describe any one of the churches or Christian modes of living analysed in this study.[201] The multiplicities and differences run deep below the surface, and the typologies of contemporary Christianity are diverse, depending on historical process, socio-political environment, cultural patterns, and denominational position. The tighter the description, the more contradictions surface, and the more ambiguous and elusive becomes the notion of one of the early core notions of Christianity, 'the' church. The more one is engaged in the events shaping the history of Christianity, the more one is aware of the fluidity of that history, and how trying to sketch its portrait is like trying to paint on a flowing stream.

In such circumstances, rather than taking a one-sided approach, such as revisionist or secularist, to the changeable landscapes of Christianity, or articulating a clear delineation between churches, sects and cults, it is much

201 Graham Ward, "The Future of Religion", *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 74.1 (2006): 179-186; Elizabeth A. Castelli, "Divining the Future Places of Religion: A Partial Response to Graham Ward, 'The Future of Religion'", *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 74.1 (2006): 187-191; José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

more important and valid to describe the various trends and characteristics of the transformation of Christianity in our global age, and to scrutinize the key controversial issues of such transformation phenomena, locating their "religious and social mobilizations" as energetic points of the transformation of Christianity,[202] and then trying to discern just where those changes are leading.[203]

This chapter examines the trajectory of the morphological transformation of Christianity and developments in the relations between Christianity and secular belief and institutions. Reflection on such changes in religious milieus is closely related to exploring the place of religion in contemporary society, as well as the rethinking of boundaries between the religious and the non-religious, between the orthodox and the heretical, and between denominations.

3.1. The Changes of Religious Milieus

In order to elucidate the morphological transformation of Christianity as it relates to the place of Christian faith in the contemporary age, an intellectual understanding of how religious milieus change is a pivotal foundation. Such changes may be categorized under three main headings, in terms of the major

202 Charles Taylor, "Religious Mobilizations", *Public Culture*, Vol. 18.2 (2006): 281-300.

203 David Martin, *The Future of Christianity: Reflections on Violence and Democracy, Religion and Secularization* (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011); "Secularization and the Future of Christianity", *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, Vol. 20.2 (2005):154-160; Hans Joas, "The Future of Christianity", *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 13.1 (Spring, 2011): 74-82 - A revised version is now available as Chapter 9, "The Future of Christianity", in Hans Joas, *Faith as an Option: Possible Futures for Christianity*, pp.116– 125; Graham Ward, "The Future of Religion"; Elizabeth A. Castelli, "Divining the Future Places of Religion".

aspects and tendencies of religious transformation. These are: 1) the inextricable link between the secular and the religious, 2) the dissolution of denominational milieus and intra-religious boundaries, and 3) the reinvigoration of global religious denominationalism and trans-denominational boundaries.

3.1.1. The Inextricable Link between the Secular and the Religious

Fundamental to the ongoing changes of religious milieus are the deconstruction of the paradigmatic epistemological framework in which the religious is assumed to be a residual category, the other of the secular, and the blurring and dissolution of the boundaries between the secular and the religious.[204] Indeed, we can grasp a new, more profound awareness of the inextricable link between the secular and the religious by contemplating secularization and religious revitalization as "ongoing mutually constituted global process rather than as mutually exclusive developments",[205] and further by reflecting the integrating process of religiosity through the transformation of religion into secular religiosity or religious secularity.[206] The

204 Danièle Hervieu-Léger, "In Search of Certainties: The Paradoxes of Religiosity in Societies of High Modernity", *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 8 (Spring & Summer, 2006): 59-68; David Martin, *On Secularization: Toward a Revised General Theory* (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2005); José Casanova, "The Secular, Secularization, Secularisms", in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford and NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.54-74; José Casanova, "The Religious Situation in Europe", in Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (eds.), *Secularization and the World Religions* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), pp.206-228.

205 José Casanova, "The Secular, Secularization, Secularisms", p.64.

206 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

latest researches, especially of sociologists of religion such as David Martin and Grace Davie in Great Britain, Detlef Pollack, Hans Joas, and Ulrich Beck in Germany, Danièle Hervieu-Léger in France, and José Casanova in Canada, have demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that the religious and the secular are inextricably linked.[207] This recognition is evident in the pervasive discussion of the term "post-secular".

On the one hand, we acknowledge and have to concede that loss of social significance of religion (the process of secularization), marked by the decline of traditional religious thinking, practice and institution, especially church-linked religion, is indeed in progress at the individual, social, and institutional level.[208] On the other hand, taking a global comparative perspective,[209] it is also clear that there exists a countervailing intensification of religion, as well as much reflection upon the internal transformation of Christianity in high modern society.[210] In this respect, loss of religious significance and

---

207 David Martin, *The Future of Christianity;* Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel, "Religious Individualization or Secularization?: Testing Hypotheses of Religious Change – The Case of Eastern and Western Germany", *British Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 58. 4 (2008): 603-32; Detlef Pollack and Daniel V.A. Olson (eds.), *The Role of Religion in Modern Societies* (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), pp.39-40; Danièle Hervieu-Léger, "In Search of Certainties"; Grace Davie, "New Approaches in the Sociology of Religion: A Western Perspective", *Social Compass*, Vol. 51.1 (2004): 73–84; José Casanova, "The Secular, Secularization, Secularisms", in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford and NY: Oxford University Press, 2011); Hans Joas, *Faith as an Option: Possible Futures for Christianity*, trans. Alex Skinner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012).

208 Even if the debate on the interpretation of the observable processes of change in the area of religion is still in full swing, researchers are agreed in one respect. It is undisputed that the observable religious change in western Europe is characterized by a general de-churchification, i.e. an abandonment of the traditional churches by large numbers of the population. This assertion is supported by numerous empirical studies (see for example, Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere [1995], Davie [1994, 2000, 2002], Bruce [1996, 2002], McLeod and Ustorf [2003], Pickel and Müller [2009], Pollack [2009]).

209 José Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective", *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 8 (Spring & Summer, 2006): 7-22.

210 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel, "Religious Individualization or Secularization?"; Detlef Pollack and Daniel V.A.

reawakening of religious vitality can coincide, and are not mutually exclusive. The trend toward the decline of religious significance has been documented by so many researchers that it is hardly necessary to re-articulate it here. We need to balance the decline of religion with revitalization in order to understand the developments in both of them, not losing sight of any of the multiple aspects of either.

First, from a global comparative and quantitative perspective, it is a notable fact that a new global vitality of Christianity has been spreading rapidly in the non-western world, so that many people are now talking about a “comeback of the gods” or “revival of religion”. Some scholars, especially religious protectionists, regard such numerical growth of global Christianity by conservative rallying as a triumph of religious authenticity over modernization, maintaining that religious institutions have survived and even flourished insofar as they have not tried to adapt themselves to the alleged requirements of a secularized world.[211] However, it is self-deceptive and self-contradictory to interpret a new global vitality of Christianity in simple terms as the success of religiosity over the secular. It is also wrong to assume that religion disappeared in the past and returned again only recently. Rather, the varieties of religious vitalities at the global level have brought into question the classical secularization expectation that the more modern a society is, the more secular

Olson (eds.), *The Role of Religion in Modern Societies*.

211 Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview”, in Peter L. Berger (ed.), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans,1999).

and the less religious it will be. Furthermore, it can be argued that the decline of the institutional churches is not the result of modern development, and does not presage the demise of religion.

Secondly, in the qualitative aspect, the secular frame by no means expels the religious entirely from the public sphere. Rather, as allegiance to the traditional religious institutions declines, we are witnessing nevertheless the persistence of religious beliefs and the vitalization of new individualized forms of religiosity.[212] This is not a return of the religion that disappeared in the past, nor a reinstatement of the previous status of religious dominance, but involves the emergence of very different types of religious dynamics. Hervieu-Léger argues that secularization allows the re-composition of religion through the whole process of decomposition, rather than the extinction of religion.[213] Such religious (re-)vitalization is above all linked with a transformation of religion that entails new modes of believing and religiosity, and different institutional structures of religious communities.[214] In this vein, Casanova argues that sociology of religion should be more attuned to the new religious forms, the product of diverse and manifold transformations, rather than the exaggerated triumph of religious revival or an obsession with the decline of religion.[215] A

212 Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values", *American Sociological Review*, Vol.65.1 (February, 2000):19-51; Robert Wuthnow, *After Heaven: Spirituality in America since the 1950s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

213 Grace Davie and Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *Identités Religieuses en Europe* (Paris: La Découverte, 1996), pp.18-19.

214 José Casanova, "The Religious Situation in Europe", pp.206-228.

215 José Casanova, Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective", *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 8, (Spring & Summer, 2006): 7-22, p.17; "Rethinking Secularization".

novel epistemic internal change followed by recognition of such religious change will serve to shape and encode the new public interest in religion and diverse global secular practices with the socio-political relevance of religion. Moreover, a wider assessment of the transformation of religion will discourage the drawing of a fixed binary divide and the mutual "othering" of faith and the secular.

Consequently, it can be said that contemporary religious changes go beyond dichotomous phenomena between the religious and the secular; indeed, it may become difficult to draw proper boundaries between the two. As an important recognition of ambivalence between the religious and the secular, we need to bear in mind that the decline of traditional religious institutions does not always mean "the death of Christianity". The churches as an organizational structure are not dying; they are merely losing their previous function and form. Their life force is in the people, irrespective of whether they are within or outside the institutionalized church. It is not the Church with a capital C that dies, that is, not Christianity itself, but the churches, as inherited social forms of Christian institution. In this vein, it is appropriate to begin a discussion of global religious and secular trends with the recognition of a paradox, rather than vague and over-used habits of classification.[216] Werner Ustorf contends that words like "secular" and "religious" have increasingly become language fossils, "terminological survivals of the power games of previously dominant

216 José Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization".

groups: the established churches and the culture of agnostic liberalism", which are both currently losing their power to control minds.[217] In this sense, the religious research paradigm of binary classification such as "religious/secular" and "sacred/profane" is not helpful in trying to understand contemporary religious change.[218] Furthermore, characterizing the religious in simple terms is no longer tenable. Rather, the process of secularization and the persistence or new visibility of religion may be viewed as complementary developments constituted through mutual reciprocal infusion rather than as necessarily mutually exclusive processes.[219]

In conclusion, we need a better and more appropriate understanding of the changes of religious milieus in this global age, one that goes beyond dichotomous approaches. To achieve this we must revisit the diverse patterns of secularization, the varieties of religious re-visibilities, the reciprocal infusion of the religious and the secular and their mutual constitution throughout the world. A new understanding based on these changes can open up new vistas to interpret the current location and role of Christianity, not only in terms of the statistical contours of religious change or superficial crisis, but also in terms of religious quality.

---

217 Werner Ustorf, "Global Christianity, New Empire and Old Europe", in Frans Wijsen and Robert Schreiter (eds.), *Global Christianity Contested Claims* (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi B. V., 2007).

218 José Casanova, "The Secular, Secularization, Secularisms".

219 José Casanova, "Religion in Modernity as Global Challenge", in José Casanova and Hans Joas (eds.), *Religion und Die Umstrittene Moderne* (Verlag: Kohlhammer W., 2010); José Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization".

In this respect, there are three important points to be considered in our revisiting of the transformation of Christianity. First, from a global comparative perspective, it is clear that there has been a numerical growth in non-western Christianity.[220] The other two points are the transformative phenomena of Christian morphology with regard to internal qualitative aspects: the mushrooming of implicit Christianity[221] and the more radical shift from religious Christianity to an exteriorization of Christian faith distinct from historical and doctrinal inertias.[222]

3.1.2. The Dissolution of Denominational Milieus and Intra-Religious Boundaries

Another notable change of the current religious landscape is the dissolution of traditional denominational milieus. Until the 1960s, denomination was a very large part of what it meant to be Christian. People were Catholics, Orthodox, or Protestants, and in the reformed churches they were Baptists, Methodists, or Presbyterians as much as they were Christians. In other words, their Christian identity was inseparable from these denominational traditions.[223] However, denominational boundaries between intra-religious entities have diminished and have frequently become rather blurred in the minds of

220 See section 3.2.1.

221 See section 3.2.2.

222 See section 3.2.3.

223 Robert Wuthnow, "Church Realities and Christian Identity in the 21st Century", *The Christian Century*, Vol. 110.16 (May, 1993): 520-523.

believers.[224] The change in confessional milieus is indicated by the statistics on marriage patterns, which show that the majority of new marriages are now "interfaith".[225] Moreover, fewer people remain in the denominations in which they were raised, fewer families are successful in passing on their traditional faith, fewer people think that their own denomination has a better grasp on the truth than other denominations, and fewer denominations impose creedal tests that people must meet in order to become members or participate. In brief, today, the role of religious denominations is indeed in decline at both the individual and the religious-societal level, and the dissolution of denominational milieus impedes the success of religious transmission and generation. As a result, Christianity can become at odds with itself, especially when leaps into the hyper-real are made from very different theological and denominational platforms. Thus, growing numbers of churches might be characterized as open systems, attempting to embrace everyone while imposing little on anyone.

However, we should note that the dissolution of denominational milieus does not necessarily lead to the weakening of intensity of confessional faith, nor to the atrophying of religious communities. Rather, paradoxically, these changes

224 Hans Joas, "The Future of Christianity", p.74.

225 Naomi Schaefer Riley, "Interfaith Unions: A Mixed Blessing", *The New York Times*, 5 April 2013, Accessed 6 September 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/06/opinion/interfaith-marriages-a-mixed-blessing.html. She is the author of "'Til Faith Do Us Part: How Interfaith Marriage Is Transforming America"; Office for National Statistics, "Trends in civil and religious marriages, 1966-2011: Part of Marriages in England and Wales", 26 June 2013, Accessed 6 September 2014. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/vsob1/marriages-in-england-and-wales--provisional-/2011/sty-marriages.html.

paved “the fascinating byways of religion” for the emergence of new Christian churches, implicit religious communities based on Christian faith, and new Christian social movements that cannot be assigned to any major traditional denomination.[226]

In addition, we have to note the other side of the same coin, whereby the dissolution of denominational milieus and intra-religious boundaries has coincided with “the reinvigoration of global religious denominationalism”.[227] While some intra-religious boundaries are being dissolved, others are being reinforced. Such a new mode of mapping allows for the representation of transnational Christian communities. In certain aspects, this tendency implies an increasing division between Christians and non-Christians, sustained by people of faith who focus on differences between themselves and the “other” traditions around them.

The discursive landscape of religion has become an undisputable global social fact, and the emerging diverse expressions of faith are ever more widespread. We should, therefore, exercise caution before rushing to condemn, remaining open to the potential of individualism to help vitalize religious life.[228] In this respect, the questions must be how the validity of the category of religion should be re-configured,[229] how values can be passed on in new ways amid

226 These three phenomena will be discussed in section 3.2

227 See section 3.1.3 below.

228 Hans Joas, *Do We Need Religion?: On the Experience of Self-Transcendence* (Boulder and London: Paradigm Publisher, 2008).

229 Peter Beyer, *Religions in Global Society* (London: Routledge, 2006); Richard Madsen, “What Is Religion?:

such a changing landscape, and how they can arise anew through new experiences.

3.1.3. The Reinvigoration of Global Religious Denominationalism and Trans-Denominational Boundaries

As mentioned above, we are currently witnessing a dissolution of traditional denominational milieus between intra-religious entities at both societal and individual level; yet simultaneously the "globalization of Christianity" continues, and a "global trans-denominational Christian milieu" is beginning to emerge.[230] As a result, parallel to the dissolution of intra-religious boundaries, new boundaries are being formulated. As such, the invigoration of a global religious system can be construed as "global denominationalism".[231]

In fact, the development of modern transportation and communications allows for interactive process and coordination of activities regardless of geographical distance, thus facilitating a global system of religions; more directly, through world-wide migrations, world religions like Christianity, Islam and Buddhism are undergoing global transformations, with an interplay of influence between

---

Categorical Reconfigurations in a Global Horizon", in Philip S. Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society* (NY and London: New York University Press and SSRC, 2012); Cecelia Lynch, "Religious Humanitarianism and the Global Politics of Secularism", in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism*, pp.204-224.

230 Hans Joas, "The Future of Christianity"; José Casanova, "Religion Challenging the Myth of Secular Democracy", in Lisbet Christoffersen, Hans Raun Iversen, Hanne Petersen and Margit Warburg (eds.), *Religion in the 21st Century: Challenges and Transformations* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), pp.19-36.

231 José Casanova, "Religion Challenging the Myth of Secular Democracy"; "Religion in Modernity as Global Challenge"; "Rethinking Public Religions", in Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft (eds.), *Rethinking Religion and World Affairs* (New York: Oxford UP, 2012).

the traditional home indigenous religious culture, and the diaspora. This phenomenon of global denominationalism is different from the globalization brought about through European colonial expansion in that it is an “interrelated reciprocal process of particularistic differentiation, universalistic claims and mutual recognition”. In other words, the present global denominationalism of Christianity can no longer be viewed simply as the transplantation of western Christianity.

Rather, the truly novel aspect of the present-day Christian milieus is their characterization not by the denominational platforms and spatial concentration of the past, but more by the development of global trans-denominational Christianity. As Casanova has noted, the newly emerging religious phenomena demonstrate that “all world religions can be reconstituted for the first time truly as de-territorialized global imagined communities, detached from the civilizational settings in which they were traditionally embedded”.[232] He specifies this proliferation of de-territorialized, de-centred, transnational, global imagined communities as “a challenge of emerging global denominationalism” to “the patterns of European secularization as well as the patterns of confessional territorialization”.[233]

An obvious manifestation of an “emerging global denominationalism” of Christianity may be found in the global trans-denominational milieus of

232 Jose Casanova, “Rethinking Public Religions”, p.33.

233 José Casanova, “Religion Challenging the Myth of Secular Democracy”; “Religion in Modernity as Global Challenge” .

Catholicism, which have been reconstituted as new transnational and de-territorialized religious forms since the Catholic *aggiornamento* of the Second Vatican Council.[234] Until the mid-20th century Catholicism had been viewed primarily as a transplanted European institution with characteristics of medieval or pre-modern Christendom. However, by embracing disestablishment and imposing transnational and trans-denominational ecumenical dialogue and interrelationships, the *aggiornamento* led to a fundamental relocation of the Catholic Church from Christendom-oriented medieval transnational regime to a new intercommunal-based transnational church; from a highly centralized structure to a relatively open global system of religion.[235]

The worldwide expansion of evangelical Christianity and, more particularly, of its potent Pentecostal mutation and charismatic movement, may also serve to illustrate equally favourable examples of the reinvigoration of the global trans-denominational Christian milieu, which is closely related to the emergence of

234 For a more extensive elaboration of this argument see, José Casanova, "Globalizing Catholicism and the Return to a 'Universal Church'", in Susanne Rudolph and James Piscatori (eds.), *Transnational Religion and Fading States* (Boulder and CO: Westview, 1997), pp.121-143.

The Second Vatican Council refers to the twenty-first ecumenical council of the Roman Catholic Church held at Saint Peter's Basilica in the Vatican (1962–65). The council formally opened on 11 October 1962 under the pontificate of Pope John XXIII, and continued under Pope John's successor, Pope Paul VI, with sessions being convened each autumn until the work of the council was completed on 8 December 1965. Sixteen documents were enacted by the council fathers. Unlike previous councils, instead of issuing any new dogmas, the council became known for its renewal of Catholic doctrine in a modern timeline and perspective. The council issued revised decrees and directed the work of the enlarged commissions with a more progressive viewpoint: spiritual renewal for the church and an occasion for Christians separated from Rome to join in a search for reunion, the renewal of consecrated life with a revised charism, and ecumenical efforts towards dialogue with other religions.

235 José Casanova, "Public Religions Revisited", in Hent de Vries (ed.), *Religion: Beyond the Concept* (NY: Fordham UP, 2008), pp.101-119.

a global society, as Martin, Joas and Casanova have noted.[236] Such newly emerging global Christianity has no particular territorial roots or identity, no historical links to tradition or centralized religious regime, and can therefore "make itself at home anywhere in the globe where the Spirit moves".[237]

In the same way, other branches of Christianity, other world religions, and even the many new forms of hybrid globalized religions, could be seen against a similar landscape of global trans-denominational and transnational milieus as a response to the same global processes, but with their own peculiar transformations. Particularism, even localism, on the one side, and cosmopolitism and universalism on the other, not only coexist but very often progress side-by-side in the development of trans-denominational milieus and supra-denominational boundaries.

However, we need to bear in mind that "global denominationalism" comprises two distinctly contrasting movements. There is, on the one hand, a reinforcing of inter-religious boundaries between those who talk of Christian faith, irrespective of traditional denominational settings, and those who talk of general spirituality, of other religious faith and of no religious faith. Thus, the divide between Christians and non-Christians becomes wider and deeper. This is being seen as global denominational Christianity linked to a modern

236 David Martin, "Evangelical Expansion in Global Society" in Donald M. Lewis (ed.), *Christianity Reborn: The Global Expansion of Evangelicalism in the Twentieth Century* (Michigan and Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2004), p.273; José Casanova, "Religion in Modernity as Global Challenge", in José Casanova and Hans Joas (eds.), *Religion und Die Umstrittene Moderne* (Verlag: Kohlhammer W., 2010); Hans Joas, *Faith as an Option*.

237 José Casanova, "Religion, the New Millennium and Globalization", *Sociology of Religion,* Vol.62.4 (2001): 415-441.

understanding of Christianity, sustained by people of faith who focus on differences between “we” and “others”. On the other hand, there are increasingly diverse ecumenical journeys into global Christianity, allowing the churches to deepen their commitment to visible unity by sharing in the variety of spiritual experience of churches around the world, respecting each other’s traditions and cultures, and inspiring and being inspired to renew their commitments to justice and peace by promoting in-depth discussion on issues of common concern. Such attitudes are enshrined primarily in public statements of the World Council of Churches (WCC).[238] Casanova critically reflects upon this contrasting tendency of “global denominationalism”:

> *Actually, one finds practically everywhere similar tensions between the protectionist impulse to claim religious monopoly over national and civilizational territories, and the ecumenical impulse to present one’s own particular religion as the response to the universal needs of global humanity. Transnational migrations and the emergence of Diasporas of all world religions beyond their civilizational territories make this tension visible everywhere.*[239]

As he reminds us, “global denominationalism” displays a dual process of anti-modern fundamentalism resisting a global secular modernization, and

238 The 10th assembly of the WCC held in Busan, Republic of Korea, from 30 October to 8 November 2013, represents a major example of the recent ecumenical movement. Through varied encounters and dialogue within the fellowship of churches, the Assembly made concrete decisions and recommendations for setting future priorities, as well as reflecting on the "unique value" of WCC programs under the theme “God of life, lead us to justice and peace”. This information is available at http://wcc2013.info/en.

239 José Casanova, “Religion Challenging the Myth of Secular Democracy”, p.30; See also José Casanova, “Public Religions Revisited”.

ecumenical trans-denominational movements as a response to the emergence of a global society. These come to compete with one another in the new global system of religion. However, the two distinctly contrasting processes are not confined to certain denominations, but operate according to trans-denominational boundaries. Thus, it is becoming harder to draw lines between the differences.

Therefore, we need to improve our understanding of the emerging global denominationalism of multiple modernities, and to manage it carefully. In the normative sense, we must begin to set out the more desirable way of global denominationalism, no matter how difficult this might be, especially in a postmodern context in which distinguishing between right and wrong, the proper and the improper, is itself considered another kind of totalitarianism that runs counter to the general request for tolerance. Consequently, it is necessary to revise the conception of a global secularism that brands all forms of global denominational Christianity as modern fundamentalism odds with modernity, and, instead, to scrutinize the dual process against a more multidimensional and reflexive classification. More importantly, all world religion of global denominationalism that responds to the global expansion of modernity should be re-examined as to whether it represents an exclusive reinvigoration of banding together against what is other-religious or non-religious, or an inclusive intensification of mutual and reciprocal process to refurbish traditions in response to the global challenge, and we should

contemplate how to contain the global denominationalism of religion as a reflexive agent within acceptable limits, so that it does not present a major threat to the democratic structures of global civil society.

3.2. Types of Morphological Transformation of Christianity

The recent empirical-sociological remarks on the morphological transformation of Christianity, in a context where large numbers of people have no religion, are reflected in three major trends: 1) the new global vitalization of more conservative forms of Christianity: re-invention of explicit Christianity, 2) the proliferation of individual spiritual forms of new Christian faith communities and movements: the mushrooming of implicit Christianity connected loosely to traditional Christian institutions and religiosity, and 3) the social presence of faith-based social organization (FBSO) as a civil agent: integrating of institutionalized Christian religiosity into new forms of faith-based social actions. This research first explores the three types of morphological transformation of Christianity and their characteristics, and then discusses controversial points in terms of both empirical and normative aspects.

3.2.1. The New Global Vitalization of Christianity: Re-invention of Explicit Christianity

3.2.1.1. The Changing Contours of the New Global Vitalization of Christianity[240] and its Characteristics

In contraposition to the secularization [Ⅱ] thesis,[241] i.e. the decline of religion, the most notable phenomenon of the changing landscape of religion is that from a global comparative perspective, new vitalized forms of Christianity have undergone sizable numerical growth,[242] and are becoming widespread at a global level.[243] Even those contemporary social scientists who continue to adhere to the notion of the secularizing effects of modernization, such as Ronald Inglehart, a prominent researcher on religious value change, now make different kinds of predictions about the global religious situation, taking greater account of demographic aspects.[244]

A number of scholars, notably theologians such as Brian Stanley (2004), Andrew Walls (2004), Harvey Cox (1996), Wilbert Shenk (1995) and Paul

240 This research will deploy the concept of a "new global vitalization of Christianity", rather than resurgence or revitalization of Christianity, because expressions with the prefix "re" are not appropriate in a global comparative perspective. In cases where such expressions are used, the terms are presented in the format "re-", i.e. "re-surgence" or "re-vitalization", in order to indicate reflection on "re-".

241 See Chapter 2, sections 2.2.1. & 2.2.2.

242 David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson (eds.), *World Christian Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.19; For many of these observations, I am indebted to Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

243 Hans Joas considers "the globalization of Christianity" as an important heading for empirical-sociological remarks on a new religious trend in his article, "The Future of Christianity".

244 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Freston (2001); sociologists such as Grace Davie (2002), David Martin (1990, 1999, 2002, 2004) and Hans Joas (2009, 2011); Gilles Kepel (1994) and anthropologist Philip Jenkins (2002, 2006),[245] are observing and noting a new vitalization of religious belief in connection with the global development of Christianity, however they might construe such "globalization of Christianity". Hans Joas presents a clear summary of this phenomenon:

> *From a global perspective, then, there is absolutely no reason to take a despairing view of Christianity's prospects of survival. In fact, it appears that we are witnessing one of the most intensive periods of the dissemination of Christianity in its entire history.*[246]

To explore the most recent changes in the global Christian landscape, we can look for instance at the figures for demographic changes in the world Christian population and its distribution by region, as reported by the *World Christian Encyclopedia* (see Tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3).

<Table 3-1> Demographic Changes of Global Christianity, 1970-2020

Adherents (%)	1970	1980	2000	2020
World population	3,610,034,	4,373,917,	6,259,642,	7,656,531,
Global Christianity	1,216,579, (33.7)	1,432,686, (32.8)	2,019,921, (32.3)	2,550,714, (33.3)

Source: David B. Barrett and Todd M. Johnson, *World Christian Trends AD30-AD2200: Interpreting the Annual Christian Megacensus* (Pasadena: William Carey Library, 2001); Center for the Study of Global Christianity, *Christianity in its Global Context, 1970–2020: Society, Religion, and Mission* (South Hamilton: Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 2013) / Numbers are given in thousands.

Overall, a body of data indicates the continuing vitalization of Christianity,

245 See Bibliography.

246 Hans Joas, *Faith as an Option*, p.122.

which seems to disprove secularization [Ⅱ].[247] In fact, the vitalization of global Christianity is central to a present observation of religious landscapes with a global perspective.

<Table 3-2> Distribution of the World's Christian Population, by Continent and Region

Continent	1970		1980		2000		2020	
Africa	142,962,	11.8	203,490,	14.2	393,326,	19.5	630,644,	24.7
Asia	90,792,	7.5	128,078,	8.9	224,601,	11.1	420,390,	16.4
Europe	491,144,	40.3	512,327,	35.7	549,504,	27.2	580,305,	22.7
L. America	267,383,	22.0	348,658,	24.3	571,157,	28.3	600,553,	23.5
N. America	206,443,	17.0	219,833,	15.3	253,589,	12.6	288,005,	11.2
Oceania	17,851,	1.5	20,298,	1.4	27,741,	1.4	30,818,	1.2
Global Christianity	**1,216,579,**	**100**	**1,432,686,**	**100**	**2,019,921,**	**100**	**2,550,714,**	**100**

Source: David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson, *World Christian Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). / Numbers are given in thousands.

The statistics also show quite clearly the numerical growth of the Christian church in Asia, Africa and Latin America, although the overall numbers are difficult to determine.[248] In what is called the Global South - Africa, Asia (such as the Philippines, the Pacific Rim, South Korea, and China) and Latin America, we see the (*re*-)surgence of global Christianity to an extraordinary degree. Hans Joas describes this situation as follows:

> *Current estimates say that the number of Christians in Africa is increasing by 23,000 people per day. While this includes births, conversions account for more than one-sixth of this figure. The proportion of Christians among the*

247 See Chapter 2.

248 See David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson, *World Christian Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed.; Sandra Stencel (et al.), *Global Christianity: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Christian Population* (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2011), also available at http://pewforum.org/Christian/Global-Christianity-worlds-christian-population.aspx.; Center for the Study of Global Christianity, *Christianity in its Global Context, 1970–2020: Society, Religion, and Mission* (South Hamilton: Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 2013), also available at www.globalchristianity.org/globalcontext.; Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity*. The data come primarily from an analysis of the two largest collections of religious demographic data.

African population rose from 25 to 46 per cent from 1965 to 2001. While it is certainly the case that statistics on religion are not extremely reliable, what they say about trends appears to be undeniable. In Asia, too, Christianity has had some amazing success stories, probably most spectacularly in South Korea. …In Latin America, the triumphant success of Pentecostalism and of Protestant sects is evidently more than a short-term phenomenon. These play a large role, particularly for women, who hope they will bring about a "reformation des machismo" . Thus, from a global perspective, there is no reason at all to question Christianity's chances of survival. On the contrary, it appears that we are witnessing one of the most intensive phases of Christianity's dissemination in its entire history.[249]

From the accumulated research on this recent current, we can intimate the characteristics of the new global vitalization of Christianity.

<Table 3-3> The Demographic Changes of Christianity by Traditional Denominations and New Movements

	Annual change, 1990-2000				2000		2025		2050		
Denomination	N	C	Total	R	A	%	A	%	A	%	Cn
All Christians	22	2	25	1.36	1,999	33	2,616	33.4	3,051	34.3	238
Roman Catholics	13	-355	12	1.29	1,057	17.5	1,361	17.4	1,564	17.6	235
Independents	4	3	8	2.49	385	6.4	581	7.4	752	8.5	221
Protestants	4	0.3	4	1.44	342	5.6	468	6	574	6.4	233
Orthodox	0.7	0.3	1	0.54	215	3.6	252	3.2	266	3	135
Anglicans	1	0.7	1	1.56	79	1.3	113	1.5	145	1.6	166
Marginal Christians	0.2	0.1	0.4	1.79	26	0.4	45	0.6	62	0.7	215
Trans-Megabloc Groups											
Evangelicals	2	0.8	0.3	1.97	210	3.5	327	4.2	448	5	5
Pentecostals/ Charismatics	7	2	0.9	2.1	523	8.7	811	10.4	1,066	12	238
Global population	78	0	78	1	6,055	100	7,823	100	8,909	100	238

(N= Natural / C= Conversion / R= Rate / A= Adherents / Cn= Countries / Numbers are given in Millions)

Source: David B. Barrett and Todd M. Johnson, *World Christian Trends AD30-AD2200: Interpreting the*

249 Hans Joas, “The Future of Christianity”, p.74.

Annual Christian Megacensus (Pasadena: William Carey Library, 2001)

From Table 3-3, it is clear that evangelical Christianity, its potent Pentecostal mutation, and charismatic movements, are growing dramatically in countries where this type of religion was previously unknown or very marginal. The worldwide expansion of such Christian movements has been of major significance over the last three or four decades.[250]

This type of religious movement is also the liveliest sector even in the developed western world, whether we speak of Britain, Holland, the United States, or Australia. It is also notable in parts of Eastern Europe, notably Romania.[251]

However, as Martin describes, the persistence and revitalization of Christianity refers not to the older, more staid evangelicalism that adhered to traditional sources of religious authority, but to movements offering what are called the "gift of the Spirit", such as healing, prophecy, and speaking in tongues; or to myriad versions of the older mainstream churches in renewal, which unambiguously represent a spill-over of spirituality, great religious passion, individual heart work, inward feeling, and ecstatic religiosity. There is an abundance of quite local small churches, as well as thriving mega-churches,

250 David Martin, "The Evangelical Upsurge and Its Political Implication", in Peter L. Berger (ed.), *Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999); Peter L. Berger, Desecularization of the World: a Global Overview, in Peter L. Berger (ed.), *Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, p.9.

251 Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity*.

often with a neo-Pentecostal emphasis on health and wealth.[252]

Moreover, the Christian groups that have seen steady growth on the global stage over the last three or four decades, notably the evangelical and Pentecostal movements, are morally and theologically conservative. These groups are precisely those that rejected an *aggiornamento* with modernity, rather than adapting to the Zeitgeist defined by progressive intellectuals. Peter Berger makes the point that the vitality of conservative religious groups is cognate with the relative decline of liberal groups that have attempted to conform to modernity as defined by progressive intellectuals, taking the United States as an example.[253] Won-kyu Lee also indicates, in empirical research on Korea, that theological conservatism is closely related to socio-political conservatism and ethical conservatism.[254] The results of his research reveal the intimate correlation between religious consciousness and social consciousness. Therefore, although we cannot say that all evangelicals take a conservative socio-political stance, certainly all socio-political conservative institutions and churches in Protestantism clearly belong to evangelical

252 David Martin, "The Evangelical Upsurge and Its Political Implication".

253 Peter Berger describes their character as follows: *"On the international religious scene, it is conservative or orthodox or traditional movements that are on the rise almost everywhere. These movements are precisely the ones that rejected an aggiornamento with modernity as defined by progressive intellectuals. Conversely, religious movements and institutions that have made great efforts to conform to a perceived modernity are almost everywhere on the decline. In the US this has been a much commented upon fact, exemplified by the decline of so-called mainline Protestantism and the concomitant rise of Evangelicalism; but the United States is by no means unusual in this."* Peter L. Berger, "The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview", p.6; David Martin, "The Evangelical Upsurge and Its Political Implication", p.37.

254 See Won-kyu Lee, "Jongkyoseonggwa Sahoegyecheungui Gwangyee Daehan Gyeongheomjeok Yungu" [An Empiric Research into Interrelation between Religiosity and Social Class], *Sinhaksasang [Theological Thought]* Vol.69 (1990):485-528

groups.[255]

Another characteristic of evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity is its substantial political presence. Indeed, the groups that have advocated the separation of religion and state no longer reject politics as an unspiritual business, but rather embrace political activism as a sacred calling.[256] They have effectively invented new ideologies and forms of religiously inspired political engagement. For examples of the evangelical impact on politics, this research relies on a variety of sources, but in particular on the work of Paul Freston on Asia, Africa and Latin America.[257]

The statistics indicating a dramatic and sustained growth in Christianity, especially in the non-western world, are undeniable, as is the fact that the emerging Christianity is largely rooted in a religiously conservative stance that adheres to a religious structure and system. These developments may mark a turning point in attitudes toward and recognition of religion, affecting Christians in Europe in a wide variety of ways. A number of recent works in the sociology of religion, notably in France, Britain, and Scandinavia, have questioned the term “secularization”, as applied to these developments.[258]

---

255 It is incorrect, or even dangerous, to mix the theological level directly with the socio-political in classifying the progressive-conservative attitude. For example, a progressive theological sect emphasizing the need for social participation and responsibility is not always liberal, and fundamentalists do not intend to turn to political progressiveness, even though they affirmed the need for social participation some time ago.

256 Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, *God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics* (New York and London: Norton & Company, 2011), p.13; David Martin, “The Evangelical Upsurge and Its Political Implication”, p.39.

257 Paul Freston, *Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

258 Peter L. Berger, “Desecularization of the World: a Global Overview”.

While these facts are not in dispute, however, there are a variety of explanations offered for the numerical expansion of global Christianity in particular forms of denominations, faith characteristics, and their socio-political implications. Moreover, there is no consensus as to the accompanying attitudes on socio-political issues, nor on the impact on global Christianity and its future shape. In order to examine this further, the basic method is to analyse and interpret the historical sources and sociological materials in each particular socio-political context.

3.2.1.2. The Key Controversial Points and a Critical Reflection on the New Global Vitalization of Christianity

The new global vitalization of Christianity raises a number of important questions. First: “Has secularization gone into reverse?” On the one hand, secularists contend that religion continues to decline. They claim that the phenomenon of religious revitalization occurred late in modern society, and that religion’s very activism and ferocity are signs of weakness, not revival.[259] If the “declinists” are right, we might as well end this study here. Religion does not require our attention if it is on the verge of dying. At most, its vigorous vitality makes it a temporary and occasionally destructive nuisance, not a subject for systematic inquiry. On the other hand, however, other scholars and commentators argue that “revival” or “comeback” is the salient empirical

259 Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott and Timothy Samuel Shah, *God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics*, p.48.

fact about religion today. Religious protectionist demographers have themselves devised schemes based on successive waves of Christian expansion and recession. Such views are represented most strikingly in, for example, Gilles Kepel's *The Revenge of God: Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World* (1994) and *God is Back* by Economist editors, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, published in 2009.[260] Gilles Kepel grasps this situation as follows:

> *Around 1975 the whole process [of secularization] went into reverse. A new religious approach took shape, aimed not only at adapting to secular values but at recovering a sacred foundation for the organization of society—by changing society if necessary. Expressed in a multitude of ways, this approach advocated moving on from a modernism that had failed, attributing its setbacks and dead ends to separation from God. The theme was no longer* aggiornamento *but a 'second evangelization of Europe'.*[261]

Kepel and others maintain that what has in fact occurred is that, by and large, religious institutions have survived and even flourished insofar as they have not tried to adapt themselves to the alleged requirements of a secularized world. They interpret the temporary numerical success of the conservative rally of Protestantism as a triumph of religious authenticity over modernization. Indeed, despite the clear resurgence and resilience of religion, the thriving

260 Gilles Kepel, *The Revenge of God: Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994); John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *God is Back: How the Global Rise of Faith is Changing the World* (London: Allen Lane, 2009).

261 Gilles Kepel, *The Revenge of God*, p.2.

Christianity in many parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America does not automatically falsify the secularization thesis. It simply means that the constellation of causal factors that produced secularization in the West is not present in many Asian, African, and Latin American societies. The different kinds of church organization and theology are bound up in different historical and socio-cultural contexts depending on spatial-temporal condition, just as the secularization process was in Europe. Moreover, there is no consensus as to the associated attitudes towards socio-political issues, nor on the impact on the shape of global Christianity, its religious characteristics, its social consequences or its future. Taking the historical context of far eastern Asia as an example, a lot depends, just as in the West or indeed anywhere, on the relation of Christianity to nationalism. In Korea, Christianity, particularly evangelical Presbyterianism, lay at the heart of Korean national revival in the context of Japanese and Chinese domination, whereas in Japan Christianity was seen as foreign and threatening. At the beginning of Korea's era of modernization, Scottish and Canadian Presbyterians helped create the education system.[262] In Taiwan Christianity was held severely in check by an oppressive nationalist government, and in Singapore it was tightly controlled

262 Christianity has been praised as having led the movement toward democracy, nationalism, and human rights in Korea. Protestant Christianity was in the vanguard of the movement for independence from Japanese occupation, and played an important role in the emancipation of the oppressed. The positive image of Protestant Christianity acquired during the late Choson dynasty and early modernization era continued among the Korean people, despite the religion being imported from overseas. See Man-yol Yi, *Hanguk Kidokkyo wa Yoksa Uisik* [*Korean Christianity and historical consciousness*] (Seoul: Chisik Sanupsa, 1981); Allen D. Clark, *Hanguk Kyohoesa* [*A History of the Church in Korea*] (Seoul: Christian Literature Society, 1973); Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Timothy S. Lee, *Christianity in Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).

by a government that wanted all religions to provide order and cohesion. In all these societies Christianity was associated with modern welfare and education, even when it was only a small minority religion as in Japan. The various manifestations of resurgent Christianity cannot be defined as one formation, a particular denomination, but rather as a much more fragmented Christian culture, and the transformation of Christianity is a historically conditioned phenomenon that varies from country to country.

To conclude, both assumptions are incorrect. It cannot be said that secularization is a universal and general process, while at the same time, new global vitalizations of Christianity can be presented as evidence either for or against secularization. It is self-deceptive and self-contradictory to describe these developments of conservative Christianity as triumphalism of religion over modernization. José Casanova prudently warns against any wholesale abandonment of the secularization thesis.[263] Therefore, sociologists should be careful not to commit the opposite mistake of assuming that every form of religious renewal is automatically evidence of re-sacralization. If we are to understand more fully the possible place of Christianity in the 21st century, the problem must be pursued further.

The second question is: “Might the global vitalization of Christianity be a re-invention of traditional Christianity as a manifestation of the post-secular, or a revelation of religious fundamentalism, or a new religious phenomenon that

263 José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*.

can be termed a “syncretistic movement”? In fact, consideration of this question may provide an intimation of the possible future of the “global vitalization of Christianity” and of the social niches and meaning it occupies in the whole society, rather than an exhaustive and comprehensive assessment of it. As aforementioned, the most demographically significant example of the global vitalization of Christianity is the expansion of evangelical Christianity and its potent mutation, Pentecostalism, and the charismatic movements.[264] Therefore, here we will trace how it has been developed, focusing on the recent global expansion of such evangelical mutations, and then discuss further whether it is likely to endure, or whether it is just a temporary phenomenon of late modernity. Parenthetically, with respect to comparisons between Evangelicalism, Pentecostalism, and charismatic movements (Ev+Pen+Ch), they are, of course, not entirely self-contained entities, but are intermingled, sometimes overlapping, yet not the same things.[265] Their global development is not simple, but so complicated and discursive that it would perhaps seem far-fetched to say that the global vitalization of Christianity is a similar consequence of comprehensive historical process.

The major characteristic of the globally expanding Ev+Pen+Ch is one of paradox. First of all, we notice the paradox of religiosity, whereby Ev+Pen+Ch neither detaches itself from an ‘explicit’ institutionalized form of the churches,

264 See Table 3-3.

265 David Martin, “Evangelical Expansion in Global Society”; *Pentecostalism: The World Their Parish* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

nor attaches itself to any particular form of them. Whereas traditional ecclesiologists of the established church emphasized its denominational institutional character, in many cases Ev+Pen+Ch do not describe themselves as such. Here, one clear fact is that global Christianity is accelerating the dissolution of denominational milieus on the one hand, and concurrently reinvigorating global religious denominationalism and trans-denominational boundaries on the other, as discussed in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. Taking one example, “The Pietist and evangelical impulse, particularly in the contemporary forms of Pentecostalism, then became indigenized in Latin America. There, it created a hybrid and pluralistic Catholic-evangelical pattern very different from either western Europe or North America. Eventually it became the most expansive form of Christianity in the world.”[266] At the same time, there are abundant examples of the older mainstream churches in renewal, representing a spill-over of the Pentecostal spirit. In this respect, it can be read that such changes of Ev+Pen+Ch will occur covertly within the old forms, parallel to the kind of changes overtly present in the new ones but within a different frame of meaning.

Another feature of the current global vitalization of Christianity is that it has forged a new synthesis between institutionalized religious power and the individualization of religion.[267] As the self is released from the constraints of

266 David Martin, *The Future of Christianity: Reflections on Violence and Democracy, Religion and Secularization*, p.27

267 David Martin, *On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory*, pp.23, 29-30,112-5, 134-5.

extended kin, the continuities of local community, and religious authority, so there comes about a heightened sense of individuality.[268] For many people, the significance of doctrinal and institutional claims, fixed religious truths anchored within religious institutions, has undoubtedly diminished in favour of the aspiration to be guided by one's own spiritual experience in matters of faith. The sort of Ev+Pen+Ch that is ignited by individual charismatic figures and offered by the religiously ardent seems contrary to this individualization of religion. However, in contrast to authoritarianism, it is exercised in an organization that is lay and participatory, and is interested in emotional and empirical impulse rather than dogmatic lesson. In fact, religious individualization and committed churchgoing are not mutually exclusive, but paradoxically may reinforce each other. In addition, their religiosity combines individual spirituality and explicit expectations with rigid moral codes and a literal interpretation of the Bible,[269] but cuts loose from western professional theology as it enables lay people to feed at will on the biblical text. The result is a competitive and often highly subjective faith that rivals the assumptions of the secular mainstream culture, declares its own religious convictions as biblical and, moreover, as "biblical facts", thus as an alternative to the world of the sciences, and aimed at universal dominance. Martin construes this tendency of Ev+Pen+Ch as follows:

---

268 *Ibid.* p.29.

269 David Martin, *Pentecostalism: The World Their Parish* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

> *In spite of the reservations of those who regard Pentecostalism as a reconstitution of folk religiosity, there is massive evidence to hand to sustain the argument that Pentecostalism, in company with evangelicalism and its charismatic penumbra, within as well as outside the mainstream churches, mobilizes against the horizon of modernity and offers one of the major options before contemporary global society.*[270]

In this perspective, the evangelical mutations as seen in Ev+Pen+Ch can be understood as a particular kind of global religious expansion formed by varieties of fusion: the church and the non-church forms of Christianity; western orthodox theology and indigenous cultural theology (in Martin's expression popular and populist religion that rejects the sponsorship and agenda of the post-Protestant and post-Catholic intelligentsias of sometime Christendom); the process of individualization and that of institutionalization.

In summary, the kinds of vitalization of Christianity that are occurring across national and ethnic boundaries correspond to a motley assortment of hybrid religious forms, pointing to the rise of individualized and spiritual forms of religion beyond traditional Christianity.[271] Thus, there is no discernible unifying principle. These developments are not directly indicative of the growth of fundamentalism, although they include elements of fundamentalist orientation and of the irrelevance of intellectualism. Conversely, they do not denote a re-invention of explicit Christianity as a manifestation of the post-

270 David Martin, *On Secularization Towards a Revised General Theory*, p.149.

271 *Ibid*. p.42.

secular. As evangelical mutation, Ev+Pen+Ch bears the paradoxical trait in its generative process, so that each stage of development necessarily takes on paradoxical aspects, and observers hold contrasting views on the expansion of this new kind of Christianity in global society: as worrying or welcome.[272] Consequently, it could be that it represents an interim phenomenon before the setting in of real secularity, or it might refresh its location and role in the whole society, so long as it does not give up on relating to society in a relevant way. "The future of Christianity depends not on what scientific advance may show, but on whether the Christian drama continues to make sense."[273]

The third question is: "Might the new global vitalization of Christianity, including evangelical, Pentecostal, and charismatic movements, be looked upon as a modern religiosity, a postmodern religiosity, or a post-postmodern religiosity?" Certainly, this vitalization developed in the wake of the postmodern thinking, which disapproved of the absolute atheism that characterizes modern secular thought and offered a novel incubator for individual spiritual forms of religion beyond rigid secular thinking and subordination to the institutionalized structure. To cite one example, Derrida argued that a fixed and final denial of God on metaphysical grounds is as culpable as any dogmatic religious

272 The welcome side is championed by Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity*, and David Martin, *Pentecostalism: The World Their Parish*, the worrying side by Steve Bruce, "Secularization and the Importance of Individualized Religion".

273 David Martin, *The Future of Christianity: Reflections on Violence and Democracy, Religion and Secularization*, p.43.

theology.[274] Postmodern thinking challenged the assumption that secularism is irreversible. The American philosopher John D. Caputo himself suggests as much:[275]

> *If modern atheism is the rejection of a modern God, then the delimitation of modernity opens up another possibility, less the resuscitation of pre-modern theism than the chance of something beyond both the theism and the atheism of modernity.*[276]

Under these circumstances, the most notable (re-)surgence was Ev+Pen+Ch, which "took some elements of the expressive individualism of postmodernity".[277]

On the other hand, in the forms of newly vitalized Christianity we can identify an anti-modern culture and a considerable suspicion of the modern secular challenge, while at the same time they are building up subcultures that are positively related to modernity.[278] Their churches encourage values and behaviour patterns that contributed to modernization: literacy to read the Bible; a positive attitude toward education and self-improvement; and training in administrative skills, including the conduct of public meetings and the keeping of financial accounts. As Martin points out, "the analysis now offered lies

---

274 Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. by Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, [1967] 1997).

275 John D. Caputo has been influenced by Heidegger and the postmodern thinker Gilles Deleuze as well as Derrida.

276 John D. Caputo, "Atheism, A/ theology and the Postmodern Condition", in Michael Martin (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Atheism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.283.

277 David Martin, *On Secularization Towards a Revised General Theory*, p.23.

278 *Ibid*. p.5.

athwart the conventional paradigm of secularization, because whereas that tends to view religion as inhibiting modernity, religion is treated here as offering more than one alternative route to the modern".[279] In this case, we can identify the construction of a modern religiosity that yet rejects modern intellectualism, a so-called "anti-modern religion" that nevertheless accommodates the modern prosperity and the post-modern individualized spiritualism. At most there is a straining towards neo-liberal positions and a rejection of kinds of intellectualism and socialism that express the anti-religious tradition of the Enlightenment. There is also a growing public engagement, mostly among what has been dubbed the "new religious right".

Moreover, there are more progressive neo-evangelicals among some of the evangelical circles, who reflect the limitations of the previously fixed theological ideas. Most importantly, we need to notice a tendency to incorporate both postmodern individualized spiritual forms of Christianity, and Christianity in the form of commitment to social involvement and integral mission. Although the initial impact of the evangelical movement was one of a major mutation of culture, and not brought about through overt political action, this phase of cultural accumulation and the establishment of autonomous space may yet issue in more direct political action. Everywhere it has taken place it has involved religious people and communities evolving from private devotion enclosed in family, community, and place of worship, to public

279 David Martin, *On Secularization Towards a Revised General Theory*.

engagement, characterized by active efforts to influence constitutions, laws, and policy.

3.2.2. The Proliferation of Individual Spiritual Forms of New Christian Faith Communities and Movements: The Mushrooming of Implicit Christianity

3.2.2.1. The Mushrooming of Implicit Christianity and its Characteristics

A prominent feature in the changing landscape of Christianity is the proliferation of individual spiritual forms of faith communities and new Christian movements only loosely connected to traditional Christian institutions and religiosity.[280] However, these are somehow different from evangelical, Pentecostal, or charismatic Christianity, going beyond church-linked institutions in their morphological aspect, and beyond traditional religious orientation in terms of theology. In fact, the decline of church-linked religion is accompanied by the rise of non-church forms of new Christian communities and movements with spiritual concerns. This is a very paradoxical sounding phenomenon of secularization.[281]

Robert Wuthnow argues that a traditional “spirituality of dwelling” that emphasizes sacred places has given way to a new “spirituality of seeking” that

280 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence*, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2010), pp.17-18, 22-26, 129-132.

281 *Ibid.* pp.22-26.

emphasizes the personal quest for new spiritual paths.[282] His observation is universally applicable to today's global religious landscapes. The trend of contemporary religiosity is one of a shift from obligation to enjoyment, from belonging to voluntary participation and sharing, from fixed doctrines to relevant and flexible disciplines.[283] This style of Christian belief and practice is being adopted by ever more individuals, and often syncretistically combined with non-Christian or non-religious elements. Importantly, this kind of religious development grows mushroom-fashion, from the bottom up, as implied in the title of this subsection, rather than being organized from the top down. Such phenomena of religious change are occurring as "implicit forms of Christianity" rather than "explicit forms of Christianity".

Therefore, this research employs the concept of "implicit religion", as developed by Edward Bailey, to refer to manifestations that differ from the official, formal religiosity that adheres to traditional religious institutions, practices and doctrines.[284] Many sociologists of religion use a similar idea with

---

282 Robert Wuthnow, *After Heaven: Spirituality in America since the 1950s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp.3-4. "A spirituality of dwelling emphasizes habitation: God occupies a definite place in the universe and creates a sacred space in which humans too can dwell; to inhabit sacred space is to know its territory and to feel secure. A spirituality of seeking emphasizes negotiation: individuals search for sacred moments that reinforce their conviction that the divine exists, but these moments are fleeting; rather than knowing the territory people explore new spiritual vistas, and they may have to negotiate among complex and confusing meanings of spirituality."

283 Grace Davie, "New Approaches in the Sociology of Religion: A Western Perspective", *Social Compass*, Vol.51.1 (2004): 73–84; Grace Davie, *Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing without Belonging* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

284 I owe the concept of "implicit Christianity" to Hans Joas's term "implicit religion". Hans Joas, "The Future of Christianity". The term "implicit religion" was coined, and the basic concept developed, by Edward Bailey. Edward I. Bailey, *Implicit Religion in Contemporary Society* (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1997); *Implicit Religion: an Introduction* (London: Middlesex University Press, 1998). He initiated the formal study of "implicit religion" (secular faith) in 1968. Now he is the editor of *Implicit Religion: Journal of the Centre for the Study of Implicit Religion and Contemporary Spirituality*.

slightly different terminology, explaining various newly emerging phenomena in terms of “alternative spirituality”, “new age”, or “new religious movement”:[285] "non-church forms of religious orientation, new religious movements, new-age psycho-cults, the occult, spiritualism or cult milieus (…), the Neo-Sannyas [Rajneesh] movement, new Germanic paganism, Bach flower remedies, Qigong, Zen meditation or the ‘small world’ of bodybuilders, the unfamiliar world of dowsers and pendulum diviners, the self-image and worldview of ‘post-modern’ youth or even the cult of football or the music scene", [286] phenomena termed “invisible religion” by Luckmann and “residual religion” by Davies.[287]

However, here “implicit Christianity” is certainly different from an all-inclusive so-called “implicit religion”, because “implicit Christianity” has distinctive Christian traits even in its non-church forms and in communities that do not subordinate themselves to institutional churches. Moreover, the transformation of Christianity toward individual spirituality tends to be played out “in” rather than “outside” or “against” religious communities. Typically,

---

285 Christopher H. Partridge, *Encyclopedia of New Religions: New Religious Movements, Sects and Alternative Spiritualities* (Oxford: Lion Books, 2006); *The Re-Enchantment of the West Volume 1: Alternative Spiritualities, Sacralization, Popular Culture, and Occulture* (London and New York: T. & T. Clark Publishers, 2004); *Volume 2* (London and New York: T. & T. Clark Publishers, 2006); Pau Heelas, Linda Woodhead, Benjamin Seel, Bronislaw Szerszynski, and Karin Tusting, *The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005); Paul Heelas, *New Age Movement* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); “Challenge Secularization Theory: The Growth of ‘New Age’ Spiritualities of Life”, *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 8.1/2 (Spring & Summer, 2006): 46-58; David Ward, “Alternative Spirituality ‘Rising Fast’”, *The Guardian*, 18 June, 2001, accessed 25 September, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/jun/18/religion.world.

286 Detlef Pollack, *Säkularisierung—ein Moderner Mythos?* (Tübingen: Mohr, 2003), pp.10-11.

287 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Danièle Hervieu-Léger, “In Search of Certainties: The Paradoxes of Religiosity in Societies of High Modernity”.

types of so-called “implicit Christianity” can be traced in Christian pilgrimage sites, retreat centres and communities.

Today, one of the world’s most distinctive Christian pilgrimage communities is the Taizé monastic order, an ecumenical community with a strong devotion to peace and justice through prayer and meditation.[288] Founded in 1940, it is composed of more than one hundred brothers, from Protestant and Catholic traditions, drawn from around thirty countries across the world. Each year tens of thousands of young pilgrims come to the small village of Taizé in Saône-et-Loire, Burgundy, France, to explore the community's way of life and to rediscover their Christian faith. Young people from every corner of the globe, many of them spiritual seekers, are encouraged to live out the Christian gospel in a spirit of joy, kindness, simplicity and reconciliation.

Other pilgrimage sites with similar characteristics are found around the periphery of Europe: Lee Abbey (founded in 1946), the Iona Community (founded in 1938), the Scargill Movement (founded in 1961) and the Othona Community (founded in 1946) in the UK; the Corrymeela community in Ireland (founded in 1965); the Bruderhof (founded in 1920) and Klosterkirchberg -

288 http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/priests/taize_1.shtml.

The Taizé Community is an ecumenical monastic order in Taizé, Saône-et-Loire, Burgundy, France. It is composed of more than one hundred brothers, from Protestant and Catholic traditions, who originate from about thirty countries across the world. It was founded in 1940 by Brother Roger Schutz, a Reformed Protestant. Guidelines for the community’s life are contained in The Rule of Taizé written by Brother Roger and first published in French in 1954. The community has become one of the world's most important sites of Christian pilgrimage. Over 100,000 young people from around the world make pilgrimages to Taizé each year for prayer, Bible study, sharing, and communal work. Through the community's ecumenical outlook, they are encouraged to live in the spirit of kindness, simplicity and reconciliation.

Berneuchener Gemeinschaften (founded in 1931) in Germany; and L'Abri Fellowship (founded in 1955) in Switzerland.[289]

These newly mushrooming Christian pilgrimage sites range from resident communities, to retreat centres, to pilgrimage destinations with more footloose styles of religiosity; at all of them seekers mingle with more traditional kinds of pilgrim. In quantitative terms, the situation is ambiguous, because this kind of pilgrimage community is shared with others through visiting and participating rather than belonging. The churches' losses are not balanced out by church gains elsewhere. Nevertheless, such unattached and vague forms of religiosity or so-called casual piety should not be considered as of no account; certainly they should not be ignored.[290]

"Implicit Christianity" remains the major form of individualized religion throughout Europe, and recognition of the Church as an institution is giving way to a more community-oriented religiosity. This transformation of Christianity is likely to gain increasing global prominence.[291] It might well make sense to see remote pilgrimage sites as outposts of resistance to the pressure exerted from the centres of those countries by radical secularism, and as a transformation of Christianity, because the shift towards

289 http://leeabbey.org.uk/; http://iona.org.uk/; http://www.scargillmovement.org/; http://www.othona.org/; http://www.corrymeela.org/; http://www.taize.fr/; http://www.bruderhof.com/; http://www.klosterkirchberg.de/; http://www.labri.org/

290 Hans Joas, *Faith as an Option*, pp.119-20, 124-5.

291 Thomas Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

individualistic spirituality tends to occur within religious communities rather than outside of or in opposition to them. That is why these avenues ought to be explored.

3.2.2.2. The Key Controversial Issues on the Mushrooming of Implicit Religion

The term “implicit Christianity” is likely to evoke a bewildering and often contradictory variety of images and attitudes. We may use it to refer to anything that is taken very seriously with the most basic sensory evidence that informs our approach to the world, and there are sometimes sharply differing opinions as to what belongs in the category and what does not.

The first question here is: “Is implicit Christianity a new form of church, a new type of Christian movement?” The basic sociological organizational types of Christianity as developed by Ernst Troeltsch - church, sects, mysticism – provide us with an empirical and methodological starting point to answer this question. [292] Undoubtedly, implicit Christianity is not the traditional institutionalized forms of church, and revolves more closely around types of mysticism. Thus the term is increasingly associated with aspects of religiosity

292 The German scholar Ernst Troeltsch attempted to classify religious groups according to their typical relationships with society as three primary types of religious social organization: church, sect, and mysticism. The church is more peremptorily inclusive and achieves greater accommodation by worldly institutions. The sect demands voluntary commitment from its members, who often adopt a critical stance toward existing social arrangements, and are set up with their own organization in distinction from, and often in protest against, established religions. Mysticism's individualistic and spiritualistic religiosity, to which Troeltsch himself was strongly attracted, is an ever present historical possibility, but it forges especially strong links with sect organizations and has a diffuse appeal under modern social conditions. These concepts have since become central to the sociological study of religious processes and have been variously adapted by more recent thinkers. Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches [Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen]*, trans. by Olive Wyon (Louisville and London: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992 [Tübingen, 1912]), Vol. 1, pp.991-1013.

focused on the experiential, the interior, and generally the subjective dimensions of personal identity.

Ironically, implicit Christianity is rarely accepted as religion by church-related institutions, especially those with a conservative religiosity, despite the fact that many of its adherents refer to themselves as representing an internal morphological transformation of Christianity. Conversely, although its participants do not describe themselves as religious, that description might be assigned to them by those who study religion and people.

In fact, religiosity corresponding to individual mysticism is present throughout Christian history, yet modernity and its challenges shift the relationship between individual and institutional authority and present new potential for mysticism to break free of religious institutions. According to Troeltsch, this potential, without grounding in institutions, leads to religious individualization and a-religion.[293]

Implicit Christianity draws our attention to the limitations of a "churchly" definition of religiosity.[294] Today the boundary between religion, sects and mysticism is beginning to be seen as arbitrary and blurred.[295] Implicit Christianity offers a new trajectory, showing the heterogeneity of religious

293 Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, Vol. 2, p.800.

294 Courtney Bender, "Things in their Entanglements", in Philip S. Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society* (NY and London: New York University Press and SSRC, 2012); *Heaven's Kitchen: Living Religion at God's Love We Deliver* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); *The New Metaphysicals: Spirituality and the American Religious Imagination* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

295 Courtney Bender, "Things in their Entanglements".

practices. Thus, it can no longer be embedded in the framework of church-sect-mysticism typology.

Indeed, Troeltsch's approach was designed to envisage a new religious element of life through the mutual interpenetration of these organizational types, and the reconciliation of the motives underlying them. In this respect, America sociologist Courtney Bender's "entanglements", and Swiss sociologist Franz-Xaver Kaufmann's "interaction" (Wechselwirkung) enable us to approach contemporary religious change in a more productive way.[296] Through these conceptions, we may perceive implicit Christianity as entailing multiple sites of interface for the churches, representing both opportunities and spiritual challenges.

Kaufmann's term highlights the necessity of such interfacing, but also the opportunities inherent in it:

> *Only if we succeed in creating an interplay between the churches, which are entrusted with preserving and developing the explicitly Christian dimension, and the forms of implicit Christian practice and communication found in interstitial spaces, can we hope to pass on Christianity to new generations under present-day social conditions.*[297]

Of course, such attempts and proposals to build bridges between the different realms must not cause anybody to squander or undervalue their own traditions.

---

296 Courtney Bender, "Things in their Entanglements"; Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, "Zwischenräume und Wechselwirkungen. Der Verlust der Zentralperspektive und das Christentum", *Theologie und Glaube*, Vol. 96 (2006): 309-23.

297 Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, "Zwischenräume und Wechselwirkungen".

There will certainly be a need to uphold transcendence in the face of trends towards de-transcendentalization in both implicit and explicit contemporary religions. But whenever one finds points of contact with experiences and interpretations in this way, one is productively challenged to rearticulate one's own tradition. If it is true that competition intensifies religious life, then both believers and religious institutions must rise to the occasion and meet this competitive challenge. Troeltsch emphasizes that "it must be maintained in its concrete fullness of life by churches and sects, if an entirely individualistic mysticism is to spiritualize at all. Thus, we are forced to this conclusion: this concept of Christianity…assumes the continuance of other and more concrete living forms of Christianity as well."[298]

The second question with regard to implicit Christianity is: "Is implicit Christianity different from hybrid globalized religions such as the Moonies, or is it a cult wearing Christian garments?"

To explore this complex issue, academics are, as ever, keen to construct typologies so that some order can be given to the great variety of new religions, sects and alternative individual spiritualities.[299] This research follows the classification developed by the sociologist of religion, Roy Wallis, rather than a taxonomy classified by theological concerns, because such a view can trigger self-justification of church-related religiosity. Wallis stated that new

298 Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, Vol. 2, p.799.

299 See Christopher H. Partridge, *Encyclopedia of New Religions: New Religious Movements, Sects and Alternative Spiritualities*.

religious movements can be simply and intelligibly classified according to their relationship with society, as “world-affirming”, “world-accommodating”, or “world-renouncing”.[300] In his description, world-affirming religious movements accept many of the values, goals and aspirations of society, but believe that they can offer a more effective route to attaining such goals and provide a better model of such values. For example, those who participate in the Taizé community do not want to distance themselves from the world, but rather want to be more meaningful and happier in it. Hence, in this sense implicit Christianity is a non-church form of new individual spiritual Christianity that can be seen as “world-affirming”.

In most cases, the impulse to implicit Christianity with individualistic spiritual forms is motivated not by a will for better religiosity or from passion for conservation of religion, but from a desire for a better life. The individuals concerned are seeking a value to devote a whole life to; they are pursuing not religion, but the value carried and mediated by religion. In this case, what is being rejected is the allegedly perennial interpretation of religious values controlled by institutionalized Christianity, not the religious spirituality or value itself. What is being pursued is a better life inspired by religious challenge, not the manifestation of religion itself. Implicit Christianity is a religious movement as a way of life channelling Christian faith or spirituality. The disestablishment of the traditional religious forms and doctrines can offer the prospect of

300 Roy Wallis, *The Elementary Forms of the New Religious Life* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).

additional avenues for an understanding of mediation that may, in turn, contribute to the formation of new, life-oriented models of Christian spirituality and mission. Implicit Christianity persists in the lives of individuals, well beyond their active participation in religious groups. The subject for empirical investigation is what kinds of form and expression such religions take – leaving the door open for the study of individualized and implicit possibilities.

Moving on to the third question: “Are individual spiritual forms of new Christian faith communities and movements modern religiosity, postmodern, or post-postmodern? As aforementioned, the individual spiritual forms of religiosity corresponding to implicit Christianity, [301] as opposed to the traditional institutionalized forms of church, have been present throughout Christian history, and thus cannot be regarded as exclusively contemporary phenomena. In this historical sense, implicit Christianity can be viewed as another modern religiosity for self-justified authenticity and satisfaction, with a stance that is directly opposite to the previous stream, because new religious movements, whether sects or mysticism, nearly always begin in protest against the “loss of authentic faith” of the body out of which they came.[302]

Yet, with the evolution of modernity, especially to postmodernism, the latest

301 It is the equivalent of Troeltsch’s mysticism.

302 H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (Kila: Kessinger Publishing, [1929] 2004); see also Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, *The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival and Cult Formation* (Berkeley, LA, London; University of California Press, 1992); "Of Churches, Sects, and Cults: Preliminary Concepts for a Theory of Religious Movements", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* Vol. 18. 2 (1979): 117-33.

challenges shift the relationship of individual faith to religious institutional authority and to society, and change the style of faith. If the previous implicit Christianity was “spirituality of dwelling”, narrowly holding one’s place in the periphery of mainstream religious institution, the new implicit Christianity revolves around a free-floating “spirituality of seeking”, as there is no longer any stigma of a cult attached to being divorced from religious institutions. The dominant mode of spiritual faith being adopted is “world-accommodating”, rather than “world-renouncing” or “world-affirming”. This change presents new potential to co-operate with public society but also with religious institutions, while at the same time breaking free of them. In this vein, the new implicit Christianity has characteristics quite different from those of the modern “spirituality of dwelling” stuck on the periphery of mainstream religious institutions, as well as from the modern religiosity in which one could hardly identify oneself as Christian without belonging to the established Church. Implicit Christianity beyond normal religion indeed works in a postmodern or post-postmodern framework.

In the upsurge of implicit Christianity, as Christian belief and practice are being increasingly adapted by individuals and syncretistically combined with non-Christian or non-religious elements, identification with any particular affiliation continues to be eroded, the monopolistic claims to truth that hold sway in traditional institutionalized Christianity are in the process of dissolution, and the conflicts triggered by symbolic distinctions are of no importance. Ulrich

Beck argues that people's eyes have been opened to "the fluid nature" of traditional religious institutions with explicit religiosity, and new individual spiritual forms of Christian faith communities and movements with implicit religiosity.[303] He describes the process clearly:

> *In determining the limits of religion, Troeltsch's distinction between churches and sects, on the one hand, and religiosity and spirituality or mysticism, on the other, can be taken further. If in the first case we have an either/or regime, in the second we have a motley assortment of 'both this and that'.*[304]

Thus it becomes possible to recognize what is involved in the interaction between the explicit institutionalized Christianity and implicit Christianity. As Beck expresses it, "it is nothing less than 'a religious reformation on a world scale'".[305]

Yet, here, in a socio-political perspective, it is clear that implicit Christianity displays two disparate facets.[306] One is an inclination toward finding a postmodern spiritual place, like New Age religion, as a refuge from the world, while the other has a re-modern proposition as a counterpart for a more reflexive faith through an entanglement process.

On the one hand, the individual spiritual forms of Christianity, in spite of all

303 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence*, p.127.

304 *Ibid.*

305 *Ibid.* p.128.

306 *Ibid.* pp.125-132.

their depth and spirituality, display a form of religious life isolated from the public sphere; in its depreciation of history, social ethics, and public engagement, this form is constitutive of implicit Christianity. This type of Christianity emerges from noetic individual experience, a point of origin that makes it difficult to organize in robust social forms. Eagleton's description of New Age religion as "one place where so-called spiritual values, driven from the face of a brutally pragmatic capitalism, have taken refuge" may be applicable to such implicit Christianity.[307] Eagleton criticized that, "it offers a refuge from the world, not a mission to transform it. The sigh of the opposed creature, as opposed to its cry of anger, is merely a pathological symptom of what is awry with us."[308] In this sense, just as Christian fundamentalism is anti-political, so implicit Christianity is apolitical. As such it can almost certainly be characterized as postmodern.

On the other hand, insofar as we can summarize diverse movements under the heading "implicit Christianity", the term relates to the diverse values and practices that are of "ultimate and utmost relevance" for those concerned.[309] Implicit Christianity alerts people to the importance of the fact that the world religions can no longer rely on their own traditions. Historically, different forms

307 Terry Eagleton, *Reason, Faith and Revolutions: Reflections on the God Debates* (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2009), p.40.

308 *Ibid.* p.41.

309 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence*, pp.128-9; Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel, "Religious Individualization or Secularization?", p.604; Detlef Pollack and Daniel V.A. Olson (eds.), *The Role of Religion in Modern Societies*.

of Christianity that have operated in isolation from one another are now forced to compete and communicate in the boundless space of the mass media. In consequence, they are forced to make their symbols accessible in a process of mutual exchange for the benefit of all concerned.

In terms of the possibility of individualized religion, Ulrich Beck notes that:

> *Communication with one's chosen God who has escaped from the controlling hand of church authority thus radicalizes the subjective basis of experience, activity and sense of responsibility. (...) Many seekers believe that exploring their own consciousness in line with the demands of subjective spirituality can lead to a direct, unmediatized contact with the sacred in all its forms.*[310]

According to his perception, implicit Christianity as individualized religion can bring "a subjectivization of utopia and revolution", by transforming religion into "competing religions of the true self".[311] In this respect, implicit Christianity can be construed not only as a postmodern "implicit religion", but as transformation of Christianity in a re-modern paradigm.

310 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence*, p.129.

311 *Ibid*.

3.2.3. The Social Presence of Faith-Based Social Organizations (FBSOs) as a Civil Agent: Integrating Christian Faith into New Forms of Faith-based Social Action

3.2.3.1. The Emergence of New Faith-based Praxis Forms of FBSOs and Their Social Participation

Another phenomenon of the recent religious landscape, noted by many researchers, is that Christianity continues to make a significant imprint on social changes and developments in civil society and in modern international relations, through Christian FBSOs[312] involved in faith-based social action.[313] In fact, although formal adherence to religious institutions, practices and doctrines has declined sharply in a number of western countries, various Christian communities, groups, and individuals have built up new types of organizations for faith-based social action as welfare providers and/or as political actors. The various Christian FBSOs are placed as an empirically

312 For the latter, we use the definition of the Religion and Development (RaD) research programme of the University of Birmingham, according to which FBOs "mean organizations that resemble NGOs or other civil society organizations but are based in or affiliated to a faith tradition or religious organization. They may be membership or non-membership organizations." Carole Rakodi, *Understanding the Roles of Religions in Development: The approach of the RaD programme* (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2007), p.54.

313 José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*; Adam Dinham, Robert Furbey and Vivien Lowndes (eds.), *Faith in the Public Realm: Controversies, Policies and Practices* (Bristol and Portland: Policy Press, 2009); Adam Dinham, *Faiths, Public Policy and Civil Society: Problems, Policies, Controversies* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Justin Beaumont and Paul Cloke (eds.), *Faith-Based Organizations and Exclusion in European Cities* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2012); Paul Cloke, "Theo-ethics and Radical Faith-based Praxis in the Postsecular City", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), pp.223-41; Carole Rakodi (ed.) *Religion, Religious Organizations and Development: Scrutinizing Religious Perceptions and Organizations* (London and NY: Routledge, 2014).

visible phenomenon of religion squarely in opposition to the "subtraction theory" of modernism and secularism during the latter half of the twentieth century, which assumed that religion is and ought to remain an exclusively private affair.[314] Most tellingly, there are very few voices today, even in Europe, that will defend "subtraction theory" or "the privatization of religion", in its most straightforward form. Rather, the public presence of Christianity is in some cases too politically consequential to ignore, and operates as a contentious challenge to the public sphere. This recognition has brought about a noticeable change in attitude and attention to religion throughout the world.

Many scholars have observed the continuing manifestation of religious faith in public engagement of religion or public faith outside religious institutions. Representatively, José Casanova argues that religious social action within what is conceptualized as "public religion" is one of the defining features of the public presence of religion today.[315] For example, Adam Dinham and his colleagues have been involved in various projects regarding the social engagement of faith.[316] In 21 cities across 7 European countries, the European research project "Faith-based Organizations and Social Exclusion in European Cities" (FACIT) addressed the question of the changing and

314 I will discuss "the privatization of religion" in detail in section 4.1.

315 José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*; "Public Religions Revisited"; "Rethinking Public Religions", p.32.

316 Adam Dinham, Robert Furbey and Vivien Lowndes (eds.), *Faith in the Public Realm: Controversies, Policies and Practices*; Adam Dinham, *Faiths, Public Policy and Civil Society: Problems, Policies, Controversies*; Robert Furbey, Adam Dinham, Richard Farnell (eds.), *Faith as Social Capital: Connecting or Dividing?* (Bristol: Policy Press & Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2006); Adam Dinham, *Priceless, Unmeasurable: Faith-based Community Development in England in the 21st Century* (London: FbRN, 2007).

present role of FBSOs in matters of poverty and other forms of social exclusion such as social isolation, homelessness or undocumented persons, through local case studies of faith-based organizations.[317]

This trend cannot be well-described using demographic evidence, but as the studies suggest, it can be traced to wider cultural phenomena within which new forms of religious organization are acting as a reflexive civil agent involved in faith-based social action and movements. Empirical observation of the emergence of new forms of faith-based organizations has to be re-analysed and re-visited in relation to new forms of religiosity. Of course, this kind of movement does not necessarily detach itself from traditional Christian institutions and the churches, and sometimes overlaps with the existing religious groups as types of participation, co-operation, and solidarity. However, it is clear that such mobilization is now shifting from religious agendas and traditional theological themes to how to live well, dissolving religious values and practices into life-oriented social agendas rather than the allegedly timeless religious doctrines controlled by institutionalized Christianity. Gordon Lynch, a prominent British cultural sociologist, gives a comprehensive and authoritative account of the burgeoning of such progressive religious movements in his book *The New Spirituality: An Introduction to progressive*

317 Participating countries are: Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, UK, Turkey, Spain and Sweden. See Danielle Dierckx, Jan Vranken, Wendy Kerstens (eds.), *Faith-based Organizations and Social Exclusion in European Cities: National Context Reports* (Leuven and The Hague: Acco, 2009); Maarten Davelaar, Jessica van den Toorn, Nynke de Witte, Justin Beaumont, and Corien Kuiper, *Faith-based Organizations and Social Exclusion in the Netherlands* (Leuven and The Hague: Acco, 2011); The Netherlands report provides an integrated overview of the Dutch case-studies conducted within the project, exploring faith-based activities in Tilburg, Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

belief beyond religion, which offers a clear and engaging analysis of the emergence of a generation of progressive religious thinkers and organizational structures of this new faith, assessing its significance in the changing religious landscape of contemporary western society.

According to him, the Christian progressive movement is a new religious typology, which reveres the natural world and the religious right, and can engage in constructive deliberation with the secular, demonstrating ideas that contribute to an increasing importance of religion in the public sphere.[318]

The institutional transfer of religious functions (such as marriage, burials) and of entire structures relating to the delivery of education, health, social care, and radical campaigning, to the state (be it secular or non-secular) and public authorities, loosens the formerly tightly held institutional power and dominance, and allows for the dissemination of religious authority and ritual authenticity – previously regulated and authenticated by church institutions – among a democratic populace of individuals. Christian Smith characterized such phenomena as "disruptive religion".[319]

Consideration of these phenomena advances the discussion of the organizational possibility that the religious forces of the present might come together in new ways through their mutual interpenetration of the basic

318 Gordon Lynch, *The New Spirituality: An Introduction to Progressive Belief in the Twenty-first Century* (London and New York; I.B. Tauris, 2007).

319 Christian Smith, "Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back In", in Christian Smith (ed.), *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.1-28.

sociological organizational types of Christianity: church, sects, and mysticism. In his essay, “The Possible Futures of Christianity”,[320] Ernst Troeltsch asked whether Europe faced the imminent emergence of new, as yet unknown religious phenomena, which would prove capable of forming a new religious element of life. The western world has not seen a wholesale shift towards a secular society in which religious faith has died out. In certain aspects, radical faith-based praxis and its social presence through FBSOs point to what this can mean in practice, in a way that moves beyond the stereotypes of religious actors as either slavering theocrats or servile service providers making up the deficiencies of the welfare state.

In spite of political secularization, the separation of religion from politics and public policy, religion still has politically assertive power. Many formally secular humanitarian workers and aid agencies are demonstrably motivated by a great deal of faith and drive to connect with the transcendent. A key similarity is their value-driven motivation.[321] This is a typology of integrating Christianity into social engagement in the public sphere.

3.2.3.2. Debates about Faith-Based Social Organizations (FBSOs) as New Forms of Religious Organization as a Civil Agent

Do we need to consider FBSOs as a new type of reformulated religion?

320 Ernst Troeltsch, “Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums,” Logos 1 (1910– 11): 165-85; *Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen* (Tübingen, 1912).

321 Rachael Chapman “Faith and the voluntary sector in urban governance: Distinctive yet similar?”, in Adam Dinham, Robert Furbey and Vivien Lowndes (eds.), *Faith in the Public Realm: Controversies, Policies and Practices*.

From the modern perspective, the answer is simple. They are neither already by themselves religion, nor do they operate socially as religion. Moreover, they are not perceived as a religious category by the traditional ecclesiology that emphasizes the institutional character of the established church, nor by the social scientists who study it.[322]

However, what is more important than the concept itself, is the fact that FBSOs are emerging with various forms and motivation, and play a dynamic and influential role in the public sphere, in contrast to the withdrawal of religion into privatized areas. In certain respects, the renewed vitalization of religion based on public engagement is more crucial to the place and role of religion in the public sphere than the resurgence of institutionalized religion and religiosity.

In this regard, Michael Barnett intimates a novel theoretical approach that would reflect integration of the religious into practical life and the social realm, not the disappearance of religion from the public sphere, through asking not "what is religion?", but rather "where is the religion?", and thematising a more transformative process of religiosity beyond the limitations of "churchly" definitions.[323] More broadly, sometimes these changes are premised on the increasing importance given by Christians to witnessing by deed rather than word. FBSOs incorporate themes and semantics from particular religions as

322 Robert Wuthnow, *Saving America?: Faith-based Services and the Future of Civil Society* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004).

323 Michael Barnett, "Where is the Religion?: Humanitarianism, Faith, and World Affairs", in Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft (eds.), *Rethinking Religion and World Affairs*, pp.165-181.

part of their vision of society, and as concreate aspects of their mobilizing of events. It can be said that faith-based social action is channelling the unique value of religion. These movements therefore profile religion, give it social visibility, without themselves being primarily religious movements, which is to say, without generating amounts of core religious communication. They are closer to “centrifugal religiosity” than “centripetal religiosity”, in the extension of Hoekendijk’s concept, “scattered church”.[324] On this point, Robert Wuthnow offered the memorable aphorism, “religion as an embedded practice”.[325] At least, they must be observed as a type of religion, denoting categories in which an emphasis on practice turns out to be more relevant to understanding social practices than to political secularization.

The outcome of these considerations is that religion is embedded within what has been called civil society, through the integration of religious faith and values into social agendas without particular religious forms. “Embedded Christianity” can also be construed as an unconventional anomalous transformation of Christianity.

If so, why is this phenomenon now considered as an important transformation of Christianity? In fact, FBSOs and charities have a long history of social action, particularly in the most deprived areas. Since the 1960s many Christian

---

324 Johannes C. Hoekendijk, *The Church Inside Out*, trans. by Issac C. Rottenberg (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966).

325 Robert Wuthnow, *Saving America?: Faith-based Services and the Future of Civil Society*.

movements have transformed into civil society movements. A greater role for faith-based organizations has also emerged, particularly from the 1990s onwards, as areas of civil society have begun to be extended after the collapse of the era of conflicting ideologies at the global level.[326] Whereas historically, FBSOs were established by religious institutions, now they are set up independently by individuals and groups focusing on specific issues. As a result, existing religious institutions participate in the projects and movements already launched by FBSOs, or co-operate with them. That is, the initiative has shifted from religious institutions to individualized religious groups, from participation in religion per se, to social action.

3.3. Testing the Theory of Morphological Transformation of Christianity within the Sociology of Religion: The Individualization of Religion[327]

The most notable phenomenon that can be observed in the contemporary ecclesiastical transformation may be the development and massive dissemination of a religiosity that is based increasingly on “individualization”, whereby people are persuaded or pushed into new forms of social

326 Steven M. Buechler, *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism* (지역: Oxford University Press, 1999).

327 There are three main positions in the current discussions within the sociology of religion:1) the secularization theory, 2) the economic market model, and 3) the individualization theory. Their central arguments are critically discussed at theoretical as well as empirical level in Detlef Pollack and Daniel V. A. Olson (eds.), *The Role of Religion in Modern Societies*. This should serve as an outline of the state of the art in research on the sociology of religion, focusing especially on controversial points of discussion concerning the social significance of religion in modern societies as well as change in this significance.

association.[328] The relevance of individualization to religion or religiosity was examined early on by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, and more recently by Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Paul Heelas, Ronald Inglehart and W.C. Roof in the framework of the sociology of religion, and has been further clarified by Ulrich Beck in his book, *A God of One's Own*.[329] Beck designates one important aspect of reflexive modernization as the "individualization" that opens up the inner aspect of religious transformation, in juxtaposition to the "cosmopolitization" of the outer aspect.[330] Certainly, from the standpoint of the sociology of religion, deploying the theory of re-modernization, "individualization of religion" is a basic feature of any diagnosis of the religious signature of the age, as well as the central motif of contemporary religious transformation.

The thesis of religious individualization proceeds from the assumption that "with increasing modernization, the religious do not disappear, but change their appearance".[331] If so, how can we best explicate and understand "the individualization of religion"? We can do so through comparison with social individualization, such as the individualization of family and social classes, which brings about profound changes in the aggregate situation, the quality of society as a whole. The process of individualization lucidly represents two

328 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence*.

329 See Bibliography.

330 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own*, pp.64, 82.

331 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own*.

radical aspects of social transformation: 1) de-traditionalization, the loosening of all the ties based on family, class, status-groups, ethnicity and milieu, including national identity and political identity, and the dissolution of old institutional stereotypes, certainties and dominant ideas, and 2) a radical individual essence and self-fulfilment, the necessity and possibility of individual decision-making.[332] In those societies that have adopted the autonomy of individuals as a principle, we see a new kind of inner diversity, contradictoriness and unpredictability, and the emergence of symbolic resources of varying quality.

On these assumptions it can also be said that while the individualization of religion or faith undermines the religious classes and the institutionalized churches of modernity, it opens up the opportunity for free religious choice, placing individual choice at the forefront in religious matters.[333] Hervieu-Leger points out that: "Legitimization of belief is moving from religious authorities, guarantors of the truth of belief, to individuals themselves, who are responsible for the authenticity of their own spiritual approach."[334] Seen from this angle, individualization of religion means the individualized dissemination of convictions and the collapse of the religious codes that organized shared certainties within believing communities. However, it must be noted that

332 See Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own*; Danièle Hervieu-Léger, "In Search of Certainties".

333 Danièle Hervieu-Léger, "In Search of Certainties".

334 *Ibid*.

individualization does not imply Bellah's individual,[335] nor egoistic and conscious choice or individual preference, nor is it Enlightenment autonomy.[336] Rather, the individualization of religion has been imposed on individuals as a consequence of the long historical process of modern institutions. Furthermore, it should be noted that we are not dealing with a postmodern concept. I assume that the themes of post-postmodern transition and ecclesiastical identity come together in a newly changing Christianity in the contemporary modern world. In the process of religious individualization, the four basic features are sufficiently complex to require more careful examination.

First, the individualization of religion highlights both "institutionalized dis-embedding and re-embedding of the individual".[337] The dissolution of religious ties of belonging and the pre-existing collectivity of religious group identities may be said to coincide with the creation of faith narratives for oneself adapted to one's own experiential horizon and self-knowledge. Indeed, nowadays the individual human being becomes increasingly adept at writing one's own faith narratives with the aid of words and symbols that have abandoned their fixed orbit in the institutionalized coordinates of sovereign world religions in which a particular tradition had held them fast for centuries. At the same time, it is a

335 Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essay in Religion in a Post Traditional World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

336 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own*, p.94.

337 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash (eds.) *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order* (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 1994).

fact that individuals form their competences as spiritual and religious 'do-it-yourselves' in their dealings with religious symbols that are almost always detached from the context that had previously guaranteed their legibility. More precisely, this means that individuals have been dissolving the pre-existing frameworks, yet from the beginning they did not intend just to dismantle pre-existing models, or one's own life or faith grounds, but instead they engaged in constructing their own biographical lives and social and religious identities through the prism of one's own existence. In this respect, as Beck intimates, the process of religious individualization may be the reflexive re-modern, rather than the recent product of an assumed "post-modernity".[338]

Secondly, the individualization of religion does not refer to the privatization of religion that means a withdrawal into the family and circle of friends, or into the inner life of the individual. It tends to be misunderstood as such privatization of religion, that is to say, the demise of the significance of religion in the public arena. Whereas "privatization of religion" degenerates into self-obsession and anomic segments, and gives rise to an unfettered narcissism, the individualization of religion evolves into the resurgence of a new kind of subjective religiosity which leads to an increasing loosening of monopoly, religious ties and the dogmatic framework provided by the institutionalized religions. Although it may bring about the privatization of religion, it also paves

338 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own*, p.124.

the way for an innovated function and role in the public sphere.[339] The result of these processes is that at the birth of the twenty-first century, we are experiencing the paradox that religion is both declining and on the rise. It is a mistake to attribute the waning influence of religion to its individualization. The opposite is also true.

Thirdly, individualization of faith raises a pivotal question: can faith exist without shared common belief? In other words, do the multiplicities of personal religious structures imply the mechanical atomization of both society and religion without a common space that binds individuals together? The answer in the re-modern perspective is no. Apart from our general conjecture, as Hervieu-Leger claims, "the greater the individualization of belief, the greater is its degree of homogenization".[340] To put it another way, highly individualized faith cultures function in a completely standardized manner. According to Beck, the rejection of institutional approval of belief and the broadening of the stock of references and symbols made available for use and reuse by individuals does not signify only the fragmentation of small systems of belief. At the same time, the liberalization of the symbol market gives room to a paradoxical tendency towards the standardization of the respective narratives: a standardization that makes possible their arrangement into networks on a worldwide scale.[341] The individualization of religion then, obeys the

339 *Ibid.* pp.88-89.

340 Danièle Hervieu-Léger, "In Search of Certainties".

341 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own*, pp.89-90.

mechanisms of the symbolic economy of religion, which is increasingly penetrated by the laws of the marketplace.[342] A good indicator is the empirically demonstrable adherence to a "minimum creed":

> *This can be summed up as follows: 'God loves you, Jesus saves and you can be healed.' Theological clarification of this creed is not required and its practical effectiveness is meant to be experienced personally by each believer. This doctrinal reduction is linked to the expansion within this movement of an emotional religiosity that explicitly preaches putting the intellectual mind on the back burner and promotes the value of emotional experience of the presence of the Spirit.*[343]

Hence we may say that the pattern of individualized faith is in fact the standard collective consciousness that I am unable to see for what it is because it thinks of itself as individual.

Fourthly, in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of individualization of religion, it is necessary to grasp the complex and decisively important point that this encompasses paradoxical situations: the horizon of possibilities that become opened up can apply to both institutionalized religion and non-institutionalized individual religion. In other words, individualization of religion can enrich and empower both the individual and the institutional, and can thus fall within both the contemporary proliferation of "cults", and the

342 Markus Vinzent, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, Vol. 32. 2 (August 2011): 143–160; 143–160; Yoon Tae Kim, Typologies of the Religious Market. An Economic Approach, PhD thesis (King's College

343 Danièle Hervieu-Léger, "In Search of Certainties".

strengthening of traditionalist and fundamentalist trends within the great religious traditions. The individualization of religion challenges the authority of established ecclesial beliefs and practices, yet it has not necessarily been inimical to all religious institutions. Religious individualization and committed churchgoing are not mutually exclusive, but may well reinforce each other. We have experienced "individual church-ism",[344] the declining significance of denominationalism, the growth of special purpose groups, and de-facto congregationalism. The changes to which these several phrases point are profoundly de-traditionalizing in their effects. The paradoxical unintended consequence that we find in this religious trend makes up two sides of the same development coin in the re-modern context, however different those sides might appear at first glance.

From the above discussion of religious individualization, we can set out the two outstanding trends of the new religious currents unfurling inside and outside the churches: "resurgent Christianity" as the transformation of institutionalized Christianity, and "disestablished Christianity"[345] as an anomalous transformation. With regard to the former, the paradigmatic example is that the thesis of individualization of religion applies to institutionalized religion in terms of the rise of contemporary evangelical

344 Chi-Joon Noh, *Hanguk Gaesingyo Sahoehak: Hanguk Gyohoeui Wigiwa Jeonmang* [*Korea Protestant Sociology: Crisis and Prospect of Korean Church* (Seoul: Hanul Academi, 1998).

345 I have borrowed the concept of "disestablishment" from James W. Heisig's interesting article "Christianity Today: The Transition to Disestablishment", *Inter-religio*, Vol.30 (1996): 63-79.

Christianity, including the Pentecostal charismatic movement that represents the new changing Christian mode. Here, the distinguishing feature is an individualized religiosity that is ignited by individual charismatic figures. One further tendency present in global society and relevant to evangelical expansion is a heightened sense of individuality as the self, where individual feeling is released from the constraints of extended kin and the continuities of local community, but is balanced and checked by religious disciplines and moral priorities. The modern revivalist, evangelical and missionary movements have forged a new synthesis between the institutionalized religious power and the individualization of religion in a re-modern paradigm. The result is a competitive and often highly subjective faith that rivals the assumptions of both the secular mainstream culture and anti-modern fundamentalism.

The second trend of ecclesiastical transformation is movement beyond the institutionalized. It is true that ties to organized religious communities are being loosened, just as the authority of the religious guard on existential questions is being weakened. However, this should not be taken to mean that religious experience and issues are of declining importance for individuals. On the contrary, the decline of established religious institutions goes hand in hand with a rise in individual religiosity.[346] With the individualization of religion, the assumption that one cannot identify oneself as Christian without belonging to

346 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel, "Religious Individualization or Secularization?", p.604; Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own*, pp.39-40.

the established Church began to be eroded, and this process of disassociation continued through the rise of science, technology, communications, and travel, until today more and more people are open to seeing themselves as Christian in view of some sort of "Christianness" rather than of any particular affiliation. The dominant form of individual religion may be "invisible religion" and this is likely to gain increasing global prominence.[347] The disestablishment of traditional Christianity can offer the prospect of additional avenues for an understanding of mediation that may, in turn, contribute to the formation of new, life-oriented models of Christian spirituality and mission. That is why these avenues ought to be explored.

To summarize, we must answer the questions: "Must we conclude that the individualization of religion is a third broad alternative between the death of religion and its antithesis in the ongoing modernization process? How do the traditional churches and individualized new religious communities relate to each other at quantitative and qualitative level, and what social structures do they have? The individualization of religion dissolves inherited religious and cultural identities, then leads, as the other side of the coin, to the constitution, activation, and even invention of communities and systems of belief that fit individuals' own aspirations and experiences, based on the principle of individual autonomy, irrespective of whether the new formations are

347 Thomas Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

institutionalized or non-institutionalized communities. This dual tendency corresponds to a rational concept of privatizing access to symbol goods, which are being progressively substituted for a collective or semi-collective rationale, which corresponds to the institutional and family transmission of religious identities. It requires the specific empirical study of the structural changes in the religious sphere.

3.4. Conclusion

The secularization thesis that predicted the inevitable gradual disappearance of religion in modernizing societies remained, until a few decades ago, unchallenged in academia and society. However, it has become clear through socio-empirical observation that Christianity has not disappeared, but remains persistent and resilient. Furthermore, the prediction is unlikely to be realized in the future. As a result, it has lost much of its plausibility, and now needs to be mediated phenomenologically through another framework, rather than merely that of an absence of religion. By the same token, post-secularism can hardly mean “after secularism”, although it might signal an end to taking it for granted that a clear, stable, and consistent demarcation has been established between secular and religious dimensions of life.

In this context, it is evident that along with the changes of religious milieus,[348]

348 These are: 1) the inextricable link between the secular and the religious, 2) the dissolution of denominational

Christianity has transformed and is continually transforming; its condition is neither one of decline nor one of simple survival. Here, the transformation of Christianity presents in the various forms and manifestations of Christian religiosity that differ from traditional church-linked forms. The logic of transformation does not necessarily contradict the theories of secularization. Paradoxically, transformation of Christianity can be compatible with both secularization and the sense of a renewed vitalization of religion.

Above all, the changes of religious milieus around the world and the transformation of Christianity can be best explicated by the process of "individualization of religious belief". Here, religiosity is formulated less by dogmatic discipline and ritual service of religious institution and the church, and more by individualized religious faith and spirituality. [349] The individualization of religion undermines religious authority and the sense of obligation. This can also be observed in the degradation of the status and number of clerics, and in the rarefaction of rituals. The most important consequence of the process of individualization of religion is the radical switch from a religion conceived as a heteronomous principle to a religion conceived as an autonomous identity and a support for individuals in an uncertain modern society. For many people, the significance of static religious truths, which are

milieus and intra-religious boundaries, and 3) the reinvigoration of global religious denominationalism and trans-denominational boundaries.

349 In this vein, the individualization of religion is definitely different from the privatization of religion.

anchored structurally within a religious institution, has incontrovertibly been decreasing in favour of "the aspiration to be guided by one's own spiritual experience" in matters of faith, and they measure all doctrinal and institutional claims in this light.[350]

Such individualization of religion in an age of globalization has an important impact on the changes of traditional religious milieus originated from religious institutions. The dichotomous distinction between the secular and the religious is becoming blurred, and denominational and intra-religious boundaries are dissolving, while at the same time we see the emergence of different levels of intensity of religious practice based on individualized religiosity.

In the course of such shifts in religious milieus, changes of Christian religiosity go hand in hand with transformation of the dominant forms of Christianity. The recent empirical-sociological remarks on a newly emerging global Christianity illustrate a transformation made possible by the burgeoning of new individualized forms of Christian religiosity. These phenomena can be traced in three major trends. First, a new and increasing global vitalization of conservative forms of Christianity presents a re-invention of explicit Christianity combined with individualized religiosity. Secondly, we witness a proliferation of individual spiritual forms of new Christian faith communities

350 José Casanova, "The Religious Situation in USA", in Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (eds.), *Secularization and the World Religions* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), pp.229-240, 237.

and movements. The mushrooming of implicit Christianity is connected only loosely to traditional Christian institutions and religiosity, and more closely to an individualization of Christianity in terms of religiosity and morphological aspects. Finally, we see a rise in the social presence of faith-based social organizations (FBSOs) as civil agents. Hence, institutionalized Christian religiosity is becoming integrated into new individualized forms of faith-based social action.

These phenomena indicate a transformation of Christianity from church-oriented religiosity towards more individualized forms of religiosity.[351] Although not all of them are entirely recent, together they represent a new phase in the history of Christianity.

What is the likely future course of this renewed vitalization of Christianity? What is the position of church-related Christianity in today's world? More specifically, what is the direction or trajectory of religion? Is it one of revival? Or is the recent revitalization a "last-ditch"[352] phenomenon of an interim situation before real secularity sets in?

---

351 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel, "Religious Individualization or Secularization? Testing Hypotheses of Religious Change – The case of Eastern and Western Germany", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol.58.4 (2008): 603-32, p.604; Detlef Pollack and Daniel V.A. Olson (eds.), *The Role of Religion in Modern Societies* (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2008).

352 I borrow the concept "the last-ditch thesis" from Peter Berger's criticism on the attempts by some sociologists of religion to salvage the classic secularization theory with the argument that "modernization does secularize, and movements like the Evangelical ones represent last-ditch defenses by religion that cannot last; eventually, secularity will triumph". Peter L. Berger, "The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview", in Peter L. Berger (ed.), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans,1999), p.12.

It is extremely difficult to predict the future from the trends of recent decades. Thus, any discussion of religion in the contemporary global age should begin with the recognition of a paradox: On the one hand, church-related religiosity is being diminished by the continuing loss of control of religious institutions over the belief systems and religious practices of individuals. On the other, those churches or religious institutions that integrate the individualized forms of religiosity into their own faith and religious projects exhibit a renewed vitality. In this sense, in fact, the trajectory of church-related Christianity has been far more discursive and complicated than secularization theory expected, even in secularism's western European strongholds.[353]

More importantly, individualized forms of Christianity, which are only loosely connected with or even exist outside religious institutions, are more widespread in the public sphere, and appear in a wider variety of forms, than ever before. Furthermore, their modes and interplay with a changed world are continually being transformed into new forms with new characteristics. In this context, scholars of religion should question the validity of the category of religion. Crucially, individualized forms of Christianity continue to play a significant role in the public sphere by engaging in society in new ways, not through dominance,[354] a development that unleashes the potential of

353 Grace Davie, *Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000); Andre M. Greeley, *Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium: A Sociological Profile* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003); Philip S. Gorski and Ates Altinordu, "After Secularization?", *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol.34 (2008): 55-85.

354 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Hans Joas, *Faith as an Option: Possible Futures for Christianity*, trans. by Alex Skinner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012).

Christianity as a reflexive agent for individuals, society, and the global community, as long as it is not withdrawn into the private sphere.[355]

In conclusion, the current transformation of Christianity overcomes the dichotomy between the religious and the secular, and the different versions of Christian transformation are inextricably linked with the modes of believing and different institutional structures of Christianity or communities. The new visibility of Christianity and related institutional arrangements will serve to shape and encode diverse global secular practices in new ways.[356]

355 Markus Vinzent, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, Vol. 32. 2 (August 2011): 143–160; Marius C. Felderhof, *Revisiting Christianity: Theological Reflections* (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011); Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

356 Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (eds.), *Secularization and the World Religions*, p.228.

Chapter 4. Reconfiguration of the Place and Role of Christianity in the Public Sphere

As the claim of "a general rejection"[357] of religion is increasingly questioned and disproved by the visible presence of multiple and multifaceted manifestations of religion in society, the theory is being replaced by a series of other hypotheses. Meanwhile, many of those speaking from a secularization perspective continue to hold to an alternative claim: instead of speaking of an imminent extinction of religion, they deploy the notion of "privatization of religion".[358] According to the privatization thesis, religion has retreated from the public to the private sphere, while at the same time losing social significance with regard to public rhetoric, legislation, debate and policy.[359] Advocates of this thesis argue that in terms of empirical aspects, the differentiation, rationalization and diversification of religion have set it on a direct road to privatization, while in normative terms, religion ought to be relegated to the private realm because it no longer has any reasonable process or relevance to our lives. This privatization thesis is "a major component in revised secularization".[360]

---

357 Charles Taylor has criticized as "subtraction theories" the epistemic attitude of a general rejection, as argued in the following representative works: Bryan R. Wilson, *Religion in Secular Society* (London: Watts, 1966); *Religion in Sociological Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1982); Ray Wallis and Steve Bruce, "Secularization: The Orthodox Model", in Steve Bruce (ed.), *Religion and Modernization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1992), pp.8-30; Steve Bruce, *God is Dead: Secularization in the West* (Oxford and Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2002).

358 For a more detailed account of "privatization of religion", see section 4.1.1.

359 Steve Bruce, while continuing to accept the privatization of religion, has at the same time argued that religion matters politically. Steve Bruce, *Secularization: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011); *Politics and Religion* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).

360 David Martin, *On Secularization: Toward a Revised General Theory* (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2005),

Hence, in recent decades, debates over the place and role of religion in the public sphere have been strongly contested, leading to a critical reflection on the privatization theory. On the one hand, the public significance of religion is dwindling, while on the other, the visibility and contribution of religion in civil society are increasing. This paradoxical situation implies that we cannot grasp the location and role of religion in the public sphere on the basis of either "privatization theory" or "the countervailing trend against privatization". The contradictory claims revolve around conflicts that resonate across the spectra of public feeling, and have come to be among the central and defining areas of political life in the 21st century. As we enter a new phase of the religious as well as the secular, prominent scholars such as José Casanova, Craig Calhoun, Jürgen Habermas, and Charles Taylor speculate about the new visibilities and public contributions of the religious in the public sphere. Even the socio-political role of religion is being re-appreciated by so-called secular intellectuals who were formerly rather critical of religion.

In this situation, in order to understand how Christianity continues to occupy a substantial position and to play an irreducible role in the public sphere, it is not sufficient simply to explore the privatization of Christianity or the resilience of Christian institution; rather, it is necessary to revisit the visibility of Christianity through its faith-based praxis in society. Furthermore, such investigation should be carried out not through theological discourse specific to the religious

p.20.

field, but through interdisciplinary reflection.

This chapter seeks to reconfigure the place and role of Christianity in the public sphere, focusing not on the quantitative erosion or eruption of the institutionalized forms of Christianity, but on its qualitative transformation, particularly in relation to the public contribution and presence of Christianity through its social engagement, participation, and entanglement, and more radically, its potential as reflexive agency in the present modern society. In this research, the crux of discussion concerning the place and role of Christianity is located in the following important discussions, which combine the theoretical, the empirical and the normative.

First of all, we need to articulate some ambiguous and confusing notions regarding the privatization of religion. In this regard we will examine whether “the privatization of religion” is an adequate conceptualization for either an empirical-sociological understanding of the public location of religion, or a normative approach. In particular, in section 4.1, the thesis will engage in an analytical-theoretical consideration of the privatization of religion in terms of its relationship to “de-privatization”, “differentiation”, and “individualization”.

Next, in section 4.2, we will explore the trend of privatization and the renewed visibility of Christianity in terms of empirical aspects. Here, we address the questions: Have religious faith and practice in the modern world really remained an exclusively private affair? If not, what types of dramatic and worldwide increase in the socio-political influence of religion has occurred?

In section 4.3 we take a normative approach to the privatization of religion and the renewed visibility of religion. The question addressed here is whether the renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere is worrying or welcome; that is, whether religious faith ought to be relegated to exclusively private matters and marginalized into the private sphere, or whether we need to embrace religion (Christianity) for the development of civil society.

Finally, in section 4.4 this study will re-illuminate the potential of Christianity as reflexive agent in a re-modern paradigm. In particular, we will look at the social meaning, value, and challenge presented by the transformation of Christian religiosity to today's radical socio-political discussion, by examining a remarkable reconsideration and renewed theological reflection among many leading European intellectuals who are normally associated with irreligious or areligious currents.

Crucially, these accounts of the place and role of religion in the public sphere, considered at three different but intricately interwoven levels, need to overcome theoretical difficulties, with all of the baggage associated with ambiguous terminology, as well as deep seated assumptions concerning empirical observations, and the problems caused by the presence of two opposing preconceived ideas.

4.1. Theoretical Considerations on a Secularization Sub-

thesis: Privatization

4.1.1. Privatization & De-privatization

The privatization thesis holds that religion in the modern world became and ought to remain an exclusively private matter, lacking the social significance it had previously had in the public sphere, in rhetoric, debate, legislation and policy, since religious belief is regarded as outdated and irrelevant to our lives, and as intellectually unable to be a proper subject of public discourse. The privatization of religion has been taken for granted both as a general modern historical and empirical trend and as the normative precondition for modern and liberal democratic politics, especially in modern secular societies. The theory has been documented and developed by many liberal theorists, and remarkably, by sociologists of religion such as Bryan Wilson (1926~2004), Thomas Luckmann (1927~), Peter Berger (1929~), and Robert Bellah (1927~2013).[361]

In Bryan Wilson's interpretation of secularization, traditional religion had become, in the modern world, primarily the concern of the individual, as "the process by which religious institutions, actions and consciousness lose their social significance".[362] Thus, there would be no requirement for religious

361 Bryan Wilson, *Religion in Sociological Perspective*; Thomas Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967); Robert Bellah, "Religious Revolution", in *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (New York: Haper & Row, 1970).

362 Bryan Wilson, *Religion in Sociological Perspective*, p.149.

teaching over value judgements. Luckmann maintained that society would be run by rational-based administrative organizations and by impersonal regulation, while individuals would internalize their particular religious faith, which would render religion socially invisible and irrelevant. The long-term consequence of the turn to inwardness and subjectivity would be an epoch-making modern tendency towards the privatization of religion.[363] Similarly, Berger argued that religion had become a private ethical matter irrelevant to the economic and political system, rather than an overarching social phenomenon, and that its effect on the public realm had declined, through a process whereby parts of society and sectors of the culture are freed from domination by religious institutions and symbols. That is, religion is not related to the structure of the universe or to history, but only to individual existence and psychology.[364] In Richard Fenn's view, religion is not ostracized from society, but is cultivated as something that does not play any important role for the whole of that society.[365] More recently, David Voas, a quantitative sociologist of religion, expressed a similar idea in his argument that "religion will survive, as astrology has survived, but its significance will be much reduced".[366] In summary, the idea of privatization of religion takes a generally

363 Thomas Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion*.

364 Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, p.151; Peter L. Berger, Brigitte Berger, Hansfried Kellner, *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness* (NY: Random House, 1973), p.113.

365 Richard K. Fenn, "Toward a New Sociology of Religion", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol.2.1 (March, 1972): 16-32, pp.16-18.

366 David Voas, "The Continuing Secular Transition", in Detlef Pollack and Daniel V. A. Olson (eds.), *The Role of Religion in Modern Societies* (London: Routledge, 2011), p.43.

negative view of the possibility that religion can play a public role in more advanced society, due to the loss of public relevance and plausibility. As a result, the claim of religious privatization is nothing but that religion has been relegated and ought to remain relegated to the private sector without a public voice.

Indeed, this view of the privatization of religion has been deeply embedded in individual mind and social culture, and entrenched in all sorts of discussion, historical and normative, so that it is not easy to be entirely free from its effects in the social-cultural atmosphere. More belligerently, the term carries negative rather than neutral normative connotations on the religious, and implies that religious faith is a last remnant of the historical process.

However, particularly since the late 1980s,[367] striking cases of religion's public influence have been observed and reconsidered by scholars. In spite of the fact that in some parts of the world religion is still regarded as a private affair, a reconsideration has begun of the various manifestations of a dramatic and

367 The collapse of the former Communist Bloc as a command economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s transformed the global political and ideological topography that had maintained rigid social and national systems for over 40 years following the end of the Second World War. The transformation at the international level meant that radical ideology could not exert a favorable influence on the public, and was interpreted as the triumph of capitalism over socialism or communism. The differentiation of radical ideology also resulted in an expansion of the territory of civil society and the middle class, which became an incubator for moderate lines of reformation. Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War, neo-liberalism spread far and wide, and the global order in the late 1980s began a shift to intense economic competition for the survival of each state beyond military and ideological conflict. The globalization of super-national industrial and financial capital, and the information and telecommunication revolution, accelerated production, circulation, and consumption in a worldwide network under the strong influence of economic globalization. See Cecelia Lynch, "Social Movements and the Problem of Globalization", *Alternatives,* Vol.23.2 (1998): 149-173.

worldwide increase in the political influence of religion. In many countries, the resurgence of conservative religious communities has produced a renewed appreciation of privatization theory as a sub-thesis of secularization. Academics and practitioners have observed that there has been a consistent presence and surprising vitalization of religion in the public sphere, as evidenced by global historical trends, and are grappling with the emphatic return of faith to the public table.[368] In this respect, as soon as one gives serious consideration to a global comparative perspective and to the internal transformation of Christianity, one must admit that a counter-current to privatization is occurring in modern societies throughout the world, although, of course, it takes different forms according to each local context. Such empirical observation calls into question "the privatization of religion", and leads to a search to make sense of its implications.

This reversal of privatization has been most persuasively presented in José Casanova's *Public Religions in the Modern World*, where he shows that the privatization claim is no longer either defensible or plausible, and introduces a new key term: "de-privatization". According to Casanova's definition:

> *Religious institutions and organizations refuse to restrict themselves to the pastoral care of an individual's soul and continue to raise questions about the interconnections of private and public morality and to challenge the claims of the subsystems, particularly states and markets, to be exempt from*

368 This is one of the most powerful implications of the post-secular.

extraneous normative considerations. One of the results of this ongoing contestation is a dual, interrelated process of repoliticization of the private religious and moral spheres and re-normativization of the public economic and political spheres. This is what I call, for lack of a better term, the de-privatization of religion.[369]

Casanova argues that religion had in fact never been absent from the public sphere, in either Europe or America; irrespective of whether there is a formal separation between state and church, religious impact remains very visible throughout society. He points in particular to the historical difficulties of maintaining the secular meta-narrative of how we all became secular in the public realm. Casanova's analytical argument is widely acclaimed as having transformed the secularist bias in the field, and is taken seriously as an important marker of a "post-secular turn". Indeed, it has sparked a wealth of commentary and research, and "de-privatization" is a good device to enable us to rethink the place and public role of religion.

However, does this process of de-privatization of religion invalidate the whole corpus of privatization of religion? Is it, as Peter Berger argues, "de-secularization"? In this context, the concept of "de-privatization" as a countervailing trend to "privatization of religion" may be just one element among many social practices and understanding, and can be seen as a selective explanation that overlooks two crucial points. First, there is

369 José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

undoubtedly a continuing retreat of religion from the public sphere; traditional institutionalized forms of religion and church-related religiosity have suffered particularly sharp declines, especially in the West and its successor societies. All the surveys emphasize that the European population is increasingly disconnected from comprehensive religious doctrines and moral disciplines such as those regarding divorce and sexual behaviours. One claim of the religious privatization thesis that is not at all contentious is that there is a gradual weakening of the public authority of religion on ethical matters.

Secondly, despite the many manifestations of a resurgence of religion in the public sphere, these are usually branded either as anti-modern fundamental religion resisting processes of secularization, or as a form of traditionalist collective identity reaction to the threat of globalization. Focusing on the resurgence of religion outside the modern West has allowed critics to pretend that these revivals are actually part of a modernizing process. Not surprisingly, many have taken pains to detect a "Puritan spirit" or an "inner-worldly asceticism" in such movements. Thus, discussions about the return of religion to the public table are taking place from a negative rather than positive standpoint, with an eye on how to deal with it rather than how to accept and develop it.[370] In other words, religion in the eyes of cosmopolitan elites is either irrelevant or just reactive. This may result in a framing of the argument

370 Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan. *Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

as the western vs the non-western, because the theory cannot escape the criticism that the importance of religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal risks and threats to their survival.[371]

Considering these two crucial points, to interpret all the visible manifestations of Christianity in the public sphere as the triumph of religion can be an inward self-soothing conjecture of religious groups, and to reconstruct the meaning of religiosity in modern society based on a global comparative perspective alone is a half-baked idea at best. On the contrary, it is clear that privatization of religion is not the whole picture, but only one part of it. The notion of privatization contains fallacies, a result of confining the religious to traditional religious institutions and simplifying its transformation.

In this respect, the most significant and overriding point is that we need alternative terms and approaches, to go beyond both religious self-centred interpretation and "secularist self-understanding".[372] Our new intellectual reflection, as a challenge to our modern zeitgeist, should put into question the privatization of religion, while at the same time it should disabuse religious adherents of the idea that religion has been a consistent presence in the public sphere.[373] Therefore, the thesis of this research posits that the globalization

371 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011), p.4.

372 Hans Joas, trans. Alex Skinner, *Do We Need Religion?: On the Experience of Self-Transcendence* (Boulder: Paradigm Publisher, 2008), pp.107-25.

373 Lisbet Christoffersen, Hans Raun Iversen, Hanne Petersen and Margit Warburg (eds.), *Religion in the 21st*

of society, while structurally favouring religious privatization,[374] also provides fertile ground for the renewed public influence of religion, focusing on the transformation of Christianity in the forms of its religiosity and in the way it engages in the public sphere rather than the dominance of institutionalized religion, and more significantly, on the social contribution of Christianity rather than the rise of politically assertive strong Christianity.

In conclusion, just as not every element of religion is irrelevant, but not all elements of religion are relevant, so not every form of religion is privatized, but not all forms of religion are de-privatized. Here, the public presence of religion does not necessarily eclipse the privatized form of religion, and vice versa. Therefore, this research will deploy neither the theory of privatization nor that of "de-privatization", but, alternatively, "the public presence of religion" as the social engagement of religion. Hence, I shall concentrate on the question of how religion engages with civil society in the public sphere, and on the process whereby the place and role of religion have been reorganized.

Before engaging with the main themes, we need to give theoretical consideration to one important point, namely that the concept of privatization is too often confused with the ideas indicated by two key terms that explain social transformation in the modernization process: differentiation and individualization. This imprecision may create many misconceptions with

---

Century: Challenges and Transformations (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010).

374 Indeed, here "particularization" of religion would be a better term rather than privatization.

regard to the historical reality of the transformation of religion. For instance, regarding functional differentiation as the privatization of religion, it can too easily be held that differentiation necessarily means that religion can no longer have public implications. Thus, in order to capture diverse historical patterns and ongoing global processes of privatization and the public presence of religion, we need to start from a theoretical consideration of the more refined and precise relationship between the privatization of religion on one hand, and differentiation and individualization on the other.

4.1.2. Privatization & Differentiation

Does functional differentiation necessarily lead to the marginalization of religion to the privatized realm? To answer this question, we need to examine historical aspects of social differentiation, that is, the separation of religion from politics, which was as much a demand for states not to interfere with religion as it was for particular religious views not to dominate states.[375]

Functional differentiation is often said to have begun in Europe in 1648, with the forging of a secular state system in the wake of the Peace of Westphalia. In fact, this is a fallacy, demonstrably untrue. The Peace of Westphalia did not

375 Social differentiation is a concept today sometimes associated with Luhmann, though it goes back to Parsons. In general, the term differentiation refers to a process through which religions and religious institutions become increasingly separated from various spheres of the social system, such as the state, polity, the market, law, welfare and education, losing their influence in these and other social areas. Rudolf Stichweh, "The History and Systematics of Functional Differentiation in Sociology", in Mathias Albert, Barry Burzan and Michael Zürn (eds.), *Bringing Sociology to International Relations: World Politics as Differentiation Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013), pp.50-70.

make states secular, nor religion privatized. What issued from the Westphalian settlement was not a Europe without religion, but a Europe of primarily confessional states with established churches under the principle of *cuius regio eius religio* ("who rules, his religion").[376] It formulated new church-state partnerships, while making international relations essentially secular.

> *The European path to a relatively strong secularism was not charted directly from the Peace of Westphalia. It was, rather, shaped by struggles against the enforced religious conformity that followed the 1648 treaties. The strong French doctrine of laïcité*[377] *was the product of un-churching struggles, against priestly authority - that continued through the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries. These gave a more strident form to secularism and positioned it as a dimension of social struggle and liberation. More generally, such secularizing struggles did not confront ancient state churches but new church-state partnerships forged in the wake of 1648.*[378]

As Casanova argues, the end of the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) did not result

376 "What followed in European states after the Peace of Westphalia was a mixture of migration, forced conversion, and legal sanctions against religious minorities. Members of some minorities moved to European colonies abroad - including English settlers who fled religious persecution only to set up state churches of their own in American colonies they dominated. Colonial-era governments (which often had established churches) further developed the category of religion - that is, reference to a set of bodies of partially analogous cultural practice and belief - to take account of the religions of people they governed." Craig Calhoun, "Secularism, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere", in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford and NY: Oxford UP, 2011), pp.75-91.

377 *Laïcité* is a concept of French secularity denoting the principle of separation of church (or religion) and state, which articulates the absence of religious involvement in government affairs as well as absence of government involvement in religious affairs. French secularism has a long history, but the current regime is based on the 1905 French law on the Separation of the Churches and the State. During the twentieth century, it evolved to mean equal treatment of all religions, although a more restrictive interpretation of the term has developed since 2004. See René Rémond, *Religion and Society in Modern Europe* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1999).

378 Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism*, p.15.

in an elimination of religion from the public stage; the fact that Europe became particularly secular may have been the result of a strong anti-sympathy against new church-state partnerships forged in the wake of 1648.[379] By contrast, in the United States, the separation of church and state, i.e. functional differentiation, has been accompanied neither by a process of religious decline nor by the confinement of religion to the private sphere; indeed, it has often been accompanied by high levels of religious belief and participation. Not only have we witnessed persistent trends toward de-secularization and de-privatization over the last forty years, but a longer historical perspective suggests a continuous entanglement of religion and society.

The secularization thesis is disaggregated by Casanova into three sub-theses: Secularization [I] - the social differentiation of religion, Secularization [II] - the loss of the social significance of religion, and Secularization [III] - the privatization of religion.[380] This distinction is useful when trying to understand discussion regarding the privatization of religion and when evaluating whether privatization has in fact occurred in any given context.[381] Since in Europe the three processes of secular differentiation, privatization of religion, and religious decline have been historically interconnected, there has been a tendency to view them as intrinsically interrelated components of a single general teleological process of secularization and modernization, rather than as

379 José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*.

380 For a more detailed account of Casanova's three sub-theses of Secularization, See Chapter 2.2.2.

381 For a detailed analysis, see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2.

particular and contingent developments. However, there is nothing that indicates that they must be connected with each other, and they are not connected in other areas of the world. Programs of institutional separation between state and religion, though often imposed on religious actors by aggressive secularists, do not necessarily end up weakening the public presence of religion. The differentiation of society does not necessarily lead to privatization of belief, and privatization is not a necessary concomitant of institutional differentiation.

Nevertheless, the differentiation thesis itself still enjoys broad acceptance. According to Casanova, while the two minor sub-theses of the secularization thesis - the decrease in the significance of religion and the privatization of religion - have undergone numerous critiques and revisions in the last fifteen years, the understanding of secularization as a process of functional differentiation of the various secular institutional spheres such as economy, law, politics and science from religion in modern societies remains.[382] Through a number of comparative studies, Casanova has demonstrated that modernization has entailed secularization as functional differentiation, in which distinct social institutions such as governments and churches increasingly assume independent roles and functions, as well as discrete institutional forms. Indeed, this is a key component of modern secularization. Of course, the

382 José Casanova, "The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms", in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism*, pp.60-61.

specifics of political secularism vary from case to case – separation of church and state in America, fairness in allocation of public support to different religious groups in India, laïcité and the exclusion of religious expression from even non-political public life in France and Turkey. Although they involve very different stances toward the place of the church in official and social life, one clear historical fact that all of these cases indicate is that the more society has advanced, the more developed has been the differentiation between throne and altar. The differentiation thesis, also defended in nuanced fashion by David Martin,[383] maintains that religion is no longer married to institutional power in the way that, for example, European monarchs once ruled by "divine right". Religious institution no longer helps prop up overarching "sacred canopies".

If that is the case, does social differentiation (secularization [I]) privatize and marginalize religion in its own specialized ghetto? Or does it create a social location and role in which faith can discover its own specific character, freed from the constraints of establishment and seductive opportunities for political influence?

Of course, the separation between politics and religion, i.e. the state and the church, and the increasing differentiation of societal spheres, may lead to atrophy of religious domains, as well as implying a loss of power on behalf of

383 David Martin, *On Secularization: Toward a Revised General Theory*, pp.17-25; *Religion and Power: No Logos without Mythos* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), pp.8-10.

the churches. Furthermore, social differentiation has entailed the extension of religious competition and pluralism. However, this does not necessarily mean that religion has been completely privatized, or that religious organizations no longer play an important role in the public sphere. Talcott Parsons (1902~1979) refined the process of social differentiation as a key component of modern secularization.[384] However, Parsons did not regard the differentiation that means the separation of each social sphere as a decline of religion, but rather as a change enabling religion better to fulfil its proper role. According to him, the influence of organized religion is on the wane and shifting towards the personal realm. However, Christian values are intertwined with western society and, in effect, have become a sacred core of our social system.[385] In fact, an observation of religious processes of change shows that religion has not lost, but rather has gained, in public relevance.

The establishment of a public sphere during the Enlightenment period did not forbid the public role of religion; rather, the differentiation brought about diverse patterns of Christian social engagement and opened up new opportunities. “Modern churches can adapt themselves to the new liberal paradigm by evolving from state-oriented into society-oriented institutions, and free citizens can found organizations with a religious purpose.” [386]

384 Talcott Parsons, “Christianity”, in David Sills (ed.), *The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (NY: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968).

385 Talcott Parsons, “Religion in a Modern Pluralistic Society”, *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 7 (Spring,1966): 125-46.

386 Arie L. Molendijk, “God made the Country, and Man Made the Town: Some Observations On the Place of Religion in the Western (Post)Secular City”, in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.),

Differentiation often contributed to increasing the autonomy and capacity of religious organizations to formulate their own political agendas and mobilize their own resources and followers.[387] Eagleton describes this paradoxical process:

> *Along with the other two symbolic domains of art and sexuality, religion was unhooked to some extent from secular power; and the upshot of this privatization for all three symbolic forms was notably double-edged. On the one hand, they could act as precious sources of alternative value, and thus of political critique; on the other hand, their isolation from the public world caused them to become increasingly pathologized.*[388]

His delineation shows that religion holds more potential than the "state could comfortably handle" (albeit that his term "privatization" ought perhaps to be replaced with "differentiation" in order to express the situation more exactly). When the church was subordinated to the state, she sometimes had to remain silent. Yet, in a situation of social differentiation, a church that remains in the free third position can express her opinion more openly, engage freely in social issues and approach the historical truth without any political interference. More significantly, social differentiation paved the way toward an authentic

---

Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2010), p.158.

387 Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion* (Berkeley: California UP, 2000); Christian Smith and Michael Emerson, *American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving* (Chicago IL: Chicago UP, 1998).

388 Terry Eagleton, *Reason, Faith and Revolutions: Reflections on the God Debates* (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2009), p.166.

religiosity emancipated from cultural and political authority, and oriented toward "movement" through participation, solidarity and entanglement, not religious dominance. In that context, religion may pursue political and public functions, for example, working for the preservation of human rights or critiquing excessive forms of capitalism.[389] Insofar as religious communities and churches do not oppose the separation of church and state, and do not strive for public or legal privilege, the public presence of religion is compatible with the social differentiation principles of modern society.

4.1.3. Privatization & Individualization

It is also necessary to clarify the distinction between the thesis of privatization of religion, and that of individualization.[390] In many cases, privatization of religion is treated as being synonymous with individualization of religion, and this creates obstacles to studying the substantial location and role of religion in the public sphere.[391] Privatization is not the same as individualization. The two concepts differ in terms of the questions they ask and their primary concerns, even if the phenomena presented through the different processes

389 Detlef Pollack, Olaf Müller and Gert Pickel, "Church and Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Analyses of the Social Significance of Religion in East and West", in Detlef Pollack, Olaf Müller and Gert Pickel (eds.), *The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), pp.3-4.

390 For a more detailed account of "individualization of religion", see Chapter 3, section 3.3.

391 For stimulating discussions, insightful comments and helpful references I am indebted to Markus Vinzent, who has already published several instructive works on this topic. Markus Vinzent, "Salus extra ecclesiam? Meister Eckhart's Institutionenskepsis", in Dietmar Mieth and Britta Müller-Schauenburg (eds.), *Mystik, Recht und Freiheit: Religiöse Erfahrung und kirchliche Institutionen im Spätmittelalter* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2012), pp.158-168; "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, Vol. 32. 2 (August 2011): 143–160.

of the two theorems can partly overlap. Whereas the initial question of privatization of religion focuses on the radius of religious influence in the whole society: “To what extent does religion have an effect in society?”, that of individualization is related to the modes of existence or lifestyle relating to religion: “How does religious faith exist?” While the antonym of privatization is “publicization”, [392] that of individualization is “collectivization” or “totalitarianization”. We could therefore translate privatization of religion as “the withdrawal of religion into the private sphere”, while individualization of religion is better expressed as “coming to selfhood of religious belief”, or “self-realization of religious belief”.

As a consequence, we need to profile as individualization rather than privatization the tendency for individuals to pay less and less attention to external sources of religious authority and more and more attention to their own intuitions and feelings (Luhmann);[393] to create their own collages of religious ideas and symbols drawn from widely differing traditions;[394] to cultivate a religiosity that does not belong to religious communities (Davie);[395] to give priority to the process of seeking personal authenticity rather than

392 The neologism “publicization” was employed as “re-publicization” to denote a trend against privatization of religion in Sébastien Tank-Storper, “Republicization of Religion in France”, in Lisbet Christofferesen, Hans Raun Iversen, Hanne Petersen and Margit Warburg (eds.), *Religion in the 21st Century*, pp.163-75.

393 Niklas Luhmann, “Society, meaning, religion – based on self-reference”, *Sociological Analysis* Vol.46.1 (1985): 5–20.

394 *Ibid.*

395 Grace Davie, “Believing Without Belonging: Is this the future of religion in Britain?” *Social Compass*, Vol.37.4 (1990): 455–469; Grace Davie, “Vicarious Religion: a Methodological Challenge”, in Nancy T. Ammerman (ed.), *Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.21-35.

"dwelling" in any particular faith tradition (Wuthnow);[396] and to be pilgrims and converts rather than regular attenders (Hervieu-Léger),[397] to mention just a few.

Moreover, the privatization of religion thesis derives from conflict between the secular value system and the religious value system, while individualization of religion has emerged from the process of natural transformation to develop our individual personal faith. Consequently, privatization of religion can be construed as a retreat of religion from the public to the private sphere, while individualization is the tendency towards increasingly subjective forms of religion.

From this point of view, it is important to note here that although the process of privatization of religion continues as a constitutive process of the late modern global society, the logic of individualization of religious belief can be compatible with the social presence of religion in the public sphere. Religion has been flourishing most where it appears in individualized forms of religiosity, but this tendency does not necessarily eclipse the social presence of religion, and does not imply that religion has lost its influence in our lives.[398] Paradoxically, individualized forms of religiosity can be a manifestation of a new consolidation of trends and socio-political markets that go beyond one's

396 Robert Wuthnow, *After Heaven: Spirituality in America since the 1950s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

397 Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *La religion en mouvement: le pèlerin et le converti* [*Religion in Movement: The Pilgrim and the Converted*] (Paris: Flammarion, 1999).

398 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own* (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2008), pp.88-91.

own self-faith, which may be equated with the social presence of religion, while at the same time indicating a self-actualization within the spiritual life, which is equated with the privatization of religion. Thus, through empirical observation, one can find individualized forms of religion and still conclude that such religiosity, as opposed to privatized religion, can be compatible with a socio-political manifestation in relation to the renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere.

4.2. Empirical Observation on the Renewed Visibility of Christianity in the Public Sphere

As a countervailing argument to the privatization thesis, scholars have observed that during the latter half of the twentieth century, the presence and visibility of religion in the public sphere actually increased.[399] This phenomenon has sparked new attempts to re-illuminate the place and role of religion in the public sphere beyond the privatization projection.

Here, the renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere does not mean that the social position of Christianity had previously been reduced to the private realm, but has now returned to the public domain, but rather that it can

399 Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: the Religious, the Political and the Urban*; Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds.), *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World* (NY: Fordham UP, 2006); Giancarlo Bosetti and Klaus Eder, "Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere", *Eurozine* (17 August, 2006); Eder Klaus, "Europäische Säkularisierung: Ein Sonderweg in die postsäkulare Gesellschaft" [European Secularization: A special route to post-secular society?], *Eurozine* (7 July, 2006). Available at http://www.eurozine.com

be visible and embedded in the public sphere, through transformation of its religiosity and of the way in which it engages with society. Thus, as emphasized previously, the empirical observation on the public presence of religion in the public sphere must be analysed in relation to forms of religiosity and their manifestation and implications in the socio-political realm, rather than in relation to institutionalized religion. This entails an exploration of the ways in which religious forms of Christianity transform, re-invent themselves, and take new shapes in a changed world, and is highly relevant to the issue of the value of Christianity in civil society. Although the public presence of Christianity is not entirely recent, it represents a new phase in the history of religion.

This public presence of Christianity is to be found primarily in two dimensions. First of all, Christian socio-political engagement in public matters draws upon the renewed religiosity of the Christian churches. In addition to this, such social engagement can be traced implicitly in the various individualized forms of religious movements that have come to exist through a multifaceted transformation of Christian morphology, i.e., outside the religious domains.

4.2.1. Illuminating the Presence of Christianity in the Public Sphere

4.2.1.1. Considerations on the idea of public religion

In any discussion on the growing prominence of religion in the socio-political discourse, it is helpful to start with the idea of “public religion” as

conceptualized in José Casanova's *Public Religions in the Modern World.*[400] In this book, Casanova focused attention on the public presence of religion in the political life of various parts of the world (especially, Spain, Poland, Brazil and the USA), and raised critical questions on some widespread assumptions about secularization and its sub-thesis, privatization:

> *Religion in the 1980s went public in a dual sense. It entered the "public sphere" and gained, thereby, publicity. Various publics – the mass media, social scientists, professional politicians, and the public at large – suddenly began to pay attention to religion. The unexpected public interest derived from the fact that religion, leaving its assigned place in the private sphere, had thrust itself into the public arena of moral and political contestation.*[401]

His analysis assumed the continuing presence and influence of religion in the public sphere as against the supposed privatization of religion and, more significantly, it provided an opportunity to reopen inquiry concerning the engagement of religion with socio-political discourse. However, Casanova himself later revised this framework, pointing out the main shortcomings of the argument: its Western-Christian centrism, the attempt to restrict modern public religions to the public sphere of civil society, and the national framing of relations of the church-state-nation-civil society without recognition of the transnational global dimension.[402] Certainly, Casanova's typology of public

400 José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*.

401 *Ibid.* p.3.

402 José Casanova, "Public Religions Revisited", in Hent de Vries (ed.), *Religion: Beyond the Concept* (NY: Fordham

religions[403] would need to be modified and expanded in order to make it more plausible. By setting the concept in the modern frame, Casanova was clinging too closely to the classic religious categories; relating the argument to the traditional location of religion rather than its substantial action; and focusing solely on religion rather than religiosity or religious faith. To take an example, the established state church that Casanova defined as the first category of public religion remains just a pre-modern or modern religious symbol rather than an actor positively engaged in the social sector or presently embedded in public life. More critically, his concept of public religions might include the rise of assertive strong Christianity, which could be explained away simply as an "anti-political trend" of fundamentalism in an individual and social context that is not yet modernized.[404] Consequently, we need a more plausible conceptualization.

4.2.1.2. Reformulating the concept of the public presence of Christianity

Therefore, instead of the term public religions, this study will use "the public presence of religion" in order to describe what kind of role certain characteristics of religions or the religious play in the development of global

UP, 2008), pp 101-119; José Casanova, "Rethinking Public Religions", in Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred Stepan C., and Monica Duffy Toft (eds.), *Rethinking Religion and World Affairs* (New York: Oxford UP, 2012), pp.25-35.

403 Casanova's typology of public religions was analytically disaggregated into three types corresponding to the distinction between three areas of a modern democratic polity - state, political society, and civil society - as follows: 1) The established state churches at the state level; 2) Religions that mobilize their institutional resources for political competition through political parties, social movements, or lobbying agencies at the level of political society; 3) Participation in open public debates about public issues, public affairs, public policy, and the common good or commonwealth at the civil society level.

404 Terry Eagleton, *Reason, Faith and Revolutions: Reflections on the God Debates*, pp.43-4.

human society, through social participation, solidarity, and entanglement. It does not seek to answer the question of to what extent religion holds a dominant position over the secular challenge. Assessment of the public presence of religion is not concerned with whether religion is *(re-)*entering the public sphere, but rather with whether the socio-political actions that religion is taking are valid and relevant to individual life and the whole society. In this respect, the public presence of religion is partly a correction of both privatization and de-privatization as its countervailing trend. The two opposite terms are central to the modern discourse about the relationship of religion to the whole society.

The framework of the public presence of Christianity considers three important factors. First, it takes into account the social involvement of Christianity in public, social, and daily life, not religious doctrinal issues or the religious system itself. Secondly, the framework is applicable to social actions within the boundaries of not being at odds with the principle of social differentiation. This stance indicates that the public presence of Christianity is generated not by the dominance principle, but by the movement principle, through its participation and entanglement, but also through mutual reflection and reciprocal beneficial impulse. Finally, the public presence of Christianity encompasses a wide range of social engagement of religion through individualized as well as institutionalized forms of Christianity. This means that the logic of the social presence of religion can be compatible with the process

of individualization of religious belief, not privatization.[405]

4.2.2. The Public Presence of Christianity in Faith-based Social Praxis

Today, the most powerful factor re-stoking academic debates over religion is the renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere, especially in the post-secular discourse.[406] In such empirically observable phenomena, we can find not only persistent trends of the public presence of religion, “partly” going beyond secularization and privatization over the last forty years, but also, in a longer historical perspective, we may well imagine a continuous entanglement of the religious with the whole society.

The empirical manifestation of the public presence of Christianity in faith-based social praxis can be traced at two levels: 1) The social participation and solidarity of Christian institutions and the churches at the ecclesiastical level, and 2) The public involvement of individual Christians or groups at the civil society level through the integrating of Christian faith and religiosity into faith-based social organizations (FBSO) or civil society movements such as NGOs. Clearly, the separation of two different types of Christian visibility in the public sphere is an analytical, ideal-typical distinction. In actual empirical reality, the delineation of the different types of public presence of Christianity is by no

405 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own*.

406 Jürgen Habermas, "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society", *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (2008): 17-29; David Martin, *Religion and Power: No Logos without Mythos*, pp.14-5.

means so clear-cut. Nevertheless, the purpose of the analytical distinction is, first, to put into question any rigid theory of privatization that would like to restrict religion to the private sphere on the grounds that any form of public religion represents a threat to the public sphere or to democratic politics, and second, to display the substantial location and role of Christianity in the present modern world. With this in mind, the scale and range of social engagement among faith groups and organizations is substantial but often unrecognized. Research evidence in this field has accumulated steadily in recent years.

4.2.2.1. The social participation and solidarity of Christian institutions and the churches at the ecclesiastical level

That the landscape of renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere contains contradictions is undeniable. At one and the same time, there has been a trend of privatization of Christianity, seeking to relegate the institutional churches and their practice to a strictly circumscribed private sphere, and another major shift, in which the churches themselves have emerged as players on the social stage.[407] Recognition of this paradoxical situation will be helpful to understand the renewed visibility of Christianity at the ecclesiastical level in a way that goes beyond both the privatization and the de-privatization theses. The question is in what sense the churches will be private, or not.

407 Craig Calhoun, "Afterword: Religion's Many Powers", In Edurado Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen (eds.) *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp.118-133.

The churches have a long history of public engagement. Even if we confine our investigation to modern times, we can adduce an abundance of historical narratives: the Wesleyan and Moravian anti-slavery movement of the 18th century, the Social Gospel of the late 19th century, the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, and so on. Indeed, Christianity has been entangled in complicated ways with social activism and politics. Moreover, since the 1960s, Christianity has resolutely carried out a ground breaking reformulation of its traditions at the ecclesiastical level that has been just as drastic as the modern secularist criticism on religious faith.

As a representative example, the *aggiornamento* of the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) arranged a new place for the Roman Catholic Church to be re-embedded in the public sphere by leading the church to affirm democracy and religious freedom for all, not just Catholics, and to operate as a legitimate and autonomous actor in civil society rather than through often defensive "concordats" (or pacts) with individual governments.[408] Casanova suggests this history as a pivotal context for the framework of the theory of de-privatization:

> *The aggiornamento led to a fundamental relocation of the Catholic Church from a state-oriented to a civil society-oriented institution. Moreover, the official adoption of the modern discourse of human rights allowed the Catholic Church to play a crucial role in opposition to authoritarian regimes and in*

408 Daniel Philpott, "The Catholic Wave", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.15 (2004): 32-46.

processes of democratization through the Catholic world. But the Catholic Church's embrace of voluntary disestablishment did not mean the privatization of Catholicism but rather its relocation from the state to the public sphere of civil society.[409]

He emphasizes the relocation of the Catholic Church as an instructive sample of the modern public religions, because "the modern discourse of secularism was often constructed in relation to Catholicism".

However, it is clear that there are various types of public presence of Christianity at the ecclesiastical level. More radical political engagement can be illustrated by the emergence of liberation theology in Latin America in the 1950s-60s,[410] and of *minjung* theology (theology of the people) in Korea in the 1960s.[411] Such theological innovation does not mean only the reconstruction of theological discourse, but also forces an involvement in the public agenda through the theological re-orientation of the traditional church. Liberation theology refers to forms of local or contextual theology that propose that knowledge of God based on revelation leads necessarily to a praxis that opposes unjust social and political structures. It has been described as "an interpretation of Christian faith through the poor's suffering, their struggle and

409 José Casanova, "Public Religions Revisited", in Hent de Vries (ed.), *Religion: Beyond the Concept*, p.107.

410 Liberation theology began as a movement within the Catholic Church in Latin America in the 1950s - 1960s, principally as a moral reaction to the poverty caused by social injustice in that region. The term was coined in 1971 by the Peruvian priest Gustavo Gutiérrez, who wrote one of the movement's most famous books, *A Theology of Liberation* [Lima, 1971] (New York: Orbis,1973).

411 Sung-jun Park, Formation and Development of Minjung Theology (Seoul: Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 1996).

hope, and a critique of society and the Catholic faith and Christianity through the eyes of the poor".[412]

Following the Korean War in 1953, liberal Protestantism resisted the *Yushin* military regime of the 1960s to the mid-1980s, when South Korea went through political turmoil, suffering corruption and dictatorship. At that time there was also serious exploitation of factory workers in regard to their employment conditions and pay. This situation led to the emergence of the distinctive *minjung* theology as a new theological paradigm to meet the needs of the urban poor, who were victims of the highly competitive capitalist market and the authoritarian military regime. Reflecting the experiences of urban workers, especially during the years of oppressive military rule, the focus of *minjung* theology is on the politically oppressed, the economically exploited and the socially alienated.[413] Theologians' main concern was not dealing with individual poor people, but lay in confronting the social process and system that prevented the *minjung* from escaping their misery. In this respect, as they tried to deal with economic and political injustice, the *minjung* theologians' concern was more with anything anti-*minjung* than with the *minjung* themselves. The National Council of Churches (NCC), a representative of liberal Protestantism, opposed the regime, adopting "The Human Rights

412 Phillip Berrvman. *Liberation Theology: Essential Facts about the Revolutionary Movement in Latin America and Beyond* (Philadelphia, Temple UP 1987).

413 Sung-jun Park, Formation and Development of Minjung Theology (Seoul: Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 1996), pp.11-15.

Declaration", which upheld human rights against state oppression.[414]

Just as Latin America brought liberation theology to world notice as an "option for the poor", an approach that puts the poor first, which is exactly what Jesus did, so transformation of evangelical groups has brought the concept of "integral mission" (holistic mission) to the notice of the wider world as an indication of the public presence of Christianity. The term, coined in Spanish in the 1970s by members of the Latin American Theological Fellowship (FTL, its Spanish acronym) to describe an understanding of Christian mission which embraces both the proclamation and the demonstration of the Gospel, has since grown in popularity among evangelical groups across every continent. The Ecuadorian theologian Rene Padilla (former International Director of the Tear Fund) is one of the premier proponents of integral mission, a holistic understanding of Christian mission in which there is no artificial barrier between evangelization and social responsibility. "Churches are becoming homes to the uprooted, families for those who have no family, especially in an urban society hungry for fellowship and belonging arising from family disintegration, and secularization."[415]

On the practical side, churches and other Christian voices in the public sphere

414 Heung-soo Kim and Seung-tae Kim, "A History of Korean Christianity Since Liberation" in Korean Research Institute for Religion and Society (ed.) *The Yearbook of Korean Religion* (Seoul: Halimwon, 1993), pp.72-84; David Martin, *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Pentecostalism in Latin America* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p.151.

415 http://www.integralchurch.co.uk/integral-mission---rene-padilla.html

assist in fulfilling essential democratic functions by advocating on behalf of marginalized populations and motivating participation in civil society and the discourses that inform political decision-making. On many pressing issues, such as war and peace, poverty and social justice, abortion and end-of-life decisions, biomedical research and human nature, religious voices are among the most morally strident and politically efficacious.

4.2.2.2. The public involvement of individual Christians or groups at the civil society level through the integration of Christian faith and religiosity in FBSOs or civil society movements

In this sub-section, we will explore how Christianity regenerates itself in the public sphere beyond the ecclesiological dimension. More precisely, the discussion concerns how Christian religiosity presents itself outside the scope of traditional religious categories, not how the institutional church participates in the public domain. While this issue was discussed in section 3.2.3, focusing on the transformation of Christianity as opposed to the subtraction theory, as a new attempt at a radical reworking and understanding of ecclesiology, here we will examine whether Christianity still has significance and potential in socio-political matters, contrary to the privatization of religion thesis, and how the public engagement of new non-church forms of Christianity presents themselves.

That Christianity has a long history of public engagement is well-known. It has played a vital part in motivating and shaping the convictions of public figures in the areas of education and welfare, government policy and moral scrutiny. The distinctive point of the current picture is that while before the late 1960s many Christian social movements were church-based, subsequently, the capability of the religious institutions, including the churches, transferred to civil society movements. Nowadays, we see the vitalized presence of new non-church forms of Christianity in civil society, as exemplified by faith-based social organizations (FBSOs) such as Oxfam (1942), Christian Aid (1957), the Jubilee Debt Campaign, The Common Good (1971), and the Make Poverty History campaign (2005).[416] Sider and Unruh's classification offers the following fivefold typology for identifying the degree to which organizations are linked to faith: 1) faith-permeated organization, 2) faith-centred organization, 3) faith-affiliated organization, 4) faith-background organization, and 5) faith-secular partnership.[417] This differentiation provides a useful device to alert us to the diverse features of FBSOs, although such organizations remain more complicatedly entangled than their classification, reflecting broader trends toward mixed partnerships of religion with the different-denominational-religious, the other-religious, and even the secular, together with the growing

416 http://www.oxfam.org.uk/; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4234811.stm; http://togetherforthecommongood.co.uk/home.html; http://www.christianaid.org.uk/; http://www.makepovertyhistory.org/takeaction/; http://jubileedebt.org.uk/

417 Ronald J. Sider and Heidi Rolland Unruh, "Typology of Religious Characteristics of Social Service and Educational Organizations and Programs", *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, Vol.33.1, (2004): 109-34.

concerns over polarization and religious extremism.

From the late 1980s onwards, FBSOs have taken on a greater role. Following the collapse of ideological boundaries, the realm of civil society began both to expand, and to come under the global dominance of neoliberal public policies. The various Christian FBSOs that take on the role of welfare provider and/or political actor in civil society and in modern international relations are placed as the empirically visible presence of religion as a counteraction to neo-liberalism. Paul Cloke, an English human geographer, argues that the effects of neoliberal globalization have paradoxically created new spaces for FBSOs.

> *The age of neoliberal governance has opened up a resurgence of faith-based activity in the public sphere - as what were previously state-provided services have become contracted out or excised from the palette of public activity, so opportunities have been created for faith-groups to fill the gap, through both voluntary and increasingly professionalized service organizations.*[418]

Cloke's profile of the growing importance of FBSO activities as the public presence of Christianity in civil society implies a post-secular position. As discussed in section 3.2.3, this is a typology of integrating Christian faith or religiosity into the working of the public discourse.

Not surprisingly, many FBSOs with Christian background were initiated by Christian churches and organizations, yet they are not subordinate to

418 Paul Cloke, "Theo-ethics and Radical Faith-based Praxis in the Postsecular City", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban*, pp.227–8.

particular denominations or the local church; indeed, given that they do not make a direct appeal to religious doctrines, often they are not immediately recognizable as faith-based organizations. Rather, they are independent from Christian institutions and churches, and the latter participate in the projects of FBSOs. In this light, the public engagement of FBSOs can be read as part of a broader augmentation of religion's place in the public sphere through the integrating of Christian religiosity into the civil society movement. In fact, the public profile of religion in connection with FBSOs is one of the most powerful implications of the "post-secular". As a result, the public presence of religion in civil society can no longer be disregarded.[419] Luke Bretherton emphasizes the role of religious groups not only as "generators of social capital", but also as mobilizers of people to act together and to be active citizens.[420] Religions, according to Bretherton, are a key catalyst in post-secularist politics because they can mobilize people, they keep alive ultimate questions about the good life, and they can promote resistance to commodification and instrumentalization. He argues that "the recent resurgence of religion in public life, and in particular in urban life, represents the 'salvation' of politics".[421]

419 Luke Bretherton, "A postsecular politics? Inter-faith Relations as a Civic Practice", *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 79.2 (2011): 346–77, p.358.

420 Luke Bretherton, "Religion and the Salvation of Urban Politics: Beyond Cooption, Competition and Commodification", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban*.

421 *Ibid.* p.207.

4.3. Normative Approach to the Public Presence of Christianity: Worrying or Welcome?

We have noted that the visibility of religion is likely to continue, beyond the religious-secular cleavage in the public sphere. This is true irrespective of the type of religion, institutional or individualized, and especially with regard to the way that religious activities involve individual commitment.

If that is the case, is the renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere worrying or welcome? Ethically and politically, should religion be restricted to a private sphere to help make society more durable and robust? Is some doctrine of privatization that limits the role of religion in public life necessary to build free and healthy societies? Is the requirement of secularity for democracy, in itself, a good thing? Must religious faith and practice be relegated to private matters and marginalized into the private sphere?

Over the centuries countless arguments have been conducted concerning whether exclusion of religious argumentation from the public sphere may be impoverishing or beneficial. We will examine some of these arguments, in particular the assertions that the renewed visibility of religion is a source of social conflict and an extension of irrationality in public affairs, and that it represents a challenge to a secular interpretation of modernity.

4.3.1. Critique on Neo-atheist Discussion

This section comprises a critique of the neo-atheist discussion on the public presence of religion, in which the following objections are prominent: 1) Religion is an obstacle to political democracy as a source of division and conflict, and 2) Religion is irrational and essentially at odds with science and evidence-based debate.

4.3.1.1. On Christianity as a source of conflict and violence

In light of the recent historical evidence, one must acknowledge that religion has not disappeared - at least not yet. Moreover, one cannot afford to ignore that the socio-political influence of religion has become infinitely varied in its manifestations, and its visibility in the public sphere will continue to be vital. This empirical trajectory has provoked the secularist school of thought, and in the past few years extreme formulations of secular views have appeared in the work of the so-called "neo-atheists": for example, Richard Dawkins' *The God Delusion*, Cristopher Hitchens' *God is not Great*, Daniel Dennett's *Breaking the Spell*, and Sam Harris' *The End of Faith*.[422] However, their version of the thesis is somewhat different from that of their predecessors and the old secularization theorists. The major points of difference revolve around

422 Cristopher Hitchens, *God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything* (London: Atlantic Books, 2007); Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006); Daniel Dennett, *Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon* (New York: Penguin, 2007); Sam Harris, *The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004). For more on the "neo-atheist" debate, see the "Beyond Belief" conference website at www.beyondbelief2006.org.

their moral assessment of religion as inherently "fundamentalist", irrational, violent, and repressive always and everywhere, and stigmatized as the cause of many of the world's worst evils.[423] For example, English biologist Richard Dawkins claims that: "Faith is an evil precisely because it requires no justification and brooks no argument. (…) Faith can be very dangerous, and deliberately to implant it into the vulnerable mind of an innocent child is a grievous wrong."[424] Similarly, in the view of Christopher Hitchens, "religion poisons everything". These neo-atheists continue to believe that religion will eventually recede, and hope that it will do so sooner rather than later, before it does more damage. Such strong critique of religion has been expressed overly stridently.

Is that really a productive attitude, or does it only compound the problem? In *Reason, Faith and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate*, Terry Eagleton begins his critical polemic by criticizing the so-called neo-atheist debates on the grounds that "most such critics buy their rejection of religion on the cheap. When it comes to the New Testament, at least, what they usually write off is a worthless caricature of the real thing, rooted in a degree of ignorance and prejudice to match religion's own."[425] That is, their prejudice and a strong

423 Peter Beyer, "Fundamentalism and the Pluralization of Value-Orientations", in Lisbet Christofferesen, Hans Raun Iversen, Hanne Petersen and Margit Warburg (eds.), *Religion in the 21st Century: Challenges and Transformations* (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), pp.37-50.

424 Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, p.308.

425 Terry Eagleton, *Reason, Faith and Revolutions: Reflections on the God Debates* (New Haven and London: Yale

aversion emanate from ill-natured understanding of religion and religious faith. Taylor articulates that “an attack in religion as calling for terrible self-mutilation is actuated by pride”.[426]

I want to argue that things are not quite as they appear. In one sense, it is not exactly religion that is at the root of violence in many 20th century cases. Rather, religion gets involved through a quite different mechanism, which itself is not intrinsically tied to religion. Certain notorious cases should alert us to this, and to a different relation between devotion and violence. Taylor makes this point clearly:

> *I want to argue that much of the implication of religion in violence in our century is to be understood as the working out of what can be called identity struggles. These have to crystallize around definitions of one’s own and the other’s identities. But these definitions are not necessarily religious. On the contrary, they frequently turn on perceived nationality, language, tribe, or whatever. The point I want to make is that what drives these struggles is frequently very similar across the different modes of definition. That religion figures in the definition, as against language, say, often changes very little… What matters is the historical identity of the people, and here some monasteries and traditional sites of devotion are important markers of*

UP, 2009), p. xi.

426 Charles Taylor, *Sesokhwaoa Hyundeamoonmyung* [*Secularization and the Modern Civilization*] (Seoul: Tasan Memorial Lecture, 2003), p.62. This book brings together 4 papers presented at the Tasan Memorial Lecture in Seoul, Korea in 2002, in which Taylor outlined his perspective on the legitimate role of religion in the modern world. The printed volume also includes an interview with the author.

territory, but little more.

In other words, even when religion is a major source of definition in modern identity struggles, it tends to figure under a description which displaces the centre of attention from what has always been seen as the main point of religious devotion and practice: God, moksha, Nirvana. Which is what raises the legitimate question: is the struggle about religion any more.[427]

His long explanation is plausible in that to paint a picture of a certain kind of religion as the source of conflict in the 20th century is certainly not to tell the whole truth. Here, Taylor provides us with useful insight in distinguishing religiosity and the modes of identity struggle.

However, although we cannot see religion itself as a source of conflict and violence, the original exclusivism embedded in religion still bears the possibility of inducing a mutation to a violent avant-garde by combining with the other sources in identity struggles, such as national identity or political party. Therefore, while Taylor's argumentation is plausible, it is not sufficiently comprehensive. A more adequate approach would recognize the multiple strata that religiosity displays. Moreover, the characteristics of religion are strikingly diverse, a reflection of the fact that human culture displays a plethora of different characteristic types within each tribe, so that there is a perennial difficulty in defining religion. Some religious adherents remain irrational, while

427 *Ibid.* pp 296-7.

others change and develop, through both experience and the impact of scientific discovery on human understanding. In other words, although certain religions may belong to the same religious classification, they may have quite different characteristics. Therefore, our questions should be: What qualitative religion will inspire and impact on the formation of human beings? What element of religion will be harmful to the formation of human beings?

4.3.1.2. On religious anti-intellectualism and rationality

Modern Science and Religion: Are They Mutually Exclusive?[428] Central to debates on the relationship between religion and reason is the view that religion is irrational and a matter of blind faith. Many secular liberal theorists propose that religion should be relegated to more circumscribed and private spheres of social interaction, and its role should be reduced to nullity, because they regard religion as a personal belief that cannot properly be made subject to public discourse.

For example, Richard Dawkins considers that religious people are psychologically dysfunctional and, from the point of view of the functioning of society, that religions are obstacles or forces resistant to change and thus socially harmful. He argues that religious people are subversive of intellectual life, since they short-circuit rationally accepted processes of establishing

428 For a more in-depth discussion between science and religion, see http://www.germaninnovation.org/news-and-events/podcasts?year=2012&speaker=2ec3446c-6c0e-e211-ae88-000c29e5517f#sthash.Slv3ZIlm.dpuf

claims to knowledge and understanding.[429] Dawkins draws a distinction between people of faith and those who are "bright", that is, who have a world view that is "free of supernatural and mystical elements". He makes binary opponents of "bright" and "faith-heads", regarding the latter as being infected by a deluding "virus", strongly "other" to scientific rationality, led by a misconceived religious irrationality. However, a wider assessment of public faith discourages the drawing of a fixed binary divide and the mutual "othering" of faith and secularity. Sharp and ongoing controversies notwithstanding, science and rationalism do not confront faith in necessary philosophical opposition. As a philosopher, Michel Onfray is fiercely opposed to the anti-intellectualism that he finds in the three great monotheistic religions. He argues that "monotheism loathes intelligence, that sublime gift defined as the art of connecting what at first and for most people seems unconnected".[430] Exploring the nature of religious belief, Sam Harris argues that religion involves such a misuse of our minds that it constitutes "a vanishing point beyond which rational discourse proves impossible".[431] According to Harris, religious belief fails the test of propositional truth because it floats free of evidence and reason, taking refuge in an internal coherence that is immune to falsification by new knowledge and events.[432] Thus: "We must find our way to

429 Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion*.

430 Michel Onfray, *Atheist Manifesto: The Case Against Christianity, Judaism, and Islam*, trans. by Jeremy Leggatt (NY: Arcade Publishing, 2007), p.67.

431 Sam Harris, *The End of Faith*, p.25.

432 *Ibid*. pp.75-76.

a time when faith, without evidence, disgraces anyone who would claim it. (…) It is imperative that we begin speaking plainly about the absurdity of most of our religious beliefs."[433]

It is not easy to find a positive passage about religion in the writings of these neo-atheists. Their argumentation is occupied with an ill-natured interpretation of the Bible that hardly contributes to a deeper understanding of religion's significance today.[434] As far as the tension between rationality and faith is concerned, neo-atheist debates need to be reconsidered at two levels, as captured succinctly in the introduction to Edurado Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen's *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere*:

> *Many of our dominant stories about religion and public life are myths that bear little relation to either our political life or our everyday experience. Religion is neither merely private, for instance, nor purely irrational. And the public sphere is neither a real or straightforward rational deliberation nor a smooth space of unforced assent.*[435]

First, the religiosity of Christianity is not purely irrational; even if one concedes that there is a certain part of Christianity that is unable to solve the tension between faith and reason through rational means, that should not be defined as irrational.

---

433 *Ibid.* p.48.

434 See Terry Eagleton, *Reason, Faith and Revolutions: Reflections on the God Debates*.

435 Edurado Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen (eds.) *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere* (NY : Columbia University Press, 2011), p.1.

On the question of faith and reason, the neo-atheist conviction of theological blindness is due to the fact that they regard religious statements as being the same kind of thing as scientific ones, reducing faith to positive knowledge. Herbert McCabe holds that Christian faith is reasonable but not provable, pointing out that demanding definitive and absolute proofs can actually be a reactionary move.[436] Of course, none of this is to suggest, as Dawkins seems to suspect, that religious claims require no evidence to back them up, or that they express merely "poetic" or subjective truths. Debates over neo-atheist scientific positivism have been well-covered in Eagleton's writing:

> *Religious faith is not in the first place a matter of subscribing to the proposition that a Supreme Being exists, which is where almost all atheism and agnosticism goes awry. God does not exist as an entity in the world. Atheist and believer can at least concur on that. Moreover, faith is for the most part performative rather than propositional.*[437]

In this respect, Eagleton expands the meaning of faith to the articulation of a loving commitment rather than a description of the way things are, referring to the vital point made by prominent French philosopher Alain Badiou: faith consists in a tenacious loyalty to what he calls "a truth event".[438] There is a remote parallel between this and Karen Armstrong's claim that religious faith

436 Herbert McCabe, *Faith within Reason* (London: Continuum, 2007). Herbert McCabe (1926-2001) was a Dominican Father and theologian.

437 Terry Eagleton, *Reason, Faith and Revolutions*, p.111.

438 *Ibid*. pp.117-120; See also Alain Badiou, *Being and Event* (London: Continuum, 2005).

is something that people do, thus "its truth is acquired by practical action".[439] In line with this thinking, Habermas notes that the very ideas of freedom, emancipation, and liberation developed in largely religious discourses in Europe, and this continues to inform their meaning.[440] Calhoun also demonstrates the religious roots of public reason, arguing that religion is part of the genealogy of public reason itself.[441]

Secondly, putting together both the capacity of rationality and its limits, the claim that the methods of empirical science alone can define reason is self-refuting. As Charles Taylor points out, "to hold that there are no assumptions in a scientist's work which aren't already based on evidence is surely a reflection of a blind faith, one that can't even feel the occasional tremor of doubt".[442] Taylor maintains that "the pure face-off between religion and science is a chimaera, or rather, an ideological construct".[443] Criticism of secular reason comes from various adherents who by no means doubt the capacity of reason in itself. Their point is rather that reason is insufficient and must be enriched with a religious perspective.

In conclusion, faith and reason have never been simple opposites, but rather have been mutually enriching. The religious are in conflict with reductive

439 Karen Armstrong, *The Case for God: What Religion Really Means* (New York: Knopf, 2009).

440 Jürgen Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere", *European Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.14.1 (2006):1-25.

441 Craig Calhoun, "Secularism, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere", in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford and NY: Oxford UP, 2011), pp.75-91.

442 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p.835.

443 *Ibid.* p.332.

rationalism and materialism, not with rationality and science per se. As Eagleton asserts, “the emergent interest in nature was not a step outside a religious outlook, but a mutation within it”.[444] Rationale alone cannot in the long run guarantee that either rights or duties are defended. Rationale, if left by itself, can be abused in many different ways. Ratzinger's conclusion is that rationale needs religion in order not to go astray. However, correspondingly, religion also relies on rationale, without which it is prone to degenerate into unruly fanaticism.[445]

4.3.2. Transformation of Socio-political Stance in Christianity: from Dominance to Movement

Aside from the teleological projection of the neo-atheists, debate over the public presence of religion is well expressed in “a conversation-stopper” worded by American philosopher Richard Rorty,[446] which relates to two concerns: First, can religion communicate with public discourse in a plural society? (4.3.2.) Secondly, can a metaphysical sense of religion communicate with rational process? (I will deal with this topic in 4.3.3.)

444 Terry Eagleton, *Reason, Faith and Revolutions*, p.76.

445 Habermas's and Ratzinger's introductory contribution is reproduced in Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, *The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion* (Freiburg: Ignatius Press, 2007), pp.50-57. It is translated from *Dialektik der Säkularisierung. Über Vernunft und Religion* (Mit einem Vorwort herausgegeben von Floran Schuller, Freiburg-Basel-Wien: Herder, 2005).

446 Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and Social Hope* (Harmondworth: Penguin, 1999), p.169.

As we have explored in empirical research, the new visibility of Christianity in the public sphere is not necessarily a return to a previous exclusive and dominant order. Rather, the public presence of Christianity takes place according to the principle of movement through participation and entanglement, not according to the principle of dominance. As long as it does not seek to dominate, Christianity can be reintroduced into the public sphere as a legitimate actor of civil society.

Therefore, the latent possibility of Christianity in the public sphere has to be analysed in relation to a method whereby Christianity engages in the public domain, and to its authentic contribution to socio-political matters, not in terms of a system of dominance. The public presence of Christianity is now best represented as a social movement, which is to do with seeking to participate and to entangle with those outside Christian circles on various issues. Indeed, the public presence of Christianity as a social movement is embodied through those two important processes: “participation” and “entanglement”.

4.3.2.1. The participation of Christianity

Above all, we need to be aware that the way religion engages in the public sphere is changing: having left behind its status of dominance and control, it has become a movement that challenges and serves. At the ecclesiastical level Christianity has given up its links with old structures of power and, more radically, at the civil society level, has emerged as a social actor, taking up

various causes and even being listened to. The growing prominence of religion in political discourse is matched by popular fervour for various social movements of Christianity.

Religion can be a significant agent for participation and solidarity that move beyond tension between normativity and creativity. Participation and solidarity are important agents to integrate value into civil communities.

Hans Joas emphasizes this point in the concluding part of his book, *The Creativity of Action*, as follows:

> *Today, the concept of participation refers to the desire for public, tangible sociality and serious creative activity within the community - a desire which the tendency towards privatization has not yet completely silenced. By participating in the organizations and institutions of democratic politics and culture, as well as in the social movements which form the fluid substratum of democracy, people are able to experience a rational pursuit of interests, moral commitment and creative self-fulfilment in a form in which these three are not separated from each other. Participation can be said to be a practical form of integrated creativity only if it is not exclusively the pursuit of one's own interests or a merely normative obligation, uncoupled from the self-fulfilment that takes place in the private sphere. (...) Much as participation may be a key word to describe a creativity that is not limited narrowly to a privatistic understanding. (...) Participation has its place within each person's individual*

balance of modes of action.[447]

Indeed, participation in the public sphere may contribute to this solidarity. Solidarity is not just a condition for reciprocal exchange of reasons in public discourse; it can also produce creative actions and events. Departing from his earlier pronouncements on this point, Habermas now seems convinced that at this later stage of global modernization religions may provide some resources to counter the lack of solidarity and other deficiencies of a consumer and success-oriented society. The appearance of increasing religiosity, the growth of many new religious movements and the maintenance of religion through participation and engagement manifest the fact that the religious can be compatible with the public sphere without antagonism; it can inspire the formation of human being and contribute to the development of global community.

4.3.2.2. The entanglement of Christianity

It is alleged that one reason why religion has been and ought to remain privatized is that, in socio-political discussion, the monotheistic value system of religion cannot be concerned with the multiplicities of values in a plural society or with the relevant response to any public reality.

However, the privatization project of religion became too doctrinaire and went

447 Hans Joas, *The Creativity of Action*, trans. by Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp.255-6.

too far. In *The Naked Public Square* Richard John Neuhaus, an outstanding American Christian cleric, claims that nowhere is the public square actually "naked", i.e. "neutral", and ironically the separation of religion from politics may hand over democratic mobilization to groups such as the Moral Majority, which makes public claims on the basis of "private truths".[448] He maintains that: "the integrity of politics itself requires that such a proposal be resisted. Public decisions must be made by arguments that are public in character".[449] Extending such discussion, Habermas demands that for religion to pose its significance in the public sphere the religious person must consider his or her own faith reflexively, to see it from the point of view of others and relate it to secular views. John Rawls initially excluded religious reasons from public debates; late in his life he reconsidered that position and argued that they should be included as long as they could be translated into secular terms.[450] Rawls uses the notion of "translation" to describe the way in which the rational arguments of religious people are rendered accessible to secular interlocutors. However, in order to bridge the religious and the non-religious, the idea of translation alone is limited.

In fact, Christianity does not make public claims on the basis of "private truths".

448 Richard John Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square* (Grand Rapids and MI: Eerdmans, 1984).

449 *Ibid*. p.36.

450 John Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 64. 3 (Summer 1997): 765–807.

Rather, as we examined in the empirical research, Christianity continues to hold a sense of attunement with wide reality, and tries to find an accord in an entanglement between a natural view and a religious view, the individual and the social, by reproducing a method to communicate with secular society, and by making a vital challenge for contemporary society by integrating religiosity into the public sphere.

Casanova's delineation shows this contextual situation well:

> *Religion always transcends any privatistic, autistic reality, serving to integrate the individual into an intersubjective, public and communal world. Simultaneously, however, religion always transcends any particular community cult, serving to free the individual from any particular world, and to integrate the same individual into a trans-social, cosmic reality.*[451]

This view on the integration of Christianity is articulated in the notion of "the very unsecular entanglement" that can be observed empirically as well as legally in a whole range of diverse patterns of church-state-civil society all across Europe.[452] Although the word "always" may weigh upon one's mind, the public presence of religion, in the majority of cases, shows that religion becomes involved in public issues and communicates with civil society through "entanglement". This concept of "entanglement" seems consonant with the

451 José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p.216.

452 José Casanova, "The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms", in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism*, p.71.

notion proposed by the Danish philosopher of law, Lisbet Christoffersen: a historically based "intertwinement" of religious and socio-cultural institutions.[453] In a similar sense, in conceptualizing the post-secular situation, Justin Beaumont pays attention to "opening up possibilities for new interconnectivities between diverse social realities" (for example, extra-religious, inter-religious, intra-religious, and pre-secular, secular, post-secular, trans-secular) within the prevailing secularized social structures of modern late capitalism.[454] Indeed, the public presence of religion through "entanglement, intertwinement, or interconnectivities" retains more than visibility, that is to say, a "mutual reflection" and "incorporation by reciprocal learning process".

Here, the deployment of the concept "entanglement" in this research indicates an interweaving of distinct threads through a historical process, even though differentiation suggests a clear separation between religion and society. More significantly, various forms of Christianity, beyond institutionalized religion, are deeply entangled within the public sphere.

453 Lisbet Christoffersen, "Intertwinement: A New Concept for Understanding Religion-Law Relations", *Nordic Journal of Religion and Society*, Vol.19.2 (2006): 93-106.

454 Justin Beaumont, "Transcending the Particular in Postsecular Cities," in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), p. 7.

4.3.3. Intellectual Challenges: Beyond an Aggressive Atheistic Naturalism and a Self-assertive Classic Transcendentalism

4.3.3.1. Naturalism and transcendentalism

Following the critique of the neo-atheist discussion and the defensive stance on the public presence of Christianity, I now want to explore the further stages of intellectually responsible discussion about how religion, particularly Christianity, relates to secular thinking in the modern society, which may be one of the central tenets of discussion concerning the place and role of religion in the twenty-first century.

The current intellectual controversy culminates in a tension between the secularism of the naturalistic worldview and the metaphysics of revealed religion.[455] On the one hand, the trend of scientific naturalism frequently operates as the foundation for an objective scientific self-understanding in everyday life. On the other hand, the metaphysical thinking of religious doctrine may be an epistemological frame that implies reaching beyond this world to eternity and to God.

Understanding the relationship between the immanent and the transcendent

455 See Roger Trigg, *Religion in the Public life: Must Faith Be Privatized?* (Oxford, Oxford UP, 2007), pp.190-208.

In general, the claim that religion has been on a path to growing obsolescence and eventual disappearance in contemporary world society is related to an assumption that transcendence, which implies reaching beyond this world to eternity and to God, is not relevant to our daily life in the immanent frame. The modern epistemological frame, which is often combined with some understanding of modern science, frequently operates as the immanent frame. Today, a central idea seems to be that the whole thrust of modern science has been to establish materialism. Rationality hinges on a distinction of and the relegation of Christianity to the transcendent side of that dichotomy: the immanent and the transcendent.

is very important when viewing the place of Christianity in the public sphere of twenty-first century society. There is an assumption that the world can be neatly divided into the immanent and transcendent, and many people assume that religious transcendence is irrelevant to our daily life in the immanent frame. This clear distinction between the immanent and the transcendent is the precondition to declare the immanent world as the only reality, and implies a great sorting out, in which the natural becomes a level that can be described and understood on its own. As a result, scientific-technical progress and material development in the natural and immanent frame have led to an increasing and irreversible "disenchantment" of the world, which has made appeals to religion less urgent or credible.[456] However, this understanding is misguided; indeed, the proper understanding of the relationship between the immanent and the transcendent is stymied by such a binary view, and furthermore such an epistemological frame is not conducive to the development of the civil society.

This research involves two questions on each side of the supposed divide: (1) Should modern reason treat metaphysics as a sort of absence? Is excluding the transcendent conducive to social development? (2) Should Christianity predicate its existential basis upon the transcendent frame? Does the

456 The term "disenchantment" is from Max Weber's work. Philip S. Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society* (NY and London: New York University Press and SSRC, 2012), p.324.

authenticity and vitality of Christianity depend just on the transcendent religiosity?

To move forward in this dispute, I examine the recent works of Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor to attempt to theorize the place and meaning of religion in the public sphere. For them, understanding the secular society is based on Habermas's term, "post-metaphysical thinking", and Taylor's "immanent frame".[457] The two scholars have been characterized as mediators between the secularism of the scientific worldview and the metaphysics of revealed religion, between the immanent and the transcendent.[458] Their primary focus is not all of the religious, but a more moderate, intellectually and ethically balanced faith, which is different from religion itself or fundamental religion - for lack of a better term.

4.3.3.2. Habermas's post-metaphysical thinking: soft naturalism

The main tenet of Habermas's recent narrative regarding religion is based on "post-metaphysical thinking": "fallibilistic but non-defeatist post-metaphysical thought differentiates itself from both sides (the secularism of the scientific world view and the archaic ways of thinking of religious doctrine) by reflecting

457 For the term, "immanent frame", I am indebted to Charles Taylor. The term is the similar expression of what I will call "closed" or "horizontal" worlds. By this I mean shapes of our "world" in Heidegger's sense, which leave no place for the "vertical" or "transcendent", but which in one way or another close them off, render them inaccessible, or even unthinkable.

458 "Introduction", in Charles Taylor, *Sesokhwaoa Hyundeamoonmyung* [*Secularization and the Modern Civilization*].

on its own limits and on its inherent tendency to overstep these limits."[459]

Habermas is critical of the Western metaphysical tradition and its exaggerated conception of reason. But he cautions against the temptation to relinquish this conception altogether. In opposition to the radical critics of Western philosophy, Habermas argues that post-metaphysical thinking can remain critical only if it preserves the idea of reason while stripping it of its metaphysical trappings. Habermas contributes to this task by developing further his distinctive approach to problems of meaning, rationality and subjectivity.

In a recent interview with Eduardo Mendietta on this subject, Habermas addresses a "terminological lack of clarity" by stipulating that the post-secular indeed does not fully map onto the post-metaphysical: "Post-metaphysical thinking remains secular even in a situation depicted as 'post-secular'; but in this different situation, it may become aware of a secular self-misunderstanding."[460]

> *It is prepared to learn from religion, but remains agnostic in the process. It insists on the difference between the certainties of faith, on the one hand, and validity claims that can be publicly criticized, on the other; but it refrains from the rationalist presumption that it can itself decide what part of the*

459 Jürgen Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge and Malden : Polity, 2008), pp. 5-6.

460 Eduardo Mendieta, "A Postsecular World Society? On the Philosophical Significance of Postsecular Consciousness and the Multicultural World Society: An Interview with Jürgen Habermas", trans. by Matthias Fritsch, The Immanent Frame (April, 2010), Available at http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/A-Postsecular-World-Society-TIF.pdf

religious doctrines is rational and what part irrational. … However, an apology of faith with philosophical means is not the task of philosophy proper. At best, philosophy circles the opaque core of religious experience when reflecting on the intrinsic meaning of faith. This core must remain so abysmally alien to discursive thought as does the core of aesthetic experience, which can likewise only be circled but not penetrated by philosophical reflection.[461]

As a consequence of this ambivalent attitude of post-metaphysical thinking, Habermas proposes a new approach, which he calls a "soft naturalism".[462] According to this view, the human world originates from nature but cannot be reduced to natural occurrences. Consciousness is not simply an insignificant by-product of various brain processes as a "hard naturalism" would allege. While consciousness stems from biological evolution, it becomes a precondition for all of human civilization once it begins to function. This approach indicates a radical challenge to Enlightenment secular "naturalism" as a method of inquiry and analysis. Religion also plays a vital role in that civilization, as the source of indispensable cultural values. Thus, Habermas sees no possibility that the transcendent may become obsolete. Rather, in a recent essay, he proposes a more inclusive approach to the role of religion in the public sphere than he was previously willing to permit.[463]

---

461 Jürgen Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, p143. See also Chapters 5 and 8.

462 *Ibid*. pp.153, 166, 208.

463 Jürgen Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere" (paper presented at The Holberg Prize Seminar, Bergen, Norway, 30 November, 2005). It is available at http://www.holbergprisen.no/images/materiell/2005_symposium_habermas.pdf# nameddest=habermas; "Religion

As Habermas has intimated, the tenor of the conversation between faith and social science requires reflexivity on both sides. Habermas, for his part, places his trust in the idea that both rights and obligations will arise out of actual human interaction, that is to say: the activity of communication. But at the same time, he admits that what he calls "post-metaphysical thought" is clearly at a loss when it comes to notions of the good or exemplary life. Such notions must be discernible in order to give people tangible guidelines for their conduct and their dreams.[464]

When Christianity was united with the Greek philosophical tradition, the latter was enriched with crucial concepts from the former; Habermas mentions as an example "embodiment", "disposal", and "fulfilment". Post-metaphysical thought has renounced all claims, and Habermas anticipates the need for translations from religious language. He mentions one example, namely how the Jewish-Christian notion that mankind is the image of God is translated to a secular notion of human value. Of course, this is not a new translation, but Habermas feels that its power must be renewed, perhaps in such a way that a human being must be treated as if they were the image of God, even if there does not happen to be any God.

Habermas sees political liberalism as in need of new moral insights and

in the Public Sphere", *European Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.14.1 (2006):1-25, p.1.

464 http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-04-01-liedman-en.html#footNoteNUM20

commitments, and recognizes religion as a potential source of renewal. However, such renewal should not take the form of a direct appeal to religious doctrines or comprehensive worldviews in ways that foreclose public debate. We should recognize, as Habermas does, the importance of religious motivations and understandings (and indeed, organizational networks and practices) in a range of social movements during the 20th century, in Europe as well as America, and worldwide. Such arguments with respect to faith, reflecting on the functional advantages and beneficial effects of Christianity, can lead to interesting research.

4.3.3.3. Taylor's rethinking of the immanent frame: immanent transcendence

I turn now to the leading political theorist and socio-religious thinker, Charles Taylor, whose methodology and arguments contain more radical reflection on the secular than do those of Habermas.[465] Taylor embraces what Jürgen Habermas has called a post-metaphysical thinking, and maintains that the world has moved beyond an anti-metaphysical discourse.[466] While Habermas emphasizes a reflective form of reasoning, that is, how a naturalistic standpoint

465 Yet, here Taylor's framework does not represent simply a "post-secular" stance as such; that is, it does not equate the secular with a secularistic certainty that was, by Habermas's own account, a mistake. This understanding of the post-secular neatly aligns with what Taylor, at the very beginning of *A Secular Age*, calls "Secularity1" and "Secularity2". In *A Secular Age* Taylor's purpose is to demonstrate that there is another, much more fundamental sense of the secular that is not captured by the classic idea of patterns of institutional separation and "secularistic certainity". Because this third sense of the secular comprehends precisely those forms of religiosity that are now most widely mobilized, resurgence of religion is not evidence of a new post-secular dispensation.

466 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*. See also Michael Warner, Jonathan Van Antwerpen, and Craig Calhoun, (eds.), *Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

adopts religious transcendence to a functional role for the advancement of the civil society, Taylor's central purpose is to make it clear that increased options and growing pluralism result in a deep mutual "fragilization".[467] He emphasizes the changes in the conditions of belief associated with his articulation of "Secularity 3",[468] and thus de-dramatizes some of the conflicts between the religious and the secular, assessing both the problems with an exclusively non-religious spiritual outlook and the problems besetting contemporary religiosity.[469]

We have certainly gone, over many centuries, from a situation in which everyone believed in God to one in which that stands as only one option amongst many, and in which secularism, at least among critical intellectuals, has established itself as the "default option". In our modern secular society, the secular appears now as the whole of reality, while the religious is increasingly perceived not only as the residual category, the other of the secular, but also as a super structural and superfluous additive, which both

---

467 The rise of a so-called secular option entails a fundamental shift in the preconditions for faith. Ever since this shift, believers have had to justify their particular faith, such as the Christian, not just as a specific confession or with respect to other religions, but also as faith per se, vis-à-vis a lack of faith that was initially legitimized as a possibility and then, "normalized" in certain countries and milieus. Of course, the rise of the secular option should not be understood as the cause of secularization; but it does establish it as a possibility. In the first instance, then, the optionality of faith arises from the fact that it has in principle become possible not to believe, and subsequently from the conditions of religious pluralism as well.

468 Taylor's "Secularity3″ refers to the condition in which the Western religious subject (and, increasingly, the non-Western religious subject) is faced with the choice of unbelief as a live option.

469 The points of difference between Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor can be traced in their dialogue in a symposium convened by the Institute for Public Knowledge at NYU, the Social Science Research Council and the Humanities Institute at Stony Brook University. See Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen, and Craig Calhoun (eds.), *Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age*. See also Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*. This monumental opus is devoted to trying to illuminate the relationship between immanence and transcendence, and in particular the historical establishment and intellectual contours of what he calls "the immanent frame".

humanity and societies can do without. The western secularity is often understood as the result of a fundamental change in sensibility marked by "disenchantment", or the systematic repression of the "magical" elements of religion.[470] Secularists believe that the lower, physical or immanent order is all that there is, and that the higher, metaphysical or transcendent order is a human invention. However, Taylor regards secularity as "the great invention of the West",[471] and "the modern social imaginary".[472] There are various ways to think about the relationship, but for my purposes, Charles Taylor's view works well:

> *The great invention of the West was that of an immanent order in Nature, whose working could be systematically understood and explained on its own terms, leaving open the question whether this whole order had a deeper significance, and whether, if it did, we should infer a transcendent Creator beyond it. This notion of the "immanent" involved denying - or at least isolating and perhaps problematizing - any form of interpenetration between the things of Nature, on the one hand, and the "supernatural" on the other, be this understood in terms of the one transcendent God or of Gods or spirits, or magic forces or whatever.*[473]

Such a contrasting view between the secular and the religious can also be

---

470 "Disenchantment" in his usage really translates Weber's term "Entzauberung", the core concept of which is "Zauber", or "magic".

471 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, p.15.

472 Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke UP, 2004).

473 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, pp.15-16.

discerned in Taylor's dyadic terms distinguishing two dimensions of existence: "immanent" and "transcendent"; "secular" refers to what pertains to a self-sufficient, immanent sphere and is contrasted with what relates to the transcendent realm, often identified as "religious". This binary distinction can then undergo a further mutation, via a denial of the transcendent level, into a dyad in which one term refers to the real "secular", and the other refers to what is merely invented "religious"; or where "secular" refers to the institutions we really require to live in this world, and "religious" or "ecclesial" refer to optional accessories, which often disturb the course of this worldly life.[474]

In his great work, *A Secular Age*, Charles Taylor seeks to trace how what he calls "exclusive humanism" or "self-sufficient humanism", i.e. "a humanism accepting neither final goals beyond human flourishing, nor any allegiance to anything else beyond this flourishing", came to be a widespread option, by exposing an ideologically slanted secularist assumption that no reasons of God, belief, or the transcendent have had anything to do with the process of building the edifice of modern knowledge.[475]

Nevertheless, Taylor argues that it is not a valid method to reject altogether the "immanent frame" that lies at the heart of the modern secular orientation. Rather, he recognizes the immanent frame as a decisive this-worldly structure

474 Charles Taylor, "Western Secularity", in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism*, p.34.

475 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, pp.18, 427-30.

for the understanding of our current condition, including human life,[476] and one that remains an option within today's modern secularity. That is, the immanent frame does not cast light upon the entire world. Therefore, he insists that the immanent should not be closed to transcendence, but should be open to its possibility.[477] The immanent frame, he suggests, is "not usually, or even mainly a set of beliefs which we entertain about our predicament", but rather, "the sense context in which we develop our beliefs".[478]

In this vein, Taylor's argument is twofold. First, he emphasizes that religion and spirituality are not extinguished in the social condition that is reformulated in the immanent frame; rather, the religious shape and belief condition of the present age have been transformed.[479]

> *My hypothesis is that this new creation of a civilized, polite order succeeded beyond what its originators could have hoped for and that this, in turn, led to a new reading of what a Christian order might be, one that was seen increasingly in immanent terms.*
>
> *This version of Christianity was shorn of much of its transcendent content and was thus open to a new departure, in which the understanding of good order (what I call "modern moral order") could be embraced outside of its*

476 Charles Taylor, "The Immanent Frame", in *A Secular Age*, pp.539-93.

477 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, pp.427–30, 300; See also Michael Warner, Jonathan Van Antwerpen, and Craig Calhoun (eds.), *Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age*.

478 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, p.549.

479 *Ibid*. p.549.

original theological, Providential frame work and in certain cases even against it.[480]

His perspective shows that the line between secular and religious is not as sharp as many philosophical and other accounts suggest. On the one hand, religious people cannot escape the prominence and power of the secular in the modern world, and on the other hand, while the norms of secular argumentation may obscure deep evaluative commitments, they do not eliminate them. Further, religion's commitments and opening to transcendence remain possible within the immanent frame, even as new forces push for "the closure of immanence". We have to notice, therefore, that disenchantment does not necessarily lead to the end of religion; conversely, the accommodation and embrace of the transcendent does not necessarily mean enchantment by religious mysticism.

Taylor's second goal is to make the idea of transcendence one that can be interpreted, and to re-embed it in the public sphere as a new challenge for "the closure of immanence". According to Taylor, the transcendent represents sources of meaning that lie beyond this-worldly life. Transcendence may also have other dimensions, for example a belief in something which transcends nature and the world. Here, the crucial feature of the transcendent is that it

480 Charles Taylor, "Western Secularity", p.50.

presents other motivations and resources for our intellectual perspectives, which legitimately transcend the limits of "scientific naturalism" and "immanent materialism".[481] The transcendent contains "great metaphysical mysteries", as if there were some sort of solution, at least in some objective sense of solution. The point of discussion is not exhausted by life, the fullness of life, even the goodness of life. Then, acknowledging the transcendent means seeing a point beyond that. One form of this is the insight that we can find in suffering and death: not merely negation, the undoing of fullness and life, but also a place to affirm something which matters beyond life, on which life itself originally draws.

Taylor does not wish to see religion as just a number of engaging practices or quasi-ethnic customs, and is critical of suggestions that the "essence of religion" lies in the answers it offers to the question of meaning, which he sees as an approach that absolutizes the modern predicament. Religion, for Taylor, entails some sort of transcendence, especially the sense that there is some higher good, beyond human flourishing. Yet, in the meantime, the discussion has overcome his still rather sceptical view of this kind of a discourse, which he associates with a calling into question of human rationality and theoretical truth, although the situating of metaphysics in the context of social life, global

481 Taylor's discussion of immanent materialism can be found in Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, pp. 360-8, 398-401, 541-550.

history and in an expressive functioning of language is recognized by Taylor.[482]

In conclusion, both Habermas and Taylor are concerned not with the survival of religion as a species in danger of becoming extinct, but with arbitrating the sharp distinction between the natural and the religious, the immanent and the transcendent, and with finding ways to integrate the religious into the public sphere. Both see the exclusion of religion from the public sphere as undermining the solidarity and creativity they seek.

Habermas emphasizes mutual conjunctive agreement by presenting the translation of religious language for religious people on the one hand, and soft naturalism for non-religious people oriented by scientific naturalism on the other. Taylor stresses mutual recognition and co-operation in common pursuits by making clear the possibility of the transcendent in the immanent frame.

Habermas's argument leaves open the worries that the translation proviso is necessarily asymmetrical, and that the call to recognize explicitly religious voices in the public sphere is at least partially instrumental. Taylor's approach is often criticized as an unduly idealist mode of socio-historical understanding and a romanticist view of our current alienation.[483] Yet despite these concerns,

---

482 Meave Cooke, *Language and Reason: A Study in Habermas's Pragmatics* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997).

483 Gregor McLennan, 'Spaces of Post-secularism', in J. Beaumont, A. Molendijk and C. Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the*

and despite the two scholars' tendency to take a cursory attitude to opposing views, their reflexive insight is very valid and effective.

4.3.3.4. An open space for mutual possibilities between the secular and the religious

Notwithstanding intellectually thoughtful consideration on the relationship between the immanent and the transcendent beyond an aggressive atheistic naturalism and a self-assertive classic transcendentalism, the negative view of transcendence should be revisited in the practical sense. Here, it is important to note that, in spite of the axiomatic possibilities and positivity of the transcendent, many people still seem rather disinclined to accommodate religious transcendence. A possible reason for such denial or deferral may be the tendency to merge traditional religious elements with a transcendent disposition. To put it concretely, the root notion of anti-transcendence is a contrast not to the transcendent itself, but to religious transcendent characteristics combined with religious elements such as 1) religious hierarchical authority, 2) external reference for ethics, and 3) providential frame of authoritarian metaphysical theism.

The first of these relates to an anti-sympathy against religious authority combined with the transcendent, which is linked to anticlericalism. Historically, the sacred was situated in a hierarchical world, a great chain of being. The

Postsecular: the Religious, the Political, the Urban (Leiden: Boston, 2010), pp.41-62.

secularist critique was practically directed against ecclesiastical institutions, which were seen to be authoritarian and repressive; and it developed a philosophical, aesthetic, and moral argument against the very idea of a personal God.

Secondly, a direct appeal to the absolute, a transcendent notion of ultimate truth, is a step outside the bounds of reasoned public discourse. Such arguments presume that absolutes, or higher-order value, are absent from ordinary rational discourse and introduced only by religious belief. Human beings, as moral agents, can exercise their duties only when they are free, and in exercising these moral duties, there is no need to posit a superior being, hence morality does not require authoritative religious presuppositions.

Thirdly, transcendence combined with a providential frame of authoritarian metaphysical theism certainly deconstructs autonomous selection and decision making. Of course, in this context, the rejection of transcendence is the only option, because this world is not mechanically operated by a providential frame.

In conclusion, transcendence as the possibility to go beyond the natural and the immanent is quite different from a metaphysical absoluteness combined with traditional religious elements. It does not mean the absolute, the other, or the authoritative; rather, it can operate with autonomy.

On the other hand, the argument seems to be one more postmodern epistemic

frame in which religion, based on its difference from the non-religious, should be accepted by and coexist with civil society, as long as it is reasonably adapted to the secular world. The case is also postmodern corollary that like Derrida the deep suspicion of fixed, binary polarities that characterizes modern thinking frame is final destination.[484]

To go beyond the immanent and the transcendent does not mean simply to construct a transitional zone between them; nor does it mean co-existence. Habermas and Taylor's suggestions of "soft naturalism" and "immanent transcendence" are to pave the way to overcome this clear dichotomous view within a world in which the natural and the supernatural, the immanent and the transcendent are distinguished, and more significantly, where the transcendent makes sense most clearly in the immanent frame of a firm footing in the "natural" as an autonomous order.

In this vein, denying transcendence means denying the fact that human life finds any point beyond itself. The strong sense that has permeated human history, that there is something more, that human life aims beyond itself, is stamped as an illusion, and a dangerous illusion at that, one that always threatens to breed disastrous, anti-human consequences. The denial gives rise to what we might call an exclusive humanism, that is, one based

484 Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, corrected, ed. and trans. by Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore and London: Johns Hokins University Press, [1967]1997), p.323.

exclusively on a notion of human flourishing, which recognizes no valid aim beyond this. Taylor explains the transcendent as seeing a point beyond such human flourishing:

> *Acknowledging the transcendent means being called to a change of identity. (…) a calling for a radical decentring of the self, in relation with God. (…) So acknowledging the transcendent means aiming beyond life, or opening yourself to a change in identity. (…) Renouncing, aiming beyond life, not only takes you away, but also brings you back to flourishing.*[485]

Christian faith can be seen in the same terms. We should note that religion saturates reality rather than being side-lined.[486] However, this view does not necessarily relate to institutionalized religion, as it is about what religion is, or can be about.

4.4. Reconsideration on the Value and Potential of Christianity as Reflexive Agent in a Re-modern Paradigm

More radical reconsideration on the role of religion in society and politics can be traced in the remarkable renewed interest among many leading European intellectuals who are normally associated with irreligious or areligious currents. Alain Badiou (1937∽), Giorgio Agamben (1942∽), Terry Eagleton (1943

485 Charles Taylor, *Sesokhwaoa Hyundeamoonmyung* [*Secularization and the Modern Civilization*], pp.358-361.

486 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, p.816.

⁓) and Slavoj Žižek (1949⁓),[487] among others, have been fascinated by the ability of religion, particularly Christianity, to inspire people to monumental projects. Their primary concern is not to oppose religious faith, but to understand it and its inherent potential, particularly in its socio-political concerns.[488]

We encounter, in this context, the promise of a return to a social philosophical mode for religion. Theology or religious studies, rather than being marginally disregarded in many faculties of humanities and social science, are increasingly being seen as necessary for the interdisciplinary analysis of our contemporary situation, and further, are reconfiguring the very makeup of the humanities in general, with disciplines like philosophy, political science, literature, history, psychoanalysis, and critical theory in particular feeling the impact of this return.[489] It seems that Christianity's primary and immediate significance is being seen in terms of a worldly spirit. As Eagleton has pointed out, "one of the places to which those radical impulses have migrated is – of

487 Alain Badiou, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, trans. by Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2001); *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, trans. by Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003); Slavoj Žižek, *On Belief* (London and NY: Routledge, 2001); *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003); *The Fragile Absolute: Or Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?* (London and NY: Verso, 2000); Creston Davis, "Introduction: Holy Saturday or Resurrection Sunday? Staging an Unlikely Debate", in Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, *The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic*?, ed. with an introduction by Creston Davis, (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2009), p.3; Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998); *The Coming Community* (Minneapolis: Minneapolis UP, 2001); Terry Eagleton, *Reason, Faith and Revolutions: Reflections on the God Debates* (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2009); *Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Ethics* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).

488 Sven-Eric Liedman, "Intellectual Challenges from Religion", in Lisbet Christoffersen, Hans Raun Iversen, Hanne Petersen and Margit Warburg (eds.), *Religion in the 21st Century: Challenges and Transformations* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), pp.51-66.

489 Creston Davis, "Holy Saturday or Resurrection Sunday?", p.3.

all things – theology".[490]

This situation is well expressed in Creston Davis's introduction to the debate between Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank.

> *For whatever the epoch of "modernity" really is - and I am convinced that we will struggle for a coherent conception of it for a long time to come - reason's stance against myth, superstition, and the theological in order to access reason, pure and autonomous reason, has proved at least wanting, if not downright irrational. If the middle Ages failed to employ enough reason (which is debatable, if not a flat-out stereotype, in itself), then secular modernity has employed too much of it (even to the point of contradiction!). Thus, to hazard an admittedly premature conjecture (and this is my conjecture): the return to the theological in our time may be a call, once again, to strike a balance between reason and myth, between belief and faith, between political struggle and the secular state, and between the divine and the human.*[491]

As Davis states, it is axiomatic that secular modernity enhances human well-being, on a scale unprecedented in human history, but at the same time it can imprison and dehumanize people, by subjecting them to an unrelenting series of rationalistic and mechanic rules and disciplines. Secular thought still has insufficient expressive potentiality and lacks sensitivity in dealing with

490 Terry Eagleton, *Reason, Faith and Revolutions: Reflections on the God Debates*, p.167.

491 Creston Davis, "Holy Saturday or Resurrection Sunday?", p.5.

unsuccessful lives, unreasonable life plans, or polluted societal conditions. Religion stands as better equipped. Thus, this philosophy has something to learn from religion, as long as religion is freed from dogmatism and coercive guilt.

It would be overstating the case to claim that the European intellectuals are caught up in religious belief or support a descriptive post-secular situation. Nevertheless, they exhibit a kind of fascination that stems from the same historical situation, typically referred to as postmodern or post-secular. The criticism against modernity that originated in France in the 1960s was very intense. So-called postmodern philosophy showed how violent and fabricated "the truth" pursued by modern philosophy might be. The criticism of philosophers like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean-François Lyotard led to dismissal of "the truth", "the subject", and "causes", the reckless pursuit of which had suppressed and excluded the potential of all else. Postmodern philosophy declares that philosophy or theology no longer have to yearn for the truth.

In fact, thinkers such as Badiou, Agamben, Eagleton and Žižek express various misgivings about some of the meanings attributed to the post-secular, such as a descriptive notion of the contemporary situation by those who want to promote a particular religion. Their discussions are not about a disembodied belief, but rather concern the true radical nature of Christianity and its political import.

In this context, this section will explore important issues with reference to two major figures, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, focusing on truth, subject and materialist theology. From dialogue between theology and social philosophy, the issues discussed will show the potential of Christianity as reflexive agent and cosmopolitan actor, while at the same time pointing out its intrinsic defects.

4.4.1. Alain Badiou's Evental Truth as Procedure towards an Interruptive Event beyond Private, Exclusive, and Absolute truth

The notion of "the truth" is a pivotal contested issue in the question of how religion reproduces value in socio-political action for global progress as an alternative to "lost causes", because ethical direction can arise only in relation to truth. Alain Badiou contends that ethics designates above all "the incapacity, so typical of the contemporary world, to name and strive for a Good", and also "the absence of any project, of an emancipatory politics, or any genuinely collective cause".[492] Badiou's notion of the truth process is important in understanding his formulation of ethics, for he believes that "the only genuine ethics is of processes of truth",[493] and if humans do not participate in a truth process, they are, Badiou says, "beneath Good and Evil".[494]

Notwithstanding the fact that the notion of the truth is decisive in understanding

492 Alain Badiou, *Ethics*, pp. 30, 31.

493 *Ibid.* p. 28.

494 *Ibid.* p. 59.

the formulation of ethics for socio-political action, postmodern philosophy expelled that notion, declaring that philosophy or theology would no longer have to yearn for the truth, and that there is no universal truth. In fact, the belligerent postmodern approach to the truth concept was unleashed as a countervailing process to the modern notion of truth that is possessed privately and proven right by the modern monolithic schema of either religion or reason. The postmodern criticism argued that to enter the socio-political arena making public claims on the basis of private and exclusive truths, irrespective of whether these are based on religion or reason, can be a source of violence and an oppressive mechanism. Therefore, because reason as well as religion is based on a belief in its monopoly on truth, it should no longer be considered a truth, but an anti-truth.

On this point, our question should be: how can Christianity overcome the private and exclusive truth and reconstruct the new notion of the truth? In an attempt to reconsider the notion of truth and reformulate it based on a "re-modern paradigm", this study deploys Badiou's [495] notion of the truth process.[496] Badiou recalled "the truth" that had been expelled by postmodern philosophy, and attempted to reconstruct a new truth concept not only to evade the modern totality and unqualified power of truth, but also to overcome the relativism, scepticism or nihilism of postmodern philosophy. However, he does

495 Alain Badiou (1937-) is the most significant contemporary French philosopher.

496 For a more in-depth account of "re-modernities", See Chapter 2 sections 2.1.3. and 2.1.4.

not seek to deny all of postmodern philosophy. Rather, he represents a truth that is definitely different from the traditional and conventional truth, absorbing the criticism of postmodern philosophy. In *Ethics*, Badiou addresses a new dimension of truth.[497]

As Peter Hallward states in the preface to Badiou's *Ethics*: "The realm of knowledge is essentially static, 'objective,' and structured according to the interests of those who govern and dominate the situation."[498] Yet, the truth, by contrast, is neither reducible to objective knowledge, nor a static and finite proposition classified by an identification system. Rather it is involved in acts of faith.[499] The truth, for Badiou, consists in the real process of a fidelity to what he calls an "event".

> *I shall call a truth the real process of a fidelity to an event: that which this fidelity produces in the situation. (…) Essentially, a truth is the material course traced, within the situation, by the evental supplementation. It is thus an immanent break. "Immanent" because a truth proceeds in the situation, and nowhere else – there is no heaven of truths. Break because what enables the truth-process – the event – meant nothing according to the prevailing language and established knowledge of the situation.*[500]

497 Alain Badiou, *Ethics*. The book should be regarded as divided into two parts: the first three chapters constitute a vigorous attack on the ideological foundation and assumptions of contemporary ethics, and the final two chapters propose "the ethics of truths".

498 Peter Hallward, "Translator's Introduction", in Alain Badiou, *Ethics*, p. ix.

499 Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, trans. by Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2005).

500 Alain Badiou, *Ethics*, pp. 41-2.

Here, he emphasizes that a truth is not a transcendentally pre-existing idea or dogmatic principle; rather, it is achieved through a procedure of evental fidelity. Thus, truth is not the champion leading us from the front, but a new way of being that follows the bearer of fidelity to the event. Here the event refers to an unpredictable supplement which "cannot be reduced to its ordinary inscription in what there is"; which "bring[s] to pass something other than the situation, opinions, and instituted knowledges"; which is unnameable and ungraspable within the context in which it occurs; and which "vanishes as soon as it appears".[501] To think from the perspective of its evental supplement and to engage in the supplement is an evental fidelity. Thus, fidelity to the event is the process that facilitates a real radical break with the status quo within the context in which the event takes place.[502]

For Badiou, truth is the material manifestation of the event through history, a process that can take place only through the faithful participation of the subject who takes part in the truth. "Whatever the circumstances, a truth is something that takes place at a particular time and under particular circumstances: to enter into the composition of a subject of truth can only be something that happens to you".[503]

"A truth-process is heterogeneous to the instituted knowledge of the

501 *Ibid.* pp.41,67.

502 *Ibid.* p. 41.

503 *Ibid.* p. xxxi

situation",[504] but it is also "the sole source of new knowledges".[505] Thus, "we shall say that the truth forces knowledges".[506] "Truth for Badiou thus evokes the logic of being true to something, of holding true to a principle, person, or ideal"[507] and the act of remaining true to the "event". Further, Badiou's truth means neither monothetic totality nor universality, rather always "truths" as plural forms. For him, truths crop up in multiple conditions and indiscernible contexts. If we do not acknowledge the event, we cannot grasp Badiou's truth notion. To be faithful to an event is to move within the situation that this event has supplemented, by thinking the situation according to the event. This, of course – since the event was excluded by all the regular laws of the situation – compels the subject to invent a new way of being and acting in the situation. Badiou explains a truth-process using love as an example.

> *It is clear that under the effect of a loving encounter, if I want to be really faithful to it, I must completely rework my ordinary way of living my situation. (…) An evental fidelity is a real break in the specific order within which the event took place.*[508]

Only when we can be faithful to an encounter with the other, and transform oneself to fit to the other, can we be a real subject. Like truths, so too the

---

504 *Ibid.* p.43.

505 *Ibid.* p.70.

506 *Ibid.* p.70. Forcing is what happens between truth and knowledge. For a more in-depth account of "force", see p.87, note no.2.

507 Peter Hallward, "Translator's Introduction", in Alain Badiou, *Ethics*, p. x.

508 Alain Badiou, *Ethics*, p.42.

subject does not exist in advance. Human beings only become subjects when they open themselves up to an "event" and remain faithful to its "truth".[509] This affirmation of and devotion to the truth process might be summarized in the phrase "Keep going!"[510]

Shifting our attention to Badiou's *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, we are able to see how all of this may be applied in the case of religion.[511] There, he presents the potential of religion, particularly Christianity, as a producer of truth processes and as a truth-bearing ethical subject. Badiou's work reveals many insights on both the potential of Christianity and its intrinsic limitations. It implies that there is a big gap between the dogmatic truth and the evental truth.

Badiou construes the event of Christ as an interruptive event in Paul's case, one that is beyond the opinions of the time. According to Badiou, one becomes an authentic human subject, as opposed to a mere anonymous member of the biological species, through one's passionate allegiance to such a revelation. As Eagleton expresses it, "truth is also a question of solidarity, involving as it usually does the birth of a believing community such as the church. This commitment opens up a new order of truth, and being faithful to this truth is what Badiou means by the ethical."[512]

---

509 *Ibid.* p.43.

510 *Ibid.* p.79.

511 Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, trans. by Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003).

512 Terry Eagleton, *Reason, Faith and Revolutions: Reflections on the God Debates*, p.118.

4.4.2. Slavoj Žižek's Materialist Theology and New Subject

The nihilism of capitalism and the self-enclosed structure of materialism stimulated thinkers to find a new way forward, a new source of hope. This ultimately opened the portal to theological discourse. Slavoj Žižek keeps an eye on Christianity, along with Marxism-Leninism, as the only effective counterweight to unbridled capitalism or militant neo-liberalism.[513] His thinking is directed towards overcoming post-structuralism and postmodernism, and establishing a new subjectivity.

> *A new field*[514] *is emerging to which the well- known designations "poststructuralism," "postmodernism," or "deconstructionism" no longer apply; even more radically, this field renders problematic the very feature shared by Derrida and his great opponent, Habermas: that of respect for Otherness. (…) The main feature of this field is its theologico-political turn: a decidedly materialist focus on theological topics (in a mode that totally differs from the late-Derridean negative theology of Otherness).*[515]

According to Žižek, post-structuralism, which began in criticism of modern subjectivity, denies the possibility of the subject by denying the subject itself. Ultimately, post-structuralism operates as a conservative ideology to confirm

513 Slavoj Žižek, "The Thrilling Romance of Orthodoxy", in Creston Davis, John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek, (eds.), *Theology and the Political* (Durham, NC, and London: Duke UP, 2005), pp.52-71; In Defense of Lost Causes (London and NY: Verso, 2009).

514 He refers to Giorgio Agamben and Alain Badiou as the main figures of the new field and also would immodestly include himself in this series.

515 Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, *The Monstrosity of Christ*, pp.254-255.

the maintenance of the status quo. Žižek points to the “liberalistic cynicism” and “religious fundamentalism” of the “perfect ideological supplement” of capitalism produced under post-structuralism.[516] It is true that religious belief, taking a perverse form, operates as a ruling ideology to manipulate conformism in capitalist society.[517]

However, to reveal a perverse aspect of religion is not the same as discarding religious faith or giving up the value of the Christian legacy. While Žižek admits Christianity’s perverse core, he nevertheless sets his sights upon the potential of Christianity as a unique emancipatory exit from the deadlock of capitalism. He assumes that Christianity is able to assemble devout multitudes that yearn for something other than consumption or rapacity in a time of unbridled liberalism.

Žižek’s thought can be regarded as a socio-philosophical response to the question: Is it possible to resist? That is, is it possible that we might be awakened as the subject of reflective-sensibility and praxis-sensibility? Here, his major idea is to sound out the possibility of the new subject and the self as a defensive agent of “lost causes”, i.e. to cultivate the universal subject and subjectivity for revolution. If so, How?

On this point Žižek’s basic framework is to unite the theological and the material to fund resistance to capitalist nihilism, i.e. to recover or reconnect

516 Slavoj Žižek, *On Belief*, p.12.

517 Slavoj Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*.

transcendence with a militant materialism. This presupposes a fundamental reality which he redefines through the kenosis of God in Christ, seen in the event of the death of Christ. Žižek, following Badiou, subscribes to the theme of the interruptive event. He argues that "God is no longer the Highest Being watching over our destiny, but a name for radical openness, for the hope of change, for the always-to-come Otherness, etc."[518]

Žižek's "God" reveals himself in a radically self-emptying process, to the point where God's love for the world results in sacrificing his own transcendence in order to be more fully God. Žižek takes God's act of revelation without reservation - revelation means absolute kenosis, after which transcendence has now arrived in the heart of the material world completely devoid of the protection that transcendence guarantees.[519] This theo-political discussion is expressed precisely in "the subject without subjectivity" or "the subject without the real".

Therefore, for Žižek, "the breakthrough of faith" has an ambivalent meaning. On the one hand, penetration through faith is the only possible way to bring about the generation of something new, by completely changing the existing order, while on the other, one has to break through religious faith itself, desiring for the Big other's power.

Following Badiou and Žižek, Christianity is taken to be a universal religion as

518 Slavoj Žižek, "Dialectical Clarity versus the Misty Conceit of Paradox", in Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, *The Monstrosity of Christ*, p.256.

519 Creston Davis, "Holy Saturday or Resurrection Sunday?", p.18.

a defensive subject of lost causes, through the interconnection between Christian religion and an idealist materialism without any collapse into a triumphant celebration of the ideal. In such an arrangement, societal participation and solidarity occur only in circumstances of weakness rather than in celebration and aspiration. In both cases, religion, and particularly Christianity, appears as a key "site of resistance" against the alienation of what is perceived as a singularly western modernity. There is scope for rapprochement in the form of bringing love, hope and charity into praxis, as for example on the issues of homelessness and fair trade. Both of these socio-philosophical implications can indeed be traced to the so-called "postsecular" turn, corresponding to the "scepticism" about the secular narratives of Enlightenment.[520]

4.5. Conclusion

As Craig Calhoun suggests, the categorization of religion as an essentially private affair is misguided; indeed, religion has never been essentially private.[521] Processes of modernization do not necessarily lead to a weakening

520 Paul Cloke, "Theo-ethics and Radical Faith-based Praxis in the Postsecular City", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), pp.223-41.

521 Craig Calhoun, "Secularism, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere", in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford and NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.54-74; José Casanova, "The Religious Situation in Europe", in Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (eds.), *Secularization and the World Religions* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), pp.75-91.

of the significance of religious faith and practices in society. Rather, the process of modernization could be accompanied by a religious transformation. The public visibility of religion is likely to continue into the future, whether as institutional religion or as individualized types of religion beyond the religious-secular cleavage.

“The privatization of religion” is distorted and misunderstood, not only by unreflective secularism, the liberal understanding of global civil society that greatly underestimates the place and role of religious organizations or imagines cosmopolitanism as a sort of escape from culture into a realm of reason where religion has little influence; but also because of the obscure and muddled use of certain terms in the social scientific fields, particularly the relationship of privatization to differentiation and individualization. In short, privatization cannot be equated with either of those terms. While differentiation and individualization can lead to privatization, conversely either process can, and often does, result in the public presence of religion in various ways.

The paradoxical landscape of the renewed visibility of religion in the public sphere is central to this chapter’s empirical observation. The public presence of religion is taking place concurrently with the privatization of religion. Whereas the social influence of the religious institutions and the churches have gradually declined, at the same time Christianity remains a specific source of meaning and moral potential in schools, social welfare, academia, politics, and international development.

With regard to the public presence of Christianity, it is important to note that this does not represent a return of religion to a previous order, but rather that religious morphology, religiosity, and its way of engaging in society have reformatted based on individualized forms of religion, and have taken on a new role and various new actors in the public sphere.

In this vein, it can be held that religion should not be read merely as a "dependent variable" to social change such as processes of rationalization, social differentiation, and cultural pluralization, but rather as an "independent variable" that can influence the public and social trends.[522] Religion and modernity are not incompatible in principle; rather, many examples can be found in which religion takes on modern characteristics and has even been the vehicle of modernization processes as a politically, economically, socially, and culturally stimulating factor. The spread of democratic civil society greatly increased the opportunity for religious actors to compete freely for political influence. Renewed recognition of this situation during the second half of the twentieth century led to significant changes in the social attitudes of Christianity, as well as in the attitude of civil society to religion.

From the normative perspective, some continue to express concern about the renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere. Just as a neighbour may remain a source of both surprise and irritation, so the public presence of

522 R.S. Warner, "Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 98.5 (1993): 1044-1093

religion has socio-political relevance, but can also have an anti-political tendency. Indeed, the return of religion to the social scientific agenda is to a large extent a product of the wide-ranging public relevance of religion, especially with regard to immanence and transcendence. Furthermore, a wider assessment of public faith discourages the drawing of a fixed binary divide and the mutual "othering" of faith and the secular. Such an assessment must involve a moving beyond particular projects of achieving mutual understanding and conceiving of progress in entirely secular terms. In this sense, consideration of the post-secular public discourse can potentially be helpful for improving the way we think about new projects of mutual understanding and social solidarity based on choice rather than mere imposition or inheritance.

From a more radical perspective, there is, among many leading European intellectuals, a remarkable renewed interest in the role of religion in society and politics. Their primary concern is not with faith itself, based on religious doctrine, but with its inherent potential, particularly in its socio-political concerns. The discussion shows that Christianity has potential as a reflexive agent in the global age, but also intrinsic limitations which it must overcome to fulfil that role.

The next question is no longer whether religion will remain private, but how the public presence of Christianity can be contained within acceptable limits, so that it does not present a major threat to our modern secular liberal democratic

structures. More significantly, the question should be how we can bring out the latent possibilities of religion, not demolish its potential along with the negative elements of religion. We must be careful that we do not “throw out the baby with the bathwater”.

Chapter 5. Conclusion: Toward Authentic Christianity in a Re-modern Paradigm: Ecclesiastical Dis-Re-establishment, Public Presence of Faith, and Integration of Christianity

As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, contrary to the "subtraction story" and "privatization of religion", Christianity has neither disappeared, nor retreated into the private realm. Rather, it has transformed itself into new forms with new characteristics, and continues to play a significant role in the public sphere, by engaging in society through new ways, a development that unleashes its potential as a reflexive agent for individuals, society, and the global community.[523]

This reflexive view on secularization also indicates that people today are neither more nor less religious than they may have been in the past, and no one region is more or less religious than other regions. Instead, contrary to the logic of subtraction, absence, or relegation, the condition of religious belief or the characteristics of religiosity are constantly changing, according to particular time and space, and to the prevailing educational, economic, political and socio-cultural context. Such change in the condition of religious

523 Markus Vinzent, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, Vol. 32. 2 (August 2011): 143–160; Marius C. Felderhof, *Revisiting Christianity: Theological Reflections* (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011); Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

belief brings about a concomitant change of religiosity, and the change of religiosity brings further change to religious form and the religious landscape. Yet, this does not imply that religious change is always a “dependent variable”. To put it another way, the whole process of the change is progressed through reciprocal action.

In this research, the individualization of religion is captured as the most prominent and fundamental phenomenon of religious transformation. In short, the individualization of religion means a new journey for religiosity free from religious authority and religious doctrinal discipline. “Legitimization of belief is moving from religious authorities, guarantors of the truth of belief, to individuals themselves, who are responsible for the authenticity of their own spiritual approach.”[524]

We can easily trace such religious individualization in the transformation of Christianity examined in Chapter 3: in the global expansion of Ev+Pen+Ch Christianity as church-based individualized types of Christianity combining individualized religiosity and spiritual mutation of existing religious institutions; in the mushrooming of implicit Christianity combining individualized religiosity and spiritual faith; and in FBSOs, which combine individualized religiosity and life-oriented action.

The concept of individualization of religion as a sociological framework proves

524 Hervieu-Léger, Danièle, "In Search of Certainties: The Paradoxes of Religiosity in Societies of High Modernity", *The Hedgehog Review* Vol. 8.1/2 (2006): 59-68.

the “transformation of Christianity” as the possibility and potential of Christianity at the individual and social level. Further, sociological contemplation on transformation of Christianity posits that Christianity transforms itself from religious institutionalized religiosity into more individualized, life-oriented, and community-oriented religiosity. Such transformation does not necessarily imply the weakening of religious institutions or churches, as we witnessed with regard to the global expansion of evangelical mutations. The possibility of religious institutions or of the churches depends not on what the advancement of secular reason and naturalism may show, but on how they transform themselves and whether they continue to make sense. This study defines the whole picture of such transformation as “ecclesiastical dis-re-establishment”.

Markus Vinzent’s theological reflection also shows that “individualization of religion” is verified by the notion of the kingdom of God, through an important biblical insight: “The kingdom of God is within you” is opposed to “The kingdom of God is amongst you”.[525] Religious individualization allows us to hold Christian faith even at a position far removed from religious institutions and theological authority, as long as individuals do not give up the communicative process with the whole community. This sociological and theological

525 Markus Vinzent, “Salus Extra Ecclesiam? Meister Eckhart’s Institutionenskepsis“, in Dietmar Mieth & Britta Müller-Schauenburg (eds.), *Mystik, Recht und Freiheit: Religiöse Erfahrung und kirchliche Institutionen im Spätmittelalter* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2012), pp.158-168. The Latin phrase *extra Ecclesiam nulla salus* means: "outside the Church there is no salvation". The 1997 Catechism of the Catholic Church explained this as "all salvation comes from Christ the Head through the Church which is his Body”.

discussion can be best explicated in a re-modern framework with regard to the feature that the transformation of Christianity indicates the refurbishment of Christianity toward individual spirituality and socio-political publicity, and in a post-secular framework[526] with reference to the feature that it also indicates multiple–directional mobility of both institutional and individual religiosities.

In light of this, the assumption that secularization theory is irresistible must be dismissed; rather, a new epistemological changeover is inevitable. Therefore, the focus of our discussion now should no longer be the question of "religious or secular?", but that of "what religiosity, and for what reason?"

Another important point in discussion about the transformation of Christianity is the renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere. According to the process of transformation, while some parts of Christianity remain as marginalized private religiosity, yet other parts have continued social influence in the public sphere. This possibility of social location and role of Christianity is to do not with the advancement of "differentiation" or "individualization" discussed in Chapter 4.1, but with Christians' own ways of making sense of how to live well and how to do well, whether as individuals, groups, or the church. This study defines such possible and sustainable visibility in the public sphere as the "public presence" of Christianity. Empirical observation on this

526 Of course, here the meaning of "post-secular" is employed to refer to the concept specified in Chapter 2, sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4: not as a clear descriptive position driven by a strong anti-secular thrust, but as a thoroughly reflexive account of transformation of Christianity, a change in the spectrum of consciousness on possibilities of religiosity, and a normative reflection on the religious.

phenomenon can be traced primarily in two dimensions: in socio-political engagement in public matters by the Christian churches, and implicitly in the various FBSOs which represent individualized forms of religiosity. This can also be regarded as a radical transformation of Christian morphology, i.e. outside of religious domains. Importantly, the public presence of Christianity is performed through "participation" and "solidarity", not through the dominance of Christianity through Christendom.[527] The end of Christendom does not mean the end of Christianity. It might even mean a new beginning.[528]

"Participation" and "solidarity" represent a creative action principle to overcome the non-committed theo-socio-political philosophy spawned by the postmodern culture and socio-political stance.[529] When we move from the statement that religion has ceased to play any role in world politics to the assertion that religion plays a key role in world politics, this does not imply a victory for the fundamentalists, but indicates the start of a shift towards a cosmopolitan way of seeing.[530] This insight is also an important re-modern approach to the possibility and potential of Christianity.

In this context, the belligerent neo-atheist attack on religion under slogans such as "God is not great", "the God delusion", and "religion is full of poison to

---

527 Christendom is a condition where the whole society or culture is impregnated with Christian belief and practice; where the society and culture is united around some form of Christian belief, and belonging to society is connected with belonging to the church.

528 See Chapter 4 "Religion Today" in Charles Taylor, *Sesokhwaoa Hyundeamoonmyung* [*Secularization and the Modern Civilization*] (Seoul: Tasan Memorial Lecture, 2002).

529 Hans Joas, *The Creativity of Action*, trans. by Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp.255-6.

530 See Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own*, Chapter 4, and pp.225-7.

society" comes out of a biased normative perspective. Neo-atheist thinkers still believe that religion will eventually recede and hope that it will do so sooner rather than later - before it does more damage. Their statements are preoccupied with an ill-natured interpretation of religiosity, and their most critical critique of religion is based on an accusation of religious private and exclusive truth. Yet, against this argument, this research focuses on a revised Christianity that is involved in public issues and communicates with civil society through "entanglement". The conceptualization of "entanglement" opens up possibilities for the relationship of Christianity to multiple social realities, and an interplay of Christianity with diverse social subjects.

In social science, countless arguments have been conducted concerning the role of religion in politics. Habermas has discussed the possibility and usefulness of religion in natural society, while Taylor has explored the importance of transcendence in the immanent frame, re-illuminating the possibility of religiosity and the religious in the late modern world. The conceptualization of Habermas's "soft naturalism" in post-metaphysical thinking and of Taylor's "immanent transcendence", although they tend to the ideal rather than the practical, pave the way for progress beyond a clear dichotomous view within a world in which the natural and the supernatural, the immanent and the transcendent, are distinguished; and more significantly, the transcendent makes sense most clearly in the immanent frame. This raises questions not only with regard to the public funding of religion, but also with

regard to whether religious arguments have a legitimate place in public debate More radically, for left-wing European intellectuals like Badiou, Agamben, Eagleton and Žižek, religion, particularly Christianity, is reconsidered as a challenge, ignition point or criterion that can address the atmosphere of non-directional crisis and fragmentation of value created by postmodern philosophy, when all norms have evaporated. They assume that Christianity is the only serious challenger to the militant neo-liberalism that predominates in our times.[531] Žižek argues that "religion appears as a key site of resistance against the alienations of what is perceived as a singularly Western modernity".[532] From this point of view, important elements of enlightened secularity in particular can be understood, not as Christianity's defeat, but as its displacement. However, it does not mean that they are caught up in renewed religious belief.

Their discussions concern not a disembodied belief, but the true radical nature of Christianity and its political import. In this context, their socio-philosophical application to theology can indeed be regarded as a "post-secular" epistemic turn, corresponding to the "scepticism" about the secular narratives of Enlightenment.[533] Juxtaposition and integration between theology and social

531 Sven-Eric Liedman, "Intellectual Challenges from Religion", in Lisbet Christoffersen, Hans Raun Iversen, Hanne Petersen and Margit Warburg (eds.), *Religion in the 21st Century: Challenges and Transformations* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), pp.51-66; Paul Cloke, "Emerging Postsecular Rapprochement in the Contemporary City", in Justin Beaumont and Christopher Baker (eds.), *Postsecular Cities: Space, Theory and Practice* (London and NY: Continuum, 2011).

532 Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, *The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic*?, ed. with an introduction by Creston Davis, (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2009), pp.255-256.

533 Paul Cloke, "Theo-ethics and Radical Faith-based Praxis in the Postsecular City", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin

philosophy, focusing on agenda for the whole of society, like truth, subject and materialist theology, present the potential of Christianity as reflexive agent and cosmopolitan actor and possibility, going beyond the intrinsic defects of Christianity in a re-modern paradigm.

In conclusion, while the trend of secularization has evidently made deep and extensive progress in many areas around the world during the last several centuries, the historical evidence also shows counter-examples where the significance of religion has increased. In contrast to secular modernity, the post-secular view, through reflexion on the transformation, public presence, and potential of Christianity, presents various routes for Christianity as a reflexive agent for the global society.[534] Further, I argue that evaluating the strength of Christianity in any society has more to do with the integrity of the Christian church and religiosity within the whole society, and this has to be constantly re-assessed, however difficult that may be. To what extent will a Christianity that has undergone an inner renewal be able to open its mind to the individualization specific to the modern age so as to gain a new religious vitality? In this respect, the question of mediation or, in D. Bonhoeffer's term, of "who is Christ for us today" is still very much alive.

Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban*, pp.223-41.

534 Ulrich Beck, *A God of One's Own*, p.158.

Bibliography

Publications

Abeysekara, Ananda, *The Politics of Postsecular Religion: Mourning Secular Futures* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2008)

Adamson, Glenn and Jane Pavitt (eds.), *Postmodernism: Style and Subversion 1970-1990* (London: V&A Publishing, 2011)

Agamben, Giogio, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998)

_____, *The Coming Community* (Minneapolis: Minneapolis UP, 2001)

Albert, Mathias, Barry Burzan and Michael Zürn (eds.), *Bringing Sociology to International Relations: World Politics as Differentiation Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013)

Alexander, Jeffry C., "Modern, Anti, Post and Neo", *New Left Review*, Vol. 210 (1995): 63-101

Almond, Gabriel A., R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, *Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003)

Ammerman, Nancy T. (ed.), *Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007)

Armstrong, Karen, *The Case for God: What Religion Really Means* (New York: Knopf, 2009)

Badiou, Alain, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, trans. by Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2001)

_____, *Being and Event*, trans. by Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2005)

_____, Saint Paul: *The Foundation of Universalism*, tans. by Ray

Brassier (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003)

Bailey, Edward I., *Implicit Religion in Contemporary Society* (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1997)

_____, *Implicit Religion: An Introduction* (London: Middlesex University Press, 1998)

Barker, Chris, *Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice* (London: Sage, 2005)

Barrett, David B., George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson (eds.), *World Christian Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001)

Barnett, Michael, "Where is the Religion?: Humanitarianism, Faith, and World Affairs", in Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft (eds.), *Rethinking Religion and World Affairs* (New York: Oxford UP, 2012)

Bauman, Zygmunt, *Holocaust and Modernity* (NY: Cornell UP, 1989)

_____, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Polity, 1989)

_____, *Modernity and Ambivalence* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991)

_____, *Intimations of Postmodernity* (London: Routledge, 1992)

_____, *Postmodernity and its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997)

_____, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000)

_____, *Liquid Life* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005)

Beaumont, Justin, "Transcending the Particular in Postsecular Cities", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban* (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2010)

Beaumont, Justin and Christopher Baker (eds.), *Postsecular Cities: Space, Theory and Practice* (London and NY: Continuum, 2011)

Beaumont, Justin and Paul Cloke (eds.), *Faith-Based Organizations and Exclusion in European Cities* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2012)

Beck, Ulrich, *Risk Society: Towards a new Modernity, trans. Mark* Ritter (London: Sage, 1992)

_____, *A God of One's Own: Religion's Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence, trans. Rodney Livingstone* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010)

_____, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order* (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 1994)

_____, Wolfgang Bonss, and Cristoph Lau, "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme", *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 20.2 (2003):1-33

Beck, Ulrich and Cristoph Lau, "Second Modernity as a Research Agenda: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations in the 'Meta-Change' of Modern Society", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 56.4 (2005): 525–57

Beck, Ulrich and Edgar Grande, "Varieties of Second Modernity: The Cosmopolitan Turn in Social and Political Theory and Research", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 61.3 (2010): 409–43

Beckford, James A., "The Return of Public Religion?: A Critical Assessment of a Popular Claim", Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, Vol. 23.2 (2010): 121-136

_____, "Public Religions and the Postsecular: Critical Reflections", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 51.1 (2012): 1–19

Bellah, Robert N., *Beyond Belief: Essay in Religion in a Post Traditional World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970)

Bender, Courtney, *Heaven's Kitchen: Living Religion at God's Love We Deliver* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003)

_____, *The New Metaphysicals: Spirituality and the American Religious Imagination* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010)

_____, "Things in their Entanglements", in Philip S. Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society* (NY and London: New York University Press and SSRC, 2012

Bennett, Jane, *The Enchantment of Modern Life* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001)

Berger, Brigitte and Hansfried Kellner, *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness* (NY: Random House, 1973)

Berger, Peter L., *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967)

_____, *The Social Reality of Religion* (London: Faber&Faber, 1967)

_____ (ed.), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999)

_____, "The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview" in Peter L. Berger (ed.), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999)

Berryman, Phillip, *Liberation Theology: Essential Facts about the Revolutionary Movement in Latin America and Beyond* (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1987)

Beyer, Peter, *Religions in Global Society* (London: Routledge, 2006)

_____, "Fundamentalism and the Pluralization of Value-Orientations", in Lisbet Christofferesen, Hans Raun Iversen, Hanne Petersen and Margit Warburg (eds.), *Religion in the 21st Century: Challenges and Transformations* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010)

Bhargava, Rajeev (ed.), *Secularism and Its Critics* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998)

Bloch, Ernst, *Atheism in Christianity: the Religion of the Exodus and the Kingdom*, with an introduction by Peter Thompson, trans. J.T. Swann (London and NY: Verso, 2009 [1972])

Blond, Phillip (ed.), *Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology* (London and NY: Routledge, 1997)

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, *Act and Being: Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology in Systematic Theology*, ed. Wayne Whitson Floyd Jr., trans. H. Martin Rumscheidt. *Works,* Vol. 2. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996)

Bourricaud, F., "Universal Reference and the Process of Modernization", in Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *Patterns of Modernity, Volume. 1: The West* (London: Continuum International Publishing, 1987)

Branzi, Andrea, *Learning from Milan: Design and the Second Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1988)

_____, *Weak and Diffuse Modernity: The World of Projects at the Beginning of the 21st Century* (Milan: Skira, 2006)

Bretherton, Luke, "Religion and the Salvation of Urban Politics: Beyond Co-option, Competition and Commodification", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010)

_____, "A postsecular politics? Inter-faith Relations as a Civic Practice", *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 79.2 (2011): 346–377

Brown, Callum G., *The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularization 1800-2000* (London: Routledge, 2001)

Bruce, Steve (ed.), *Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992)

_____, *God is Dead: Secularization in the West* (Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, 2002)

_____, *Politics and Religion* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003)

_____, *Secularization: In Defense of an Unfashionable Theory* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011)

_____, "Secularization and the Importance of Individualized Religion", *Hedgehog Review, Vol. 8.1/2* (Spring & Summer, 2006): 35-45

Buechler, Steven M., *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism* (Oxford University Press, 1999)

Buswell, Robert E. and Timothy S. Lee, *Christianity in Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006)

Calhoun, Craig (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1992)

_____, "Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere", in Craig Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992)

_____, "Afterword: Religion's Many Powers", in Edurado Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen (eds.), *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2011)

_____, "Secularism, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere", in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford and NY: Oxford UP, 2011)

Calhoun, Craig, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford and NY: Oxford University Press, 2011)

Calhoun, Craig, Eduardo Mendieta and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Habermas and Religion* (Malden, MA and Cambridge: Polity, 2013)

Campbell, William S., "Marius Felderhof's Contribution to the World of Religious Education", *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, Vol. 32.2 (2011): 119-123

Canzler, Weert, Vincent Kaufmann and Sven Kesselring (eds.), *Tracing Mobilities: Towards a Cosmopolitan Perspective* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008)

Caputo, John D., “Atheism, A/ theology and the Postmodern Condition”, in Michael Martin (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Atheism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)

Casanova, José, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994)

_____, “Globalizing Catholicism and the Return to a ‘Universal Church’”, in Susanne Rudolph and James Piscatori (eds.), *Transnational Religion and Fading States* (Boulder and CO: Westview, 1997)

_____, “Religion, the New Millennium and Globalization”, *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 62.4 (2001): 415-441

_____, “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective”, *The Hedgehog Review,* Vol. 8, (Spring & Summer, 2006): 7-22

_____, “Public Religions Revisited”, in Hent de Vries (ed.), *Religion: Beyond the Concept* (NY: Fordham UP, 2008)

_____, “The Religious Situation in Europe”, in Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (eds.), *Secularization and the World Religions* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009)

_____, “Religion Challenging the Myth of Secular Democracy”, in Lisbet Christoffersen, Hans Raun Iversen, Hanne Petersen and Margit Warburg (eds.), *Religion in the 21st Century: Challenges and Transformations* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010)

_____, “Religion in Modernity as Global Challenge”, in José Casanova and Hans Joas (eds.), *Religion und Die Umstrittene Moderne* (Verlag: Kohlhammer W., 2010)

_____, “The Secular, Secularization, Secularisms”, in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford and NY: Oxford University Press, 2011)

_____, “Rethinking Public Religions”, in Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft (eds.), *Rethinking Religion and World Affairs* (New York: Oxford UP, 2012)

Casanova, José and Hans Joas (eds.), *Religion und Die Umstrittene Moderne* (Verlag: Kohlhammer W., 2010)

Castelli, Elizabeth A., "Divining the Future Places of Religion: A Partial Response to Graham Ward, 'The Future of Religion'", *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 74.1 (2006): 187-191

Center for the Study of Global Christianity, *Christianity in its Global Context, 1970–2020: Society, Religion, and Mission* (South Hamilton: Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 2013)

Chapman, Rachael "Faith and the voluntary sector in urban governance: Distinctive yet similar?", in Adam Dinham, Robert Furbey and Vivien Lowndes (eds.), *Faith in the Public Realm: Controversies, Policies and Practices* (Bristol and Portland: Policy Press, 2009)

Choi, Jongchul, "Hanguk Kidokgyogyohoedeului Jeongchijeok Teado, 1972-1990" [The Political Attitude of Korean Church's Protestantism, 1972-1990], *KyongJe wa Sahoe [Economy and Society]*, Vol.16 (Winter,1992): 205-241

Christoffersen, Lisbet, "Intertwinement: A New Concept for Understanding Religion-Law Relations", *Nordic Journal of Religion and Society*, Vol. 19.2 (2006): 93-106

Christoffersen, Lisbet, Hans Raun Iversen, Hanne Petersen and Margit Warburg (eds.), *Religion in the 21st Century: Challenges and Transformations* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010)

Chung, Min-ho, *The Spirit of Capitalism in Korea: Tracking the Rapid Growth and Stagnation of the Korean Protestant Church in the 90s*, PhD thesis (The University of Birmingham, 2005)

Clark, Allen D., *Hanguk Kyohoesa [A History of the Church in Korea]* (Seoul: Christian Literature Society, 1973)

Cloke, Paul, "Theo-ethics and Radical Faith-based Praxis in the Postsecular City", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010)

_____, "Emerging Postsecular Rapprochement in the Contemporary City", in Justin Beaumont and Christopher Baker (eds.), *Postsecular Cities: Space, Theory and Practice* (London and NY:

Continuum, 2011)

Cooke, Meave, *Language and Reason: A Study in Habermas's Pragmatics* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997)

Court, Jürgen and Michael Klöcker (eds.), *Wege und Welten der Religionen: Forschungen und Vermittlungen* (Frankfurt: Verlag Otto Lembeck, 2009)

Cox, Harvey, *The Future of Faith* (NY: HarperCollins, 2009)

Cox, Jeffrey, "Secularization and other master-narratives of religion in modern Europe", *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 14.1 (2001): 24-35

_____, "Master Narratives of Long-Term Religious Change", in Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf (eds.), *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

Davelaar, Maarten, Jessica van den Toorn, Nynke de Witte, Justin Beaumont, and Corien Kuiper, *Faith-based Organizations and Social Exclusion in the Netherlands* (Leuven and The Hague: Acco, 2011)

Davie, Grace, "Believing Without Belonging: Is this the future of religion in Britain?" *Social Compass*, Vol. 37.4 (1990): 455–469

_____, *Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing without Belonging* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994)

_____, *Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000)

_____, *Europe: The Exceptional case: Parameters of Faith in the Modern World* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002)

_____, "Praying Alone? Church-going in Britain and Social Capital: A Reply to Steve Bruce", *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, Vol. 17.3 (2002): 329-334

_____, "New Approaches in the Sociology of Religion: A Western Perspective", *Social Compass*, Vol. 51.1 (2004): 73–84

_____, "Vicarious Religion: a Methodological Challenge", in Nancy T. Ammerman (ed.), *Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007)

Davie, Grace and Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *Identités Religieuses en Europe* (Paris: La Découverte, 1996)

Davis, Creston, "Introduction: Holy Saturday or Resurrection Sunday? Staging an Unlikely Debate", in Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, *The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?*, ed. with an introduction by Creston Davis (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2009)

Davis, Creston, John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek, (eds.), *Theology and the Political, with an introduction by Rowan Williams,* (Durham, NC and London: Duke UP, 2005)

Dawkins, *Richard, The God Delusion* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006)

Dennett, Daniel, *Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon* (New York: Penguin, 2007)

Depoortere, Frederiek, *Christ in Postmodern Philosophy: Gianni Vattimo, René Girard, and Slavoj Žižek* (London and NY: T&T Clack, 2008)

Derrida, Jacques, "différance" (1968), *Speech and Phenomena*, trans. David B. Allison (Evanstone: Northwestern UP, 1973)

_____, *Of Grammatology*, trans. by Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, [1967] 1997)

_____, *Acts of Religion*, edited with an introduction by Gil Anidjar (London: Routledge, 2001)

Derrida, Jacques and Gianni Vattimo (eds.), *Religion*, trans. David Webb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998)

Descartes, René, *Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy* (Fourth Edition) (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1998)

Dias, Candice and Justin Beaumont, "Postsecularism or Late Secularism? Faith Creating Place in the US", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin

Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban* (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2010)

Dierckx, Danielle, Jan Vranken and Wendy Kerstens (eds.), *Faith-based Organizations and Social Exclusion in European Cities: National Context Reports* (Leuven and The Hague: Acco, 2009)

Dinham, Adam, *Priceless, Unmeasurable: Faith-based Community Development in England in the 21st Century* (London: FbRN, 2007)

_____, *Faiths, Public Policy and Civil Society: Problems, Policies, Controversies* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)

_____, Robert Furbey and Vivien Lowndes (eds.), *Faith in the Public Realm: Controversies, Policies and Practices* (Bristol and Portland: Policy Press, 2009)

Durkheim, Émile, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life: A Study in Religious Sociology*, trans. Carol Cosman (New York: Oxford UP, [1915] 2001)

Dussel, Enrique, Ethics and Community, trans. R. Barr (New York: Orbis Books, 1998)

Eagleton, Terry, *The Illusions of Postmodernism* (Malden, Oxford, Melbourne and Berlin: Wiley-Blackwell, 1996)

_____, *Reason, Faith and Revolutions: Reflections on the God Debates* (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2009)

_____, *Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Ethics* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009)

Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (ed.), *Patterns of Modernity, Volume. 1: The West* (London: Continuum International Publishing, 1987)

_____, "Multiple Modernities", Daedalus, Vol. 129.1 (2000): 1-30

Fahle, Oliver, *Bilder der Zweiten Moderne: Serie moderner film*, Vol. 3 (Weimar, 2005)

Felderhof, Marius C., *Revisiting Christianity: Theological Reflections* (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011)

Fenn, Richard K., "Toward a New Sociology of Religion", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 2.1 (1972): 16-32

Foucault, Michel, *Discipline and Punish* (New York: Vintage, 1977)

_____, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* (NY: Pantheon Books, 1978)

_____, *Power and Knowledge* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980)

_____, *Power and Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (NY and Toronto: Random House, 1998)

Freston, Paul, *Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

Furbey, Robert, Adam Dinham, Richard Farnell (eds.), *Faith as Social Capital: Connecting or Dividing?* (Bristol: Policy Press & Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2006)

Gauchet, Marcel, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, trans. Oscar Burge (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997)

Giddens, Anthony, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990)

_____, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992)

_____, *Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998)

Girard, René, *Violence and the Sacred,* trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977)

Goodnight, Thomas G., "Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Controversy", *International Journal of Public Opinion*, Vol. 4.3, (1992): 243-255

Gorski, Philip S. and Ates Altinordu, "After Secularization?", *Annual Review of*

Sociology, Vol.34 (2008): 55-85

Gorski, Philip S., David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society* (NY and London: New York University Press and SSRC, 2012)

Gray, John, *Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia* (London, NY, and Toronto: Penguin, 2007)

Greeley, Andre M., *Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium: A Sociological Profile* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003)

Green, Simon J.D., *Religion in the Age of Decline: Organization and Experience in Industrial Yorkshire,1870-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

Gutiérrez, Gustavo, *A Theology of Liberation* [Lima, 1971] (New York: Orbis,1973)

Haber, Honi Fern, *Beyond Postmodern Politics: Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault: Selves, Community and the Politics of Difference* (New York: Routledge, 1994)

Habermas, Jürgen, "Modernity versus Postmodernity", trans. Seyla Ben-Habib, *New German Critique*, Vol. 22 (1981): 3-14

_____, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987)

_____, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989)

_____, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere", in Craig Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1992)

_____, *The Postnational Constellation*, trans. Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001)

_____, “Faith and Knowledge”, the acceptance speech delivered on the occasion of the awarding of the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade in Frankfurt on October 14, 2001.

_____, *The Future of Human Nature* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003)

_____, “Faith and Knowledge”, in *The Future of Human Nature* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003)

_____, *The Future of Human Nature (*Cambridge: Polity, 2003)

_____, “Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism”, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 13.1 (2005): 1-28

_____, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, *European Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 14.1 (2006): 1-25

_____, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, Paper presented at The Holberg Prize Seminar, Bergen, Norway, 30 November, 2005). Available at: http://www.holbergprisen.no/images/materiell/2005_symposium_habermas.pdf# nameddest=habermas

_____, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2008)

_____, "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society*", New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (2008): 17-29

Habermas, Jürgen and Joseph Ratzinger, *The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion* (Freiburg: Ignatius Press, 2007)

Habermas, Jürgen (et al.), *An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-secular Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011)

Hall, Stuart and Bram Gieben (eds.), *Formations of Modernity* (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press in association with The Open University, 1992)

Hallward, Peter, “Translator’s Introduction”, in Alain Badiou, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, trans. with an introduction by Peter Hallward (London and NY: Verso, 2001)

Harrington, Austin, “Habermas and the ‘post-secular’ society”, *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 10.4 (2007): 543–560

Harris, Sam, *The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004)

Harvey, David, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1990)

Hassan, Ihab, “The Culture of Postmodernism”, *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol. 2.3 (1985): 119-32

Heelas, Paul, *New Age Movement* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996)

_____, “Challenge Secularization Theory: The Growth of ‘New Age’ Spiritualities of Life”, *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 8 (2006): 46-58

Heelas, Pau, Linda Woodhead, Benjamin Seel, Bronislaw Szerszynski, and Karin Tusting, *The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005)

Heisig, James W., “Christianity Today: The Transition to Disestablishment”, *Inter-religio,* Vol. 30 (1996): 63-79

Herbert, D., *Religion and Civil Society: Rethinking Public Religion in the Contemporary World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003)

Hervieu-Léger, Danièle, *La religion en mouvement: le pèlerin et le converti* [*Religion in Movement: The Pilgrim and the Converted*] (Paris: Flammarion, 1999)

_____, “In Search of Certainties: The Paradoxes of Religiosity in Societies of High Modernity”, *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 8 (Spring & Summer, 2006): 59-68

Hitchens, Cristopher, *God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything* (London: Atlantic Books, 2007)

Hoekendijk, Johannes C., *The Church Inside Out*, trans. by Issac C. Rottenberg (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966)

Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker, “Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values”, *American Sociological*

Review, Vol.65.1 (2000): 19-51

Jagodzinski, Wolfgang, and Karel Dobbelaere (eds.), *Secularization and Church Religiosity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1995)

Jameson, Frederic, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke UP, 1992)

Jenkins, Philip, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)

Joas, Hans, *The Creativity of Action*, trans. by Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996)

_____, *Do We Need Religion?: On the Experience of Self-Transcendence* (Boulder and London: Paradigm Publisher, 2008)

_____, "Society, State and Religion: Their Relationship from the Perspective of the World Religions: An Introduction", in Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (eds.), *Secularization and the World Religions* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009)

_____, "The Future of Christianity", *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 13.1 (Spring, 2011): 74-82

_____, *Faith as an Option: Possible Futures for Christianity*, trans. Alex Skinner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012)

Joas, Hans and Klaus Wiegandt (eds.), *Secularization and the World Religions* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009)

Joas, Hans and Wolfgang Knoebl, *Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)

Kang, In-Chul, "Soolyeom Hogeun Hegemony?: 1990 yondea Eehoo Gaesingyo Jihyeongui Byeonhwa" [Convergence or Hegemony?: The transformation of Protestant Topography since 1990], *Kyungjewa Sahoe [Economic and Society]*, Vol. 62 (Summer, 2004): 18-53

_____, *Hankukui Gaesingyowa Bangongjuui [Korean Protestantism and Anti-communism]* (Seoul: Jung Sim, 2006)

Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason* [Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781],

trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (NY and London: Penguin, 2007)

_____, the Critique of Practical Reason [Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788]

_____, the Metaphysics of Morals [Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 1797]

_____, the Critique of Judgment [Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790]

Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver, "Zwischenräume und Wechselwirkungen. Der Verlust der Zentralperspektive und das Christentum", *Theologie und Glaube*, Vol. 96 (2006): 309-323

_____, Zwischen Wissenschaft und Glauben: Persönliche Texte (2014)

Kaya, Ibahim, "Modernity, Openness, Interpretation: A perspective on Multiple Modernities", *Social Science Information*, Vol. 43.1, (2004): 35-57

Kepel, Gilles, *The Revenge of God: Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994)

Kesselring, Sven, "The Mobile Risk Society", in Weert Canzler, Vincent Kaufmann and Sven Kesselring (eds.), *Tracing Mobilities: Towards a Cosmopolitan Perspective* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008)

Kierkegaard, Søren, *Either–or*, Part 1 and 2, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987)

Kim, Heung-soo and Seung-tae Kim, "A History of Korean Christianity Since Liberation" in Korean Research Institute for Religion and Society (ed.) *The Yearbook of Korean Religion* (Seoul: Halimwon, 1993)

Kim, Yoon Tae, *Typologies of the Religious Market. An Economic Approach, PhD thesis* (King's College London, 2013)

Klotz, Heinrich, *Kunst im 20. Jahrhundert: Moderne—Postmoderne—Zweite Moderne* (Munich: Beck, 1994)

Knott, Kim, "Cutting through the postsecular city: A spatial interrogation", in

Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban* (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2010)

Korean Research Institute for Religion and Society (ed.) *The Yearbook of Korean Religion* (Seoul: Halimwon, 1993)

Lacan, Jacques, *Écrits: A selection,* trans. A. Sheridan (NY: Norton, 1977)

Lash, Scott, *Another Modernity: a Different Rationality* (Oxford: Wiley-VHC, 1999)

Latour, Bruno, "Is Re-modernization Occurring – And If so, How to Prove It?", *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 20.2 (2003): 35-48

Lee, Jin-Woo, *Philosophical Understanding of Postmodernism* (Seoul: Seokwangsa, 1993)

Lee, Laymond L.M., "In Search of Second Modernity: Reinterpreting Reflexive Modernization in the Context of Multiple Modernities", *Social Science Information*, Vol. 47.1 (2008): 55-69

Lee, Soo-in, *Hangukui Kugga, Simin Sahoiwa Gaesinkyoui Jeongchi Sahoijeog Teado Byundong: 1960s-1990s [State, Civil Society and the Change of Socio-political Attitude of Protestants: 1960s-1990s]*, PhD thesis (Ewha Womans University, 2002)

_____, "Gaesingyo Bosubunpaui Jeongchijeok Haengwi : Sahoehakjeok Gochal" [Political Activity of Conservative Protestant: Sociological Analysis], *KyongJe wa Sahoe [Economy and Society]*, Vol. 64 (Seoul: Winter, 2004): 265-299

Lee, Won-gyu, *Hankuk Gyohoiui Hyeonsilgwa Jeonmang [The Reality and Prospect of the Korean Church]* (Seoul: SeongSeo Yungusa, 1996)

Levinas, Emmanuel, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1978)

Lewis, Donald M. (ed.), *Christianity Reborn: The Global Expansion of Evangelicalism in the Twentieth Century* (Michigan and Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2004)

Liedman, Sven-Eric, “Intellectual Challenges from Religion”, in Lisbet Christoffersen, Hans Raun Iversen, Hanne Petersen and Margit Warburg (eds.), *Religion in the 21st Century: Challenges and Transformations* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010)

Lilla, Mark, *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West* (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007)

Luckmann, Thomas, *The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1967)

Luhmann, Niklas, “Society, meaning, religion – based on self-reference”, *Sociological Analysis,* Vol. 46.1 (1985): 5–20

Lynch, Cecelia, “Social Movements and the Problem of Globalization”, Alternatives, Vol. 23.2 (1998): 149-173

_____, “Religious Humanitarianism and the Global Politics of Secularism”, in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism*, (Oxford and NY: Oxford University Press, 2011)

Lynch, Gordon, *Generation X* (London: Darton, 2002)

_____, *The New Spirituality: An Introduction to Progressive Belief in the Twenty-first Century* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007)

Lyotard, Jean-François, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984)

Madsen, Richard, “What Is Religion?: Categorical Reconfigurations in a Global Horizon”, in Philip S. Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society* (NY and London: New York University Press and SSRC, 2012)

Mahnkopf, Claus-Steffen, *Kritik der neuen Musik. Entwurf einer Musik des 21. Jahrhunderts* (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1998)

_____, “Neue Musik am Beginn der Zweiten Moderne”, *Merkur*, Vol. 594/595 (1998):_____

_____, “Thesen zur Zweiten Moderne”, *Musik & Ästhetik*, Vol. 36 (2005):____

_____, "Second Modernity - An Attempted Assessment", in Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf, Frank Cox, Wolfram Schurig (eds.), *Facets of the Second Modernity: New Music and Aesthetics in the 21st Century*, Vol. 6 (Hofheim: Wolke, 2008)

Mahnkopf, Claus-Steffen, Frank Cox, and Wolfram Schurig (eds.), *Facets of the Second Modernity: New Music and Aesthetics in the 21st Century*, Vol. 6 (Hofheim: Wolke, 2008)

Marion, Jean-Luc, *God without Being*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson, with a forward by David Tracy (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991)

Martin, David, *The Religious and the Secular: Studies in Secularization* (Oxford: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969)

_____, “The Evangelical Upsurge and Its Political Implication”, in Peter L. Berger (ed.), *Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999)

_____, Pentecostalism: The World Their Parish (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002)

_____, “Evangelical Expansion in Global Society”, in Donald M. Lewis (ed.), *Christianity Reborn: The Global Expansion of Evangelicalism in the Twentieth Century* (Michigan and Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2004)

_____, *On Secularization: Toward a Revised General Theory* (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2005)

_____, “Secularization and the Future of Christianity”, *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, Vol. 20.2, (2005): 154-160

_____, *The Future of Christianity: Reflection on Violence and Democracy, Religion and Secularization* (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011)

_____, *Religion and Power: No Logos without Mythos* (Farnham and

Burlington: Ashgate, 2014)

_____, *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Pentecostalism in Latin America* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990)

McCabe, Herbert, Faith within Reason (London: Continuum, 2007)

McLennan, Gregor, "Spaces of Post-secularism", in J. Beaumont, A. Molendijk and C. Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: the Religious, the Political, the Urban* (Leiden: Boston, 2010)

_____, "The Postsecular Turn", *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 27.4 (2010): 3-20

McLeod, Hugh, "Introduction", in Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf (eds.), *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, c1750-2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003)

_____, *The Religious Crisis of 1960s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

McLeod, Hugh and Werner Ustorf (eds.), *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

Mendieta, Edurado and Jonathan Vanantwerpen (eds.), *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2011)

Micklethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, *God is Back: How the Global Rise of Faith is Changing the World* (London: Allen Lane, 2009)

Midgley, Mary, *Science as Salvation: A Modern Myth and its Meaning* (London: Routledge, 1992)

Mieth, Dietmar and Britta Müller-Schauenburg (eds.), *Mystik, Recht und Freiheit: Religiöse Erfahrung und kirchliche Institutionen im Spätmittelalter* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2012)

Mohamed, Feisal G., *Milton and the Post-Secular Present: Ethics, Politics, Terrorism* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2011)

Molendijk, Arie L., "God made the Country, and Man Made the Town: Some Observations On the Place of Religion in the Western (Post)Secular City", in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin Beaumont and

Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban* (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2010)

Molendijk, Arie L., Justin Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), *Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban* (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2010)

Neuhaus, Richard John, *The Naked Public Square* (Grand Rapids and MI: Eerdmans, 1984)

Neville, R. (ed.), *Religion in Late Modernity* (Albany: Suny, 2002)

Niebuhr, H. Richard, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (Kila: Kessinger Publishing, [1929] 2004)

Noh, Chi-jun, *Hanguk Gaesingyo Sahoehak: Hanguk Gyohoeui Wigiwa Jeonmang [Korea Protestant Sociology: Crisis and Prospect of Korean Church* (Seoul: Hanul Academi, 1998)

Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)

Onfray, Michel, *Atheist Manifesto: The Case Against Christianity, Judaism, and Islam,* trans. by Jeremy Leggatt (NY: Arcade Publishing, 2007)

Park, Sung-jun, *Formation and Development of Minjung Theology* (Seoul: Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 1996)

Parsons, Talcott, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1960)

_____, "Religion in a Modern Pluralistic Society", *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 7 (Spring,1966): 125-46

_____, *Sociological Theory and Modern Society* (New York: Free Press, 1967)

_____, "Christianity", in David Sills (ed.), *The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (NY: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968)

_____, *The System of Modern Societies* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:

Prentice-Hall, 1971)

Partridge, Christopher H., *The Re-Enchantment of the West Volume 1: Alternative Spiritualities, Sacralization, Popular Culture, and Occulture* (London and New York: T. & T. Clark Publishers, 2004)

_____, *Encyclopedia of New Religions: New Religious Movements, Sects and Alternative Spiritualities* (Oxford: Lion Books, 2006)

_____, *The Re-Enchantment of the West*, *Volume 2* (London and New York: T. & T. Clark Publishers, 2006)

Paul, Saint, *The Foundation of Universalism*, tans. by Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003)

Philpott, Daniel, "The Catholic Wave", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15 (2004): 32-46

Pickel, Gert and Olaf Müller (eds.), Church and Religion in Contemporary Europe: Results from Empirical and Comparative Research (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2009)

Pocock, J.C.A., "Modernity and Anti-Modernity in the Anglophone Political Traditions", in Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *Patterns of Modernity, Vol. 1: The West* (London: Continuum International Publishing, 1987)

Polanyi, Karl, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944)

Pollack, Detlef, Säkularisierung—ein Moderner Mythos? (Tübingen: Mohr, 2003)

_____, "A Renaissance of Religion? Findings of Social Research." Osteuropa. Heft, (2009) Vol. 59.6: 29-45

_____, "Religious Conversion", in Juergensmeyer M and Anheiner HK (eds.), Encyclopedia of Global Studies (2009)

Pollack, Detlef and Daniel V. A. Olson (eds.), *The Role of Religion in Modern Societies* (London: Routledge, 2008)

Pollack, Detlef and Gert Pickel, "Religious Individualization or Secularization?: Testing Hypotheses of Religious Change – The Case of Eastern and Western Germany", *British Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 58.4

(2008): 603-632

Pollack, Detlef and Gert Pickel, "*Church-State Relations and the Vitality of Religion in European Comparison*', in Gert Pickel and Olaf Müller (eds.), *Church and Religion in Contemporary Europe*: Results from Empirical and Comparative Research (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2009)

Pollack, Detlef, Olaf Müller and Gert Pickel (eds.), *The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2012)

Pollack, Detlef, Olaf Müller and Gert Pickel, "Church and Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Analyses of the Social Significance of Religion in East and West", in Detlef Pollack, Olaf Müller and Gert Pickel (eds.), *The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2012)

Rakodi, Carole, *Understanding the Roles of Religions in Development: The approach of the RaD programme* (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2007)

_____ (ed.), *Religion, Religious Organizations and Development: Scrutinizing Religious Perceptions and Organizations* (London and NY: Routledge, 2014)

Rawls, John, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 64.3 (Summer 1997): 765–807

_____, *A Brief Inquiry into The meaning of Sin and Faith: with on my Religion*, ed. by Thomas Nagel (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2009)

Rémond, René, *Religion and Society in Modern Europe* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1999)

Rees, Martin, *Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces That Shape the Universe* (NY: Basic Books, 1999)

_____, *From Here to Infinity: A Vision for the Future of Science* (NY: W. W. Norton, 2012)

Rorty, Richard, *Philosophy and Social Hope* (Harmondworth: Penguin, 1999)

Rorty, Richard and Gianni Vattimo, *The Future of Religion*, ed. Santiago Zabala, (NY: Columbia University Press, 2005)

Rudolph, Susanne and James Piscatori (eds.), Transnational Religion and Fading States (Boulder and CO: Westview, 1997)

Ruzicka, Peter, "Zweite Moderne und Musiktheater", *Musik & Ästhetik*, Vol. 30 (2004):_____

Shah, Timothy Samuel, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft (eds.), *Rethinking Religion and World Affairs* (New York: Oxford UP, 2012)

Sider, Ronald J. and Heidi Rolland Unruh, “Typology of Religious Characteristics of Social Service and Educational Organizations and Programs”, *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, Vol. 33.1 (2004): 109-134

Sills, David (ed.), *The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (NY: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968)

Sim, Stuart (ed.), *The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism* (London and NY: Routledge, 2011)

_____, “Preface to the third edition: The Modern, the Postmodern and the Post-postmodern”, in Stuart Sim (ed.) *The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism* (London and NY: Routledge, 2011)

Sloterdijk, Peter, *God’s Zeal: The Battle of the Three Monotheisms* (Malden, MA and Cambridge: Polity, 2010)

Smith, Christian (ed.), *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism* (London: Routledge, 1996)

_____, “Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back In”, in Christian Smith (ed.), *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism* (London: Routledge, 1996)

Smith, Christian and Michael Emerson, *American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving* (Chicago IL: Chicago UP, 1998)

Stark, Rodney and Roger Finke, *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion* (Berkeley: California UP, 2000)

Stark, Rodney and William Sims Bainbridge, "Of Churches, Sects, and Cults: Preliminary Concepts for a Theory of Religious Movements", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* Vol. 18.2 (1979): 117-133

_____, *The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival and Cult Formation* (Berkeley, LA and London; University of California Press, 1992)

Stencel, Sandra (et al.), *Global Christianity: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Christian Population* (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2011)

Stichweh, Rudolf, "The History and Systematics of Functional Differentiation in Sociology", in Mathias Albert, Barry Burzan and Michael Zürn (eds.), *Bringing Sociology to International Relations: World Politics as Differentiation Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013)

Susen, Simon, "The Philosophical Significance of Binary Categories in Habermas's Discourse Ethics", *Sociological Analysis*, Vol. 3.2 (2009): 97-125

_____, "Remarks on the Concept of Critique in Habermasian Thought", *Journal of Global Ethics*, Vol. 6.2 (2010): 103-126

Tank-Storper, Sébastien, "Republicization of Religion in France", in Lisbet Christoffersen, Hans Raun Iversen, Hanne Petersen and Margit Warburg (eds.), *Religion in the 21st Century: Challenges and Transformations* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010)

Taylor, Charles, *Sources of the Self: The making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)

_____, *Sesokhwaoa Hyundeamoonmyung [Secularization and the Modern Civilization]* (Seoul: Tasan Memorial Lecture, 2002)

_____, "Religious Mobilizations", *Public Culture*, Vol. 18.2 (2006):

281-300

_____, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007)

_____, "Western Secularity", in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford and NY: Oxford UP, 2011)

The Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), *A History of Christianity in Korea Vol.III* (Seoul: The Institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, 2009)

Toft, Monica Duffy, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, *God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics* (New York and London: Norton & Company, 2011)

Touraine, Alain, *Critique of Modernity,* trans. David Macey, (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1995)

_____, "Social Transformation of the Twentieth Century", *International Social Science Journal,* Vol.50: 165-171

Trigg, Roger, *Religion in the Public life: Must Faith Be Privatized?* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007)

Troeltsch, Ernst, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches [Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen]*, trans. by Olive Wyon (Louisville and London: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992 [Tübingen, 1912])

Troeltsch, Ernst, "Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums," *Logos 1 (1910– 11)*: 165– 85

Turner, Bryan S., "Social Fluids: Metaphors and Meanings of Society", *Body & Society*, Vol. 9.1 (2003): 1-10

Turner, Tom, *City as Landscape: A Post Post-modern View of Design and Planning* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1995)

Ustorf, Werner, "Global Christianity, New Empire and Old Europe", in Frans Wijsen and Robert Schreiter (eds.), *Global Christianity Contested Claims* (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi B. V., 2007)

Vattimo, Gianni, *La fine della modernità: nichilismo ed ermeneutica nella cultura postmoderna* (Milano: Garzanti, 1985)

Vattimo, Gianni and René Girard, *Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith: A Dialogue*, ed. Pierpaolo Antonello, trans. William McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010)

Vinzent, Markus, "'Re-modernity': Overcoming the Divide of Denominations, Religions and Ideological Categories", in Jürgen Court and Michael Klöcker (eds.), *Wege und Welten der Religionen: Forschungen und Vermittlungen* (Frankfurt: Verlag Otto Lembeck, 2009): 635-645

_____, "Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion", *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, Vol. 32.2 (2011): 143–160

_____, "Salus extra ecclesiam? Meister Eckhart's Institutionenskepsis", in Dietmar Mieth and Britta Müller-Schauenburg (eds.), *Mystik, Recht und Freiheit: Religiöse Erfahrung und kirchliche Institutionen im Spätmittelalter* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2012): 158-168

Voas, David, "The Continuing Secular Transition", in Detlef Pollack and Daniel V. A. Olson (eds.), *The Role of Religion in Modern Societies* (London: Routledge, 2011)

Vries, Hent de (ed.), *Religion: Beyond the Concept* (NY: Fordham UP, 2008)

Vries, Hent de and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds.), *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World* (New York: Fordham UP, 2006)

Voas, David, "The Continuing Secular Transition", in Detlef Pollack and Daniel V. A. Olson (eds.), *The Role of Religion in Modern Societies* (London: Routledge, 2008): 25-48

Wallis, Roy, *The Elementary Forms of the New Religious Life* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984)

Ward, Graham (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology* (Malden and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005)

_____, "Introduction, 'Where We Stand'", in Graham Ward (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology* (Malden and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005)

_____, "The Future of Religion", *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 74.1 (2006): 179-186

Warner, Michael, Jonathan Van Antwerpen, and Craig Calhoun, (eds.), *Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010)

Warner, R.S., "Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in United States", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 98.5 (1993): 1044-1093

Wijsen, Frans and Robert Schreiter (eds.), *Global Christianity Contested Claims* (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi B. V., 2007)

Wallis, Ray and Steve Bruce, "Secularization: The Orthodox Model", in Steve Bruce (ed.), *Religion and Modernization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1992)

Wilson, B.R., *The Theology of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: The Free Press, 1947)

_____, *Religion in Sociological Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1982)

_____ (ed.), *Religion: Contemporary Issues: The All Souls Seminars in the Sociology of Religion* (London: Bellew, 1992)

_____, *Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969)

Wilson, B.R. and Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (London: Methuen, [1922] 1966)

Wuthnow, Robert, "Church Realities and Christian Identity in the 21st Century", *The Christian Century*, Vol. 110.16 (1993): 520-523

_____, *Christianity and Civil Society: the Contemporary Debate* (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996)

_____, *After Heaven: Spirituality in America since the 1950s*

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998)

_____, *Saving America?: Faith-based Services and the Future of Civil Society* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 2004)

Yi, Man-yol, *Hanguk Kidokkyo wa Yoksa Uisik [Korean Christianity and historical consciousness]* (Seoul: Chisik Sanupsa, 1981)

Yoon, Hyo-nyeong (et al.), *Critique on The Concept of the Subject: Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault* (Seoul: Seoul UP, 1996)

Zieberts, Hans-Georg and Ulrich Riegel (eds.), *Europe: Secular or post-secular*? (London and New Brunswick: Lit Verlag, 2008)

Žižek, Slavoj, *The Fragile Absolute: Or Why the Christian Legacy is worth Fighting for?* (London and NY: Verso, 2000)

_____, *On Belief* (London and NY: Routledge, 2001)

_____, *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003)

_____, "The Thrilling Romance of Orthodoxy", in Creston Davis, John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek, (eds.), *Theology and the Political* (Durham, NC, and London: Duke UP, 2005)

_____, *In Defense of Lost Causes* (London and NY: Verso, 2009)

_____, "Dialectical Clarity versus the Misty Conceit of Paradox", in Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, *The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?*, ed. with an introduction by Creston Davis, (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2009)

Žižek, Slavoj and John Milbank, The *Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?*, ed. with an introduction by Creston Davis, (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2009)

Zondervan, Antonius A.W., *Sociology and Sacred: An Introduction to Philip Rieff's Theory of Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005)

Newspapers, Magazines, and Articles in Media

Joh D. Boy, “What we talk about when we talk about the postsecular”, *The Immanent Frame*, 15 March, 2011, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/03/15/what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-the-postsecular/F

David Ward, “Alternative Spirituality ‘Rising Fast’”, *The Guardian*, 18 June, 2001, accessed 25 September, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/jun/18/religion.world

Bosetti, Giancarlo and Klaus Eder, “Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere”, *Eurozine* (17 August, 2006). http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-eder.en.htm

Eduardo Mendieta, “A Postsecular World Society? On the Philosophical Significance of Postsecular Consciousness and the Multicultural World Society: An Interview with Jürgen Habermas”, trans. by Matthias Fritsch, The Immanent Frame (4, 2010), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/A-Postsecular-World-Society-TIF.pdf.

Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, Paper presented at The Holberg Prize Seminar, Bergen, Norway, 30 November, 2005). http://www.holbergprisen.no/images/materiell/2005_symposium_habermas.pdf# nameddest=habermas

Ven-Eric Liedman, “The rebirth of religion and enchanting materialism” http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-04-01-liedman-en.html#footNoteNUM20

Prof. Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, “Modern Science and Religion: Are They Mutually Exclusive?”, 24 Oct 2012 http://www.germaninnovation.org/news-and-events/podcasts?year=2012&speaker=2ec3446c-6c0e-e211-ae88-000c29e5517f#sthash.Slv3Zllm.dpuf

Naomi Schaefer Riley, “Interfaith Unions: A Mixed Blessing”, The New York

Times, 5 April 2013
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/06/opinion/interfaith-marriages-a-mixed-blessing.html.

Office for National Statistics, “Trends in civil and religious marriages, 1966-2011”
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/vsob1/marriages-in-england-and-wales--provisional-/2011/sty-marriages.html

“Campaign bids to end poverty trap”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4234811.stm

“Taizé”, BBC, 08 October 2009
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/priests/taize_1.shtml,

“Transformation”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transformation_(genetics)

Homepage

http://www.pewresearch.org/

http://leeabbey.org.uk/

http://iona.org.uk/

http://www.scargillmovement.org/

http://www.othona.org/;

http://www.corrymeela.org/

http://www.taize.fr/

http://www.bruderhof.com/

http://www.klosterkirchberg.de/

http://www.labri.org/

http://www.oxfam.org.uk/

http://togetherforthecommongood.co.uk/home.html

http://www.christianaid.org.uk/

http://www.makepovertyhistory.org/takeaction/; http://jubileedebt.org.uk/

“Beyond Belief” conference website at www.beyondbelief2006.org